Executive Summary
While most of Washington looked at the deepening political crisis surrounding Hillary Clinton’s campaign for president, there appeared to be problems with the Saudi led campaign of aggression against Yemen.
The Monitor Analysis also looks at the evolving campaign and how Saudi Arabia and its allies will continue the effort, along with US support including potential selective usage of the Special Forces of several nations in order to create better opportunity for a negotiated lasting cease fire.
Think Tanks Activity Summary
The CSIS looks at the growing chaos in American foreign policy. They worry, “the United States has no clear strategy for dealing with Russia and Asia and is reacting tactically to the immediate pressures of events in the Middle East and Afghanistan without any clear goals or direction. Worse, these military tactical reactions are steadily more decoupled from the need to create an integrated civil-military strategy: Grab any short-term form of “win” and ignore the need to “hold” and build.”
The Washington Institute looks at one of King Salman’s younger sons, Prince Muhammad, who was appointed defense minister in January and sees the current events in Yemen as defining his future – as well as the king’s. They conclude, “Many observers were surprised when MbS (Prince Muhammad) rocketed to prominence in January rather than his half-brother Prince Faisal bin Salman, who instead was appointed governor of Medina province. Faisal’s 2003 book, based on his Oxford doctoral dissertation about Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, was an obvious credential for taking on a foreign policy role in his father’s court. Instead, while the Yemen intervention remains popular at home, the outside world watches as a young novice struggles to win respect in a conflict whose previous episodes have seldom produced a clear result, and which is increasingly seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran…If that does not happen in Saudi Arabia, then King Salman may find himself under pressure from senior princes seeking more fundamental change.”
The CSIS also looks at the Saudi led campaign in Yemen and the long term chance of success. They conclude, “In short, the key lesson of Yemen – and it is scarcely unique – is the need to either find broader solutions to dealing with failed states, or accept the fact that military action alone can only achieve limited and temporary objectives. The strategic challenges of warfare in failed states must either address the broader reasons for those failures, or run a critical risk of becoming failed wars.”
The Carnegie Endowment looks at how Saudi foreign policy is a counter to the growth of democracy in the world. They note, “Although Saudi Arabia is not a revolutionary power bent on exporting its brand of authoritarian governance, its foreign policy is counterdemocratic in effect. Within the region, Saudi money and influence have been used to block the ascendance of groups that the royal family deems a threat to its security at home. The Saudi regional strategy is rooted in the monarchy’s view of the 2011 uprisings not as the Arab Spring but as the Arab Troubles—upheavals that brought sectarian strife, Iranian expansionism, newfound prominence for the Muslim Brothers, and fresh strains of jihadism such as the one that drives the Islamic State.
A key target of Saudi interference has been the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood…A desire to prevent a repeat of this scenario has factored heavily into Saudi Arabia’s post-2011 policies toward the Brotherhood.
The Carnegie Endowment looks at the changing political scene in Egypt since the Arab Spring. They note, “Egypt’s political scene in 2015 is nearly the opposite of what it was in 2011–2012. The Islamist parties that made the strongest showing in the votes held between November 2011 and January 2012 have been sidelined. Nationalist figures, including some from the Mubarak era who were mostly absent in 2011 and 2012, have retaken center stage. The public spaces used in the past for mobilization, especially by secular opposition movements, have been constricted to a large degree. And a new electoral law has stunted the growth of political parties. The most obvious difference is that the previously dominant Islamist parties have been either outlawed or greatly weakened in terms of their ability to garner public support and funding. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, which headed a small coalition that won nearly half of the seats in the two houses of parliament during the last election, was banned in August 2014, thirteen months after Morsi’s removal and nine months after the Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization by the interim military-backed government.”
The Heritage Foundation looks at the Congress/Obama deal regarding the Iranian nuclear deal. They note, “The Obama Administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action makes clear that the United States will be left with a risky deal that will not halt Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, but only slow the pace of its advance temporarily, while allowing Iran to stage a nuclear breakout from a much-improved position after restrictions on uranium enrichment expire in 10 years to 15 years. Iran is allowed to maintain more than 6,000 operational centrifuges for 10 years, after which it will be free to build a much bigger program that will greatly shorten the time it needs for a nuclear breakout. Despite six U.N. Security Council Resolutions that called for a halt in its enrichment efforts, the Administration has essentially accepted Iran’s self-proclaimed “right” to enrich uranium. Since the global market provides more than enough enriched-uranium fuel for civilian nuclear reactors at much lower prices than Iran can produce it, Iran’s claim that its enrichment efforts are due to necessity is suspicious at best.”
The Washington Institute looks at quotes from Iranian leaders on their foreign policy goals. Each year, the director of national intelligence presents Congress with a “Worldwide Threat Assessment” detailing the range of security threats to the United States, with the latest edition released this February. The Washington Institute compiles a list of quotes from past and present assessments discussing Iran’s regional posture and the role of its proxies.
The Center for Security Policy looks at the current story about Hillary Clinton. There is a growing controversy about foreign payments (some from Middle Eastern nations) to the Clintons while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State. Since she is the current favorite for America’s next president, this scandal could have a major impact on the 2016 presidential elections. According to the Center, “Most press stories on the Schweizer book have focused on the impropriety of the Clinton Foundation taking large foreign donations while Clinton was Secretary of State and how those donations may have influenced U.S. foreign policy…A more troubling angle in the Clinton Foundation scandal surfaced over the last few days: that foreign donations to the foundation may have put U.S. national security at risk. According to an article in today’s New York Times, some of these contributions involve Uranium One, a Canadian uranium mining company that was taken over by the Rosatom, the Russian atomic energy agency. The Uranium One takeover gave Russia control of one-fifth of U.S. uranium production and advanced Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal of controlling most of the global uranium supply chain.”
ANALYSIS
Yemen Conflict – Saudi Arabia Backs off, America Steps Up
This week, Saudi Arabia and its “Sunni” and GCC allies announced they were ceasing their air operations against rebels in Yemen. On Tuesday, Saudi forces announced that they had achieved their objectives over the course of Operation Decisive Storm and it would be winding down. But while that operation was ending, Saudi commanders revealed that a new phase of combat operations in Yemen set to commence the next day.
The stated reason for stopping the air war was that it has achieved its objectives and had eliminated the threat the Houthi rebels had posed to Saudi Arabia. Yemeni security officials revealed this week that forces loyal to the nation’s president-in-exile have regained partial control of that country’s coastline.
“Anti-Houthi coalition airstrikes in Yemen removed any threat posed to Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries, the Kingdom’s ministry of defense said on Tuesday,” The Saudi-owned news organization Al Arabiya reported. “Sorties reportedly targeted and destroyed ballistic missiles operated by Houthis and militias loyal to deposed leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, a statement said.”
However, it was obvious that the political price for continuing the air operations had grown. According to the World Health Organization, more than 900 people have died in Yemen since the Saudi led aerial campaign against Yemen began on March 25th. In addition, one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) Yemenis have been displaced and the number of people lacking food has increased to more than twelve million, 12,000,000. Yemen imports more than 90% of its food—prices for basic food items have soared and there are widespread shortages. In Aden, most of the city inhabiotants of more than five hundred thousand has no access to water. Across the country, supplies of gasoline and gas have been exhausted. Hospitals, which were already struggling to cope with a lack of medicine and supplies, now have little or no fuel left to run their generators. Those patients in Yemen’s Intensive Care Units will likely die as their life saving machines are idled due to a lack of electricity.
Clearly, the air operations were ineffective as the Monitor had predicted a few weeks ago. It is a maxim of war that while air power can destroy, it is the infantryman that must occupy the ground and secure a military and political victory.
Ironically, the failure was even starker when one considers that the military air operations were playing to the GCC’s strengths. It employed the GCC air forces, which are modern and well trained. It also made good use of the American logistics train, which provided it with enough munitions to continue the air offensive without seriously depleting their war reserves.
This failure to win a clear victory result required a new military operation that would meet the political goals of the GCC without the massive manpower investment that a ground invasion of Yemen would entail – something that the 1960s Egyptian intervention of Yemen proved.
The Saudi coalition revealed that a new phase of the war in Yemen dubbed “Operation Restoring Hope” began last Wednesday. The new mission will reportedly prioritize civilian life and include a diplomatic component while continuing to execute combat operations against rebels.
The scope of these new military operations is unknown. However, they probably include support of indigenous forces to take the fight to the Houthi.
While the Saudi 10th Mechanized Brigade is deployed near the border with Yemen, any military activity by the Saudi Army will probably be limited to their special forces. The Saudi Special Forces consist of three companies that have the equipment and training to fight rebels.
The problem is that Saudi and GCC special forces units are much less effective than NATO Special Forces like the Green Berets, SEALS, or SAS. Saudi Special Forces undergo a basic military training that lasts three months, followed by another month of basic security training and an additional specialization that can last for anything from two to seven months. That is no more than the average training given to the average NATO soldier. Western Special Forces soldiers undergo two to three years of rigorous training before being deployed.
If the coalition forces are relying on these forces to push back and defeat the Houthi rebels, they are very likely to fail. This indicates that the Saudis and their allies are relying on Western nations to provide their more highly trained forces to fight the rebels.
One scenario been advance by Military analysts’ close the Pentagon thinking is to rely on US Special Forces for variety of tasks especially since they were stationed in Yemen and it’s likely that many of them are or will be deployed in Saudi Arabia to assist the coalition.
The first step will be to train the Saudis and other GCC special forces specifically in guerilla warfare and training indigenous forces. Since US forces have worked with Yemeni personnel and operated in Yemen, they are highly qualified to do this training.
While training the coalition forces, American SF personnel will infiltrate into Yemen and reestablish contacts that were severed when they were forced to withdraw just before the fall of the capitol. They will be able to assess the level of resistance to the rebels, the level of motivation to carry out attacks on the guerillas, and the quality of the indigenous forces that could be used against the Houthi.
Depending on the results of this incursion, the US Special Forces will begin training of Yemeni forces and help in pinprick attacks against the rebels. As the Saudi and GCC forces complete their training, they will be infiltrated into Yemen to expand the campaign.
Targets in these operations will be key Houthi commanders, supply lines and logistics bases. More conventional operations will have to wait until enough Yemeni forces are trained and equipped to form a credible conventional force under the command of the Yemeni president-in-exile.
The US Navy Moves
The nature of these covert operations explain the movement of American naval assets this week and their currently ambiguous mission.
An American carrier task force is moving into the area and it appears that they are prepared to intercept an Iranian convoy that is believed to be transporting weapons to the rebel Houthi. The Iranian convoy of freighters is escorted by warships from the Iranian military and Revolutionary Guard forces – which indicates that the Iranians are prepared to confront the US force if necessary. (Some news reports suggested withdrawal of Iranian convoy from the area)
The deployment comes after a U.N. Security Council resolution approved last week imposed an arms embargo on rebel leaders. The resolution passed in a 14-0 vote with Russia abstaining.
What’s unusual about the Iranian deployment is that the Iranians are not trying to conceal it, US officials said. Instead, they appear to be trying to “communicate it” to the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf.
The question is, “Why Iran is making the brazen move?” One theory is that the Saudi-led coalition has effectively blockaded any air routes into Yemen and there are no other ways to resupply the Houthi.
Another theory is that Iran is trying to distract the coalition from another ship it has tried hard to conceal that is currently docked at Oman — a potential land route for smuggling arms into Yemen.
Yet another theory is that Iran wants to force a confrontation with Saudi Arabia that it believes it will win, because Iran views the Saudi military as weak and suspects the U.S. lacks the willpower to support its Gulf ally. This theory is reinforced by comments by US officials that the US naval task force has no intention of intercepting and boarding Iranian ships.
It’s possible that Iran thinks Obama is so heavily invested now in the success of the Iranian nuclear agreement that he wouldn’t dare risk the deal by confronting them with military force.
Another possibility is that Obama fears a major military conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran at this point and is calculating that Iran’s navy will be less likely to do something rash if there’s a U.S. carrier group nearby to defend Saudi interests.
By stationing the US naval task force nearby, the hope is that it will keep Saudi and Iranian forces from coming face to face.
There is another possibility. US aircraft carriers have been frequently used as a base for major Special Forces operations (as was seen in 2002 in Afghanistan). Even if the carrier task force doesn’t directly confront the Iranian fleet, it is well positioned to carry out operations to support US, NATO, or GCC Special Forces operations. This would allow the US and members of the coalition to counter Iran and the Houthi rebels without creating a direct confrontation with Iran.
The US knows that the Houthi control little of the coastline, which means any attempt to resupply the rebels by sea is risky. With US assets, including Special Forces based in Saudi Arabia, the US can track any weapons movement and inform either allied Special Forces or rebels supporting the (resigned) Yemeni president to move in and attack the weapons shipment at or near the landing place. Such an attack would be just as successful and wouldn’t involve the politically risky move of intercepting and boarding Iranian flagged vessels.
The carrier task force would also be able to carry out air attacks in remote locations along the Oman/Yemen border, if Iran decides to move munitions along that route.
What’s next for Yemen?
By concluding Operation Decisive Storm, the Saudi led coalition has made it clear that they can’t win merely through overwhelming air superiority and that land operations are necessary either for a military or political resolution.
By not bringing in large land forces from a country like Pakistan, it is clear that the focus will be on a Special Forces backed insurgency, much like that used successfully by the US in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Special Forces will train insurgents and help them carry out targeted attacks against command personnel, supply routes, and logistical hubs. These will be supported by nearby American assets like the US Navy.
The plan according to some experts in Washington is to wear out the Houthi rebels and their Iranian backers with the hope they will seek a political solution. At the same time, the harassment will prevent the Houthi from instigating any guerilla attacks across the border into Saudi Arabia.
PUBLICATIONS
Senate’s Iran Nuclear Bill Misses the Point
By Michaela Dodge, Steven Groves, and James Phillips
Heritage Foundation
April 16, 2015
Issue Brief #4387
Two days ago, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) unanimously passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, a bill that attempts to bolster the congressional role in the Obama Administration’s negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. While the effort is well intentioned, the bill sets up Congress to allow the Administration to act as if it had congressional approval while a substantive oversight of the agreement is lacking. The bill paves a path to lifting sanctions and congressional approval of what has emerged as a flawed and dubious deal with a notoriously untrustworthy regime. The bill allows the Obama Administration’s future agreement with the Iranian leaders to go forward unless it is disapproved by enactment of a new law. To halt a bad agreement then, Congress would need to pass a joint resolution disapproving the agreement, which the President could then veto, as a result of which it would not become law unless two-thirds of both Houses of Congress vote to override the veto.
America’s Failed Approach to Chaos Theory
The Complexity Crisis in US Strategy
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Center for Strategic and International Studies
April 16, 2015
The United States now faces a rapidly evolving world filled with new challenges at a time when real-world defense planning is focused on budget cuts, when U.S. “strategy” lacks plans and program budgets, and when talk of strategic partnership lacks clear and specific direction. Far too much U.S. strategic rhetoric is a hollow shell, while the real U.S. national security posture is based on suboptimizing the budget around the fiscal ceilings set by the Budget Control Act (BCA), persisting in issuing empty concepts and strategic rhetoric, and dealing with immediate problems out of any broader strategic context. The end result resembles an exercise in chaos theory. Once one looks beyond the conceptual rhetoric, the reality is a steadily less coordinated set of reactions to each ongoing or new crisis: the strategic equivalent of the “butterfly effect.” To paraphrase Edward Lorenz, the chaos theorist who coined the term, “the present state determines a series of changes and uncertain adjustments in U.S. force postures and military actions in spite of the fact the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.
Yemen and Warfare in Failed States
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Center for Strategic and International Studies
April 22, 2015
It is still unclear what the end of the Saudi-led air campaign that made up “Operation Decisive Storm” or “Determined Storm” really means. The shift to a campaign called “Operation Hope Restore” would seem to emphasize some form of political settlement and effort to deal with the humanitarian crisis caused by Yemen’s civil war, the air campaign, and the deployment of naval forces, but this is still unclear. This raises far broader strategic issues than the immediate nature of military intervention in Yemen. It illustrates far broader strategic problems in fighting counterinsurgency and other military campaigns in failed states. No campaign can succeed that does not blend military action with some form of effective stability operations bordering on nation building. This is a challenge that goes far beyond Yemen and that every headline shows is just as real in cases like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Egypt’s Nationalists Dominate in a Politics-Free Zone
By Michele Dunne
Carnegie Endowment
April 15, 2015
Egypt’s political scene has changed radically from the vigorous pluralism that followed the 2011 uprising; in 2015 the Islamist and secular groups that won those elections are excluded or marginalized. Nationalists associated with the military or former regime of Hosni Mubarak have retaken center stage, and rivalries within that camp have reemerged. Any parliament elected under such conditions is likely to be fractious—despite the lack of real pluralism—and might have difficulty fulfilling its constitutionally mandated role.
The Authoritarian Resurgence: Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats
By Frederic Wehrey
Carnegie Endowment
April 15, 2015
Journal of Democracy
One of the world’s last remaining bastions of absolute monarchy, the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursues throughout the broader Middle East and beyond an activist foreign policy that is largely nonideological, realist, and defensive in intent, but negative in its implications for democracy. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia has intervened in a number of transitioning states with the aim of countering the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi jihadism as embodied by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the intent of such interference may not be explicitly antidemocratic, many of the recipients of Saudi support have been authoritarian and antiliberal. The ultimate effect has been damaging to the spread of democratization and political pluralism.
Saudi Arabia’s ‘Inexperienced Youngster’
By Simon Henderson
Washington Institute
April 21, 2015
PolicyWatch 2412
Earlier today, Saudi Arabia announced that it has ended its airstrikes in Yemen because the heavy weapons and ballistic missiles threatening the kingdom have been destroyed. The fighting had appeared to be stalemated for at least the past two weeks. Although the announced outcome is being depicted as a military success, it is unclear how it fits into a Saudi strategy to reinstate the government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, currently in exile in Riyadh, though the statement spoke of a political solution. A key Saudi decisionmaker on the matter is one of King Salman’s younger sons, Prince Muhammad, who was appointed defense minister in January. The outcome of the crisis, which saw the deployment of Saudi naval and army units, could make or break his career and perhaps even define his father’s legacy.
Changing Iran Trends in the Worldwide Threat Assessment
By Marina Shalabi and Ian Duff
April 14, 2015
PolicyWatch 2410
Each year, the director of national intelligence presents Congress with a “Worldwide Threat Assessment” detailing the range of security threats to the United States, with the latest edition released this February. Below is a list of quotes from past and present assessments discussing Iran’s regional posture and the role of its proxies. “In the Middle East, Iran and its neighbors see a strategic shift: Iran’s influence is rising in ways that go beyond the menace of its nuclear program. The fall of the Taliban and Saddam, increased oil revenues, HAMAS’s electoral victory, and Hizballah’s perceived recent success in fighting against Israel all extend Iran’s shadow in the region.” “Iran remains a threat to regional stability and US interests in the Middle East…Tehran’s leadership seeks to preserve Iran’s Islamic revolutionary government, sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity while expanding Iran’s influence and leadership in the region and the Islamic world.”
Did the Clintons’ Greed Endanger U.S. National Security?
By Fred Fleitz
Center for Security Policy
April 23, 2015
Although Peter Schweizer’s new book “Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich” will not hit bookstores until May 5, it has already set off a firestorm of controversy that foreign governments bought influence with the Clintons – including when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State – by contributing millions of dollars to the Clinton Foundation and paying the Clintons millions in speaking fees. Bill Clinton, according to Schweizer, earned $48 million in speaking fees while Mrs. Clinton was Secretary of State. Although Hillary Clinton claimed she and her husband were “dead broke” in 2000, their current net worth is estimated between $100 million and $200 million.
