SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, PUBLICATIONS, AND ARTICLES
Think Tanks Activity Summary
(For further details, scroll down to the PUBLICATIONS section)
The Heritage Foundation looks at Ian’s saber rattling over the Persian Gulf. They note, “Protecting shipping through the strait would not be easy. Iran boasts of having a large arsenal of anti-ship missiles, based on Russian and Chinese designs, that pose significant threats to civilian oil tankers as well as to warships. Shore-based missiles deployed along Iran’s coast would be augmented by aircraft-delivered laser-guided bombs and missiles, as well as by television-guided bombs. Iran also has anti-ship mines, including modern mines that are far superior to the simple World War I-style contact mines that it used in the 1980s. The mines could be deployed by Iran’s three Kilo-class submarines, various mini-submarines, helicopters, or small boats disguised as fishing vessels. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval forces have developed swarming tactics using fast attack boats and could deploy naval commandos trained to attack using small boats, mini-submarines, and even Jet Ski-type watercraft.”
The Cato Institute argues that the late Senator McCain was too pro-war, which had a major impact on US policy. They conclude, “McCain has been lauded as a foreign-policy giant by more than his usual press advocates. However, he invariably chose the most confrontational position, and it usually didn’t end well. Other than reconciliation with Vietnam, foreign-policy successes are few and far between. He was too slow to recognize the inherent limits on the ability of a country, even a superpower, to pressure others. Nor did he adequately consider the costs to Americans, who funded and implemented his preferred policies. Celebrate McCain’s courage and fortitude. But reject his foreign policy. There is no better way to commemorate the life of yet another American serviceman who suffered in an unnecessary, counterproductive war.”
The Foreign Policy Research Institute argues that American foreign policy has changed, even if Trump hadn’t won. The author says, “I believe that even if a future president is personally committed to a robust U.S. role in the international system, there are trends at work which will contribute to domestic political pressure for American retrenchment and even a partial withdrawal from our current posture of forward engagement. First, there is the ongoing shifts in how force is deployed in both its conventional and non-conventional means. Changes in technology—advances in artificial intelligence, drones, and cyber capabilities among them—are undermining the post-Cold War advantages that the United States has enjoyed in being able to project power far beyond its shores. We are moving from a 1990s paradigm where an American carrier battle group could be sent to distant shores at low risk of casualties (for Americans) and a high chance of achieving success to a situation where the expensive behemoths of U.S. conventional military might be subject both to low-cost defensive measures and relatively cheap unconventional assaults. Today, a bevy of anti-ship missiles that cost $50,000 each to produce and which have a longer range than carrier-based aircraft have a high probability of sending a billion-dollar ship to Davy Jones’ locker, while teams of wage-salary hackers stand a good chance to being able to blind, confuse, disrupt, or even shut down vital systems essential to American military operations. Conventional defense, particularly in the realm of anti-access/area denial (in other words, keeping someone else out of your immediate back yard) is becoming cheaper and more accessible to more powers, in the same way that unconventional offense, especially in the cyber realm, is available to a much wider array of players.”
The Carnegie Endowment looks at the new Arab world order. They conclude, “The Trump administration has struggled to manage these new realities. Trump’s sudden policy changes and the wildly incoherent messaging that is coming from different parts of the U.S. government are confusing allies and adversaries alike. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may like Trump’s harder line on Iran and his support for the war in Yemen, but other policies, such as Washington’s pressure on them to end the blockade of Qatar, its demands for them to increase oil production, and the signals of its intention to pull out of Syria, have generated new frustrations. Still, Trump’s chaotic administration should not distract from the deeper structural realities, which would have presented a challenge to any U.S. president. The United States no longer has the power or the standing to impose a regional order on its own terms. In all likelihood, U.S. hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.”
The CSIS looks at the problems of providing aid to Yemen. They note, “Aid organizations struggle to meet the staggering humanitarian needs in Yemen, but they increasingly are grappling with how aid delivery can complicate or even prolong a humanitarian crisis in the midst of war. Armies, militias, and war profiteers instrumentalize aid to enhance their own interests, either indifferent or hostile to the interests of civilian populations. Aid providers are not always well-situated to understand how their actions affect broader conflicts, but they understand that they do. While they resist privileging peacemaking over urgent relief, they also are eager to ensure their actions do not draw out the war and the suffering that flows from it.”
The Heritage Foundation argues that Iran can’t shield itself from US sanctions despite the EU’s actions. They note, “The EU would abort its pushback against U.S. sanctions if Iran decides to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear agreement. Such a decision would lead European states to re-impose their own Iran sanctions. On May 23 Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gave Iranian President Hassan Rouhani permission to negotiate with the EU to gain protection from U.S. sanctions. But he set several onerous conditions for staying in the nuclear agreement. Khamenei insisted that the EU: compensate Tehran for oil revenue lost due to U.S. sanctions; guarantee that European banks will continue financing bilateral trade with Iran, and not raise the issue of Iran’s ballistic missiles or it regional interventions. He even stipulated that the Europeans must vote for a UN Security Council resolution criticizing Washington for withdrawing from the JCPOA. It is hard to believe that European leaders, who resent being told what to do by the United States, will swallow these conditions laid down by a theocratic dictator.”
Syria, American Policy, and Assassination
The questions concerning American policy towards Syria got a boost with the newest book by Bob Woodward, “Fear.”
According to Woodward, Trump wanted to have the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, assassinated last year but his defense secretary ignored the request. According to the book, Trump told the defense secretary, Jim Mattis that he wanted to have president Assad assassinated after it was alleged that the Syrian president launched a chemical attack on civilians in April 2017. “Let’s fucking kill him! Let’s go in. Let’s kill the fucking lot of them,” Trump said, according to Woodward.
Mattis told Trump he would “get right on it” but instead developed a plan for a limited air strike that did not threaten President Assad personally.
However, before taking the book’s report as the unvarnished truth, remember that previous Woodward books have had serious questions raised about the truthfulness of some of Woodward’s sources. It’s also important to remember that Trump has a tendency to make exaggerated claims or statements, and outbursts that may not reflect US policy or even Trump’s thinking in a more serious moment.
However, there is no doubt that there is some difference of opinion in terms of Syrian policy. During the campaign, Trump insisted that the US defeat ISIS and then quickly leave Syria, which put him at odds with the powerful Senator McCain (who died last week). And, although ISIS is no longer a threat, there is a considerable American presence in Northeast Syria.
Although the most vocal advocate of regime change in Syria, Senator John McCain, is dead (which will probably have a major impact on Syrian policy in the near future), there are still many in Washington and the Trump Administration that favor ridding the region of President Assad. One such official is John Bolton, the president’s National Security Advisor.
However, he isn’t the only one.
In 2013, top Obama Administration officials described their policy in the Syrian War as one of keeping the war going. The administration wanted a say in terms of the final political settlement.
The Trump Administration seems to be slipping into that same policy priorities in Syria. Last week, the Washington Post quoted an unnamed Administration official as saying that “right now, our job is to help create quagmires (for Russia and the Syrian regime) until we get what we want.”
Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said the UN Security Council would meet on Friday to discuss the precarious situation in the Idlib province. Turkey has held several rounds of talks with Syria ally Russia aimed at averting an assault on Idlib, but Moscow dubbed the region a “pocket of terrorism.”
The truth is that there are many facets to American policy towards Syria. President Trump seems to be more conciliatory and willing to accept that president Assad remains in charge of Syria.
However, there are many who see any role for President Assad in a post war Syria as a failure of their policy. National Security Advisor Bolton, the late Senator McCain, Republican “Neocons,” and many in the Obama Administration fall into this camp.
Another camp sees the Syrian war as a continuation of the conflict with Putin and Russia. To them, allowing President Assad to remain in power is to give Russia more influence in the region.
On the opposite side of the argument are those who see an Assad win as a victory for Iran and its allies in the region. This side includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
There are also those who don’t mind an Assad controlled Syria, as long as the Kurds get some sort of self-autonomy region as a protectorate of US. Many in the US military are in this camp as the Kurds have been loyal US allies for decades.
The current concern is with Russia’s military assistance of Syria in ridding the Idlib region of all armed groups that opposing the government. On Labor Day, Trump Twittered, “President Bashar al-Assad of Syria must not recklessly attack Idlib Province. The Russians and Iranians would be making a grave humanitarian mistake to take part in the potential human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of people could be killed. Don’t let that happen.”
Last Friday Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also issued a statement ahead of the imminent Syrian and Russian campaign to liberate Idlib from rebel control. Pompeo said via Twitter: “The 3 million Syrians, who have already been forced out of their homes and are now in Idlib, will suffer from this aggression. Not good. The world is watching.”
Ironically, the US claimed this region was rife with ISIS militants and had few problems with attacks just last year.
The US versus Russia
The anti-Russian elements in Washington are gearing up for a possible US-Damascus-Russia confrontation in response to Assad’s military action in Idlib. This has gone so far as to claim that Syria is planning another chemical weapons attack, even though CW is traditionally the weapon of the losing side.
On Tuesday after learning that the Russian had begun bombing Idlib province, the White House issued a statement saying that it will, “Respond swiftly and appropriately,” if Syrian government forces used chemical weapons.
“Let us be clear, it remains our firm stance that if President Bashar al-Assad chooses to again use chemical weapons, the United States and its Allies will respond swiftly and appropriately.”
UN Ambassador Haley added: “What you are seeing is the president saying to Iran, Russia and Assad ‘don’t go there…’ Do not let a chemical attack happen on the people of Idlib.”
One proof that Russia and Syria are prepared for some sort of US response is the addition of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons to the Russian arsenal in and around Syria. Since none of the rebels have submarines, this is obviously to counter the American fleet in the Mediterranean.
On Septenber 1st, two Tu-142MK maritime reconnaissance and ASW aircraft arrived in Hmeimim, Syria from Russia. They had been escorted by Su-35 fighter aircraft.
Hmeimim is the base where most Russian aircraft operate out of.
The two aircraft are expected to assist the Russian Navy in exercises off the coast of Syria. This is the largest naval armada since the Syrian war according to the Russian defense ministry. It includes 25 warships led by the Marshall Ustinov missile cruiser and 30 aircraft.
Clearly, Russia is making it clear that an American cruise missile attack against Syria can be met with force.
This is a major Russian presence and is larger than the permanently stationed US Fleet in the Mediterranean. If the US intends to act against Syria in the face of this Russian maritime presence it will have to call upon naval assets in the Arabian Sea and the US Second Fleet.
Can this Russian fleet counter any American actions? It depends.
Today’s Russian Navy is quite different from that of the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet fleet, which was designed to sortie out and deliver massive missile barrages against NATO ships, the new Russian fleet is designed to stay on station longer. The ships also have more advanced defense systems than before.
The one exception to this is the Russian cruiser Marshall Ustinov, which was built during the Cold War. It can fire a massive volley of missiles and has the major offensive capability of the Russian fleet off Syria.
Unlike the Marshall Ustinov, the Russian warships off Syria are predominately destroyers, frigates, and light warships that can carry out ASW operations and provide air defense.
The problem for the Russian task force is that it has limited effective defense against American aircraft carriers. Although American carriers are rarely stationed in the Mediterranean now, they are capable of launching attacks against ships off the Syrian coast from the Arabian Gulf or the Red Sea. There are also the NATO aircraft stationed on land bases around the region.
Which brings us back to the question, is the US willing to assassinate President Assad?
According to many experts here in Washington and previous US officials, assassination has never been a successful US strategy from the aborted attempts against Castro to the forays into Libya and Iraq, which ended in the death of the national leadership and the nations’ decent into anarchy and civil war.
A military analyst asked about the matter responded: “Syria is clearly a nation where the assassination of president Assad would lead to a major war, threatened the unity of Syria, and probably the spread of chaos into neighboring nations”.
He added:”The assassination of President Assad might very well solidify the alliance between Russia and Iran”.
From US point of view, doing nothing insures that Russia and Iran will part ways.
Considering the fact that the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey are already engaged in the current conflicts throughout the region, killing Assad will only lead to more problems, not less.
With McCain’s death and his replacement by less vocal Senator Jon Kyle, the strong push for involvement in Syria will probably die down. This will give Trump a chance to reconsider his position during the campaign of deescalating the conflict in Syria.
In that case, Trump’s comments about killing president Assad may be seen more as an expression of frustration than a change in US policy.
Iran’s Saber Rattling on Persian Gulf Likely to Rattle World Oil Markets
By James Phillips
Aug 28, 2018
The commander of the navy of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Gen. Alireza Tangsiri, warned on Monday that Iran maintained control of the Persian Gulf and that the U.S. Navy did not belong there. Tangsiri said Iran had full control of the gulf, as well as of the Strait of Hormuz, which leads into it. “We can ensure the security of the Persian Gulf, and there is no need for the presence of aliens like the U.S. and the countries whose home is not in here,” he said. Although it is not clear what he meant by “control,” Iran’s Islamist dictatorship long has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if it is attacked or unable to export its own oil through the strait. The Trump administration seeks to cut Iran’s oil exports to zero through sanctions that are slated to take effect in November, but it is unlikely to reach that goal owing to continued imports of Iranian oil by China and other countries that reject the U.S. sanctions.
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Iran’s Economy Can’t be Shielded from U.S. Sanctions
By James Phillips
Aug 21, 2018
EU efforts to protect Iran from U.S. sanctions are doomed to fail, but could help undermine the effectiveness of sanctions. The EU is trying to salvage the Iran nuclear deal by assembling a package of economic incentives to induce Iran to remain in the nuclear agreement. On June 6, the European Commission updated its Blocking Statute to prohibit EU firms from complying with American sanctions and protect European companies trading with Iran from secondary sanctions imposed by Washington. The updated Blocking Statute, which entered into force on August 7, allows EU companies to recover damages arising from U.S. extraterritorial sanctions from the persons causing them and nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court rulings based on them. It also forbids EU persons from complying with those sanctions, unless authorized to do so by the European Commission But individual companies are more likely to avoid doing business with Iran than invoke this protective measure. U.S. sanctions will force them to choose between conducting business with the United States, the world’s largest market, or with the much smaller Iranian market. Total, Maersk, Siemens and other major European companies already have signaled that they will pull back from Iran.
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Aid and Conflict: Pitfalls in Yemen
By Jon B. Alterman
Center for Strategic and International Studies
August 16, 2018
Aid organizations struggle to meet the staggering humanitarian needs in Yemen, but they increasingly are grappling with how aid delivery can complicate or even prolong a humanitarian crisis in the midst of war. Armies, militias, and war profiteers instrumentalize aid to enhance their own interests, either indifferent or hostile to the interests of civilian populations. Aid providers are not always well-situated to understand how their actions affect broader conflicts, but they understand that they do. While they resist privileging peacemaking over urgent relief, they also are eager to ensure their actions do not draw out the war and the suffering that flows from it.
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New Arab World Order
By MARC LYNCH
August 16, 2018
In 2011, millions of citizens across the Arab world took to the streets. Popular uprisings from Tunis to Cairo promised to topple autocracies and usher in democratic reforms. For a moment, it looked as if the old Middle Eastern order was coming to an end and a new and better one was taking its place. But things quickly fell apart. Some states collapsed under the pressure and devolved into civil war; others found ways to muddle through and regain control over their societies. Seven years later, those early hopes for a fundamental, positive shift in Middle Eastern politics appear to have been profoundly misplaced. But the upheaval did in fact create a new Arab order—just not the one most people expected. Although the Arab uprisings did not result in successful new democracies, they did reshape regional relations. The traditional great powers—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—are now barely functional states. Wealthy and repressive Gulf countries—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are thriving. The proliferation of failed and weakened states has created new opportunities for competition and intervention, favoring new actors and new capabilities.
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John McCain Loved the Military Too Much
By Doug Bandow
August 28, 2018
John McCain was a brave man, from the time he spent as a prisoner of war in Vietnam to his final battle against cancer. May he rest in peace. However, his public career warrants a harsher judgment, and it is worth bidding farewell to the kind of aggressive, militarized foreign policy he championed, too. McCain was an unlikely leader of the Senate’s pro-war caucus. He suffered in the Vietnam War, which was both mistakenly and incompetently waged. He presciently opposed President Ronald Reagan’s disastrous intervention in the Lebanese civil war, was sometimes skeptical of U.S. involvement in the Balkans, criticized turning Somalia into an exercise in nation building, and denounced the Clinton administration’s plans to invade Haiti. These positions suggested a focus on both America’s interests and its capabilities. However, in his last few decades in the Senate, he turned into one of its most ferocious advocates of military intervention, almost irrespective of circumstance. McCain favored aggressive war against Serbia, an endless crusade to bring democracy to Afghanistan, the disastrous invasion of Iraq, the equally counterproductive destruction of Libya, a combat role in Syria’s horrific civil war, and military aid for Saudi Arabia in its brutal aggression against Yemen. He recklessly promoted Georgia against Russia in those two countries’ short-lived war, advocated striking North Korea militarily, and sang about bombing Iran in a little ditty set to the Beach Boys’ “Barbara Ann.” He proposed creating a no-fly zone in Sudan and intervening in Nigeria against the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram. Last year, he urged the Trump administration to “choose the Kurds” over Iran and Iraq, since for decades the United States “has protected them from attacks, both from within and outside Iraq.” Ukraine was a disappointment, causing him to lament: “I do not see a military option, and that is tragic.”
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Inexorable Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy?
By Nikolas Gvesdov
Foreign Policy Research Institute
August 14, 2018
It seems to be an article of faith among many members of the U.S. foreign policy community that, whenever Donald Trump—and his administration—leaves office, a subsequent president (whether a Democrat or a non-Trumpist Republican) will push a reset button that will return the United States to its position in world affairs that it occupied in 2008 or 2016. They take reassurance in the assumption, however, that Trump’s presidency can only represent a brief aberration and that, as Lawrence Freedman notes, “When Trump ceases to be President, things should return to normal.” Leaving aside the extent to which the disruptions caused by the Trump administration will have already caused major changes in the international system, which may preclude any reset, such a perspective also seems to ignore changes which ongoing technological, demographic, economic, and military trends are likely to produce in how U.S. foreign policy is understood. Even if Trump had not been nominated and elected and Hillary Clinton, Marco Rubio, or Jeb Bush were sitting in the White House, these trends would still be at work reshaping our understanding of U.S. national interests.
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Mounzer A. Sleiman, Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor