Executive Summary
Although Washington remains focused on events in the Ukraine, it is looking more at the Middle East, especially in light of the recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to Washington and the upcoming visit of Obama to the region.
Israel’s anti-ballistic missile system was in the news this week as it was suggested that (with U.S. assistance) it could protect parts of Egypt and Jordan. The Monitor analysis looks at the Israeli battery of ABM systems, their current and future capabilities, and other ABM systems in the region.
Think Tanks Activity Summary
The American Enterprise Institute asks if Lebanon is being dragged into a new civil war. They conclude, “The growing political and security turmoil in Lebanon, however, demonstrates that US policy has largely failed and requires a reset. Hezbollah’s political power is rising while the influence of the pro-West March 14 coalition is in decline, Hezbollah’s expanding arsenal and alleged smuggling of advanced missiles from Syria risks another war with Israel, the Lebanese Armed Forces are not yet capable of maintaining security and policing the country’s borders, al Qaeda-linked groups are gaining a foothold in Sunni regions of the country, and the spillover of Syria’s sectarian conflict has pushed Lebanon to the brink of another civil war.”
The Carnegie Endowment suggests a new approach to Gulf security. One suggestion is, “Use foreign military sales (FMS) more deliberatively and selectively to both build the defense capacity of Gulf States and promote domestic reform. U.S. military sales reinforce U.S. security commitments to the Gulf on threats of mutual concern. But withholding military items, particularly those used in internal repression and high-value items that offer prestige to Gulf regimes can also signal U.S. concern about Gulf domestic policies and potentially compel Gulf regimes to enact specific reforms.”
The Washington Institute looks at what must be done to prevent a breakout by Iran after a nuclear deal is agreed upon. They note, “In any likely final agreement with Iran, a residual nuclear enrichment program, however undesirable, will likely be permitted. This will necessitate a regime to prevent Iran from breaking out of that agreement to develop nuclear weapons, or exploiting the threat of a breakout for regional intimidation. Such a regime would require three interlocking components: specific limitations on Iran’s program, in order to maximize Iran’s prospective breakout time; extensive verification, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities, inside and outside the agreement, to spot any breakout as soon as possible; and, finally, credible response scenarios should a breakout occur.”
The Washington Institute looks at Iran’s growing maritime presence and its threat to security beyond the Arabian Gulf. They note, “Iran and Syria have been working together to threaten U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean by transferring advanced arms (such as C-802 and Yakhont antiship missiles) to Hezbollah — which is developing a rudimentary maritime strike capability that may someday threaten the U.S. Aegis destroyers that constitute the seaborne leg of NATO’s missile defense architecture there. And Iran has been strengthening naval cooperation with Russia, which it sees as a potential partner in efforts to limit and constrain U.S. influence. Russian warships have made at least two port calls at Bandar Abbas since December 2012. The refueling and logistical services available there could facilitate Russian operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and the transit of ships between the Pacific fleet and the eastern Mediterranean.”
The Carnegie Endowment looks at the continuing political turmoil in Turkey. They conclude, “One wonders what future lies ahead for ordinary citizens in Turkey. They may have benefited from the country’s economic progress in recent years in the form of better highways, airports, and hospitals. But now they are worried about their economic future, the value of their currency, their individual rights, and, more importantly, harmony within their diverse society. The notion sometimes found in the press that the AKP’s core electorate values only material progress, accepts corruption as normal, and buys into conspiracy theories is not a reflection of the electorate’s wisdom. At the same time, voters have a long historical memory. They remember the 1970s and 1980s, decades of recurrent military coups, permanent high-double-digit inflation, ephemeral political coalitions, political assassinations, and corruption scandals. For many Turks, twelve years of AKP rule has meant stability, prosperity, and, simply, a better life.”
The CSIS looks at the 2015 defense budget and what it means in terms of American commitments to the Middle East. They conclude, “The fact remains, however, that U.S. strategy is not somehow tilting towards Asia at the expense of the Middle East or towards Iran at the expense of its proven allies. The United States does not plan to weaken its commitment to the Middle East, and the details reported in both its FY2015 budget submission and its QDR show that it plans major increases in the effectiveness of its air, naval, missile and missile defense forces – as well as improvement in readiness and power projection capability.”
The American Enterprise Institute looks at the Obama Administration defense budget and the number of aircraft carriers it funds. It notes that the American carrier forces are deployed in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and no carrier is kept on station in the Mediterranean, even though there is an increasing need for one. They note, “No American aircraft carrier was in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of the conflict in Libya. Nor was a US carrier in the Mediterranean when our Ambassador to Libya and three others were murdered. No American aircraft carrier was in the Mediterranean when Syria stepped over President Obama’s “red line” and attacked its own citizens with chemical weapons. And while international conventions would ordinarily limit a carrier’s presence in the Black Sea, the complete absence of one in the Mediterranean surely helped further embolden Mr. Putin in Ukraine.”
ANALYSIS
Anti Missile Defenses Proliferate in Middle East
This week, Brigadier-General John Shapland, chief defense attaché for the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, raised the idea of extending Israel’s anti-missile umbrella while speaking at a security conference in Israel. He suggested that the upgraded Israeli Arrow 3 anti ballistic missile could also protect Egypt and Jordan.
“If we were able to build a regional defense capability in, say, Jordan, that capability could easily defend Israel, Jordan and even Egypt, if you so desired, adding one more layer to your multi-layered defense,” he told Israeli officials and experts gathered at the INSS think-tank.
Although Egyptian and Jordanian officials refused to comment on the suggestion, it was positively received in Israel by the head of Israel’s missile defense organization, Yair Ramati. He said, “The policy of the (Israeli) Defense Ministry is always to cooperate with the countries of the region, including the countries cited.” Although he refused to comment, he also implied that the current Arrow 2 ABM system was already capable of providing some protection to both Egypt and Jordan.
Unclassified information on the Arrow 2’s interception range suggest that it could protect much of west Jordan, including the capital city Amman, and eastern regions of Egypt, as well as Israel and the occupied West Bank. The Arrow 3, which is scheduled for deployment by 2016, would be capable of shooting down incoming Iranian rockets over Iraq – well before they reached Jordanian or Israeli-controlled airspace.
Proliferating ABM Systems
The fact is that ABM systems are proliferating in the region. Israel has several systems, each designed to meet a specific threat. The US is beginning to deploy naval vessels capable of providing mobile anti ballistic missile protection, in addition to the Patriot missiles currently in the region. The GCC nations are interested in an ABM system to protect themselves from a perceived Iranian threat. And, although not in the immediate vicinity, India is interested in a partnership with Israel in developing an ABM system to protect themselves from Chinese and Pakistani missiles.
Undoubtedly, the leader in ABM systems in the region is Israel, who has a multitude of ABM systems in use and in development. The network of systems is called Homa, which is Hebrew for wall. However, this “wall” has been questioned by some of Israel’s leading missile experts, who claim that Israel can’t intercept all of Iran’s missiles, should Iran decide to launch a massive salvo at one time..
The most capable system in operation is the Arrow 2. The Arrow missile system defends against medium to long-range ballistic missiles. The Arrow 2 was designed to defeat the largest, longest-range, and fastest missile threats. The most likely missiles that Arrow would target would be the Iranian Shahab-3, Shahab-4, and Sejil missiles. Israel has developed three versions of the Arrow missile: the Arrow 1, which was a prototype to test the technology; the Arrow 2, which is deployed; and the Arrow 3, which will be operational in a few years.
Although it is common to focus on the missile itself, the Arrow radar is critical. It is difficult to jam and can track up to 200 targets up to 500 kilometers away. It can direct up to 14 Arrow interceptor missiles at one time.
The Arrow 2 has a range of 100 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 50 kilometers. This allows the Arrow the ability to intercept inbound missiles at a range far from any possible target. By destroying missiles far from the intended target, the Arrow system minimizes the risk of collateral damage around the target area.
While the Arrow 2 is designed for longer range missiles, Israel also has several other systems designed for shorter range threats. The American developed Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3), is intended to defend against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The most likely missiles that IDF Patriots would target include older Scud missiles and Scud variants, such as Shahab-1 and Shahab-2. The Patriot is also stationed in Jordan to protect that nation from potential Scud attacks by the Syrians.
The Patriot is less capable and can only track 100 targets at 100 kilometers. It can direct up to 9 missiles at a time and the missiles have a range of 100 kilometers and an altitude of 25 kilometers. It can be used to kill ballistic missiles that leak through the Arrow 2 envelope.
Shorter range, tactical missiles and mortar shells are covered by Israel’s Iron Dome ABM system. It came on line three years ago and has been used extensively, unlike the Arrow, which has never been used in actual combat conditions.
The Iron Dome system is the newest and most technologically advanced component of the IDF missile defense system, and it is the only missile defense system in routine use. The Iron Dome system shoots a radar-guided missile interceptor with an explosive warhead. After being guided to the inbound rocket or mortar by the radar, the Iron Dome interceptor explodes in close proximity to the rocket or mortar. Because it targets short-range rockets and mortars, it has much less time than either Patriot or Arrow to detect an inbound projectile, track it, and launch an interceptor to hit it. According to the Israelis, Iron Dome has an interception rate of 90%, although there are many who call that figure greatly exaggerated and insist that 66% is a more accurate figure and some experts discount the effectiveness of the system altogether.
Since Iron dome missiles are too expensive to fire at every incoming missile or mortar shell, the Iron Dome radar can differentiate between incoming missiles that may hit populated areas and those that will hit fall elsewhere. This allows the system to effectively counter missile barrages by only using interceptors against threatening missiles. The Iron Dome missile has a range of 70 kilometers.
The Arrow 2, Patriot, and Iron Dome ABM systems provide a wide level of protection against threats. However, Israel is expanding its ABM capabilities in order to tackle a wider spectrum of threats.
The Arrow 3 is being built to expand Israel’s capability against longer range threats. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in space before they’re over Israel and shoot them down at high altitudes to disintegrate nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. Unlike the Arrow 2 variant currently in service, which is designed to intercept ballistic missiles at lower altitudes within Earth’s atmosphere with explosive warheads, Arrow 3 uses interceptors that ram their targets.
With the introduction of the Arrow 3, the Arrow 2 will be used as a back up to target and intercept missiles that leak through the Arrow 3 envelope.
Since the Patriot ABM system is 30 years old and designed to combat Soviet tactical missiles of the 1980s, Israel is developing a new ABM system called David’s Sling. Although the specifications are still in flux, it will be able to intercept every missile threat that the Patriot is capable of and overlap some of the capabilities of the Arrow and Iron Dome systems. It will probably have a range of up to 300 kilometers.
One weakness of the total system is short range missile threats that can hit their targets before Iron Dome can react. As a result, Israel has worked with the US on laser weapons development to fill this gap. It is called Iron Beam and is reportedly nearly ready for deployment. It will become the innermost layer of protection. Iron Beam is designed to intercept close-range drones, rockets and mortars which might not remain in the air long enough for Israel’s Iron Dome system to intercept. Some of the specification of the system were made public last month at the Singapore Air Show.
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which is building it, said test data show Iron Beam lasers are destroying more than 90 percent of their targets. One advantage of the laser is that the cost to destroy an incoming missile with a laser is considerably less than the cost to destroy that same missile with an interceptor missile.
Israel’s Iron Beam will not be the first laser interceptor to be deployed in the region. The U.S. Navy announced last year that it will attach a prototype of its Laser Weapons System (LaWS) to USS Ponce and send the amphibious transport docking ship to the Middle East this summer. It can be used for a “hard” kill on smaller targets (directing enough energy at the target to set it on fire or explode fuel aboard it) or for a “soft” kill by blinding a drone or missile’s imaging sensors. The ship will also support embarked forces of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and US 5th Fleet in the Arabian Gulf.
The US will also have other ABM systems either in the Middle East or within a few days range of it. Last month, the first of four Aegis equipped American destroyers was moved into the European theater. The USS Donald Cook took up station in the Spanish port of Rota from where it will operate as an anti-missile platform and take part in other tasks such as maritime security and NATO deployments, a statement said. Rota is an important American military base and a critical logistics hub for the American fleet in the Mediterranean.
“For the first time, a ship of the United States Navy equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile-defense system is permanently based in Europe” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said.
Although Rota is on Spain’s Atlantic coast, it is just outside the Mediterranean and only a couple of days away from the Middle East, should circumstances call for it. Three other Aegis destroyers will be deployed in the area in the next two years, which will mean that one of them will probably be stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Israel isn’t the only nation to worry about the missile threat in the Middle East. GCC nations are also looking at ABM systems in the face of Iran’s growing missile threat. And, the US is relaxing the rules to allow the GCC to buy American ABM technology. The move was made to assure the GCC nations that the US was committed to their protection, even while pursuing an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program.
The relaxing of the rules governing sales to the GCC has already meant sales to American firms. Raytheon received an order for two Patriot units from Kuwait. Meanwhile, the UAE has ordered the more capable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) from Lockheed Martin.
Although a beginning, these purchases still leave the GCC vulnerable to many types of missile threats. Iran military presence in several disputed islands around the Strait of Hormuz most likely includes surface to surface missiles that are capable of reaching the UAE. These shorter range missiles are not the type of missiles that THADD was designed to intercept and therefore still pose a threat.
Despite these weaknesses, the Middle East is rapidly becoming a maze of ABM systems, primarily designed to counter Iranian growing missile capabilities. From the growing ABM system presence in the GCC nations, to the massive Israeli ABM network that can reach Jordan and Egypt (and, undoubtedly parts of western Saudi Arabia), Patriot batteries in Turkey and Jordan, to the mobile ABM defenses of the American Navy, much of the western portion of the Middle East have fallen under the cover of some sort of missile defense.
Of course, the ability of the systems to kill incoming missiles and the cost of the interceptor missiles make these systems very expensive and subject to a degree of uncertainty, which raises the question of their value.
Experts agree that a system with a 100% ability to defeat incoming missiles is not necessary. Their importance in a strategic sense is to drastically reduce the number of missiles that hit their target and increase the uncertainty factor for the attacking nation.
Iran could launch a salvo of missiles against Israel, knowing that only 20% may penetrate the Israeli missile defense system. And, although that 20% may be devastating, Iran couldn’t rely upon what they would hit and what might be missed. While Tel Aviv might be hit, would the IDF command centers or the nuclear tipped Jericho missiles be hit? If not, Iran could expect an immediate and massive nuclear retaliation. That fact alone, is a deterrent against an attack.
This, in fact, was the idea of the limited ABM systems deployed by the US and Russia during the Cold War – inject enough uncertainty to make a first strike unthinkable.
Within a few years, the Middle East will have a similar situation. While Iran may have enough missiles to threaten its adversaries, local ABM systems and the concept of dispersing military assets will make the concept of a first strike in the region equally unthinkable.
PUBLICATIONS
The FY2015 US Defense Budget, the New Quadrennial Defense Review and the U.S. Commitment to the Middle East and Asia
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 6, 2014
The United States has repeatedly made it clear that both the Middle East and Asia are its too main priorities for both defense strategy and military partnerships. The United States stated this repeatedly in the new Defense Strategic Guidance it issued in January 2012, and has done so every year since that time. There still, however, is doubt and fear in much of the Middle East that the United States may be cutting its forces and commitments to the region, “pivoting” to Asia at the expense of its partners in the Middle East, or making some kind of deal with Iran.
Is deepening Shi’ite-Sunni tension plunging Lebanon into a new civil war?
By Ahmad K. Majidyar
American Enterprise Institute
March 6, 2014
With Iranian support, Hezbollah—a predominantly Shi’ite group and a US-designated terrorist organization—has emerged as the most powerful military and political force in Lebanon. Through extensive soft-power efforts, Iran promotes its ideological and political agenda in Lebanon at the expense of American interests. To promote stability in Lebanon, the US must counter Iranian influence, strengthen Lebanese state institutions, and partner with moderate leaders from all Lebanese ethnic and religious groups, including the Shi’ites, to contain and marginalize Hezbollah.
America‘s Navy needs 12 carriers and 3 hubs
By Mackenzie Eaglen and Bryan McGrath
American Enterprise Institute
March 11, 2014
President Obama’s latest defense budget would shrink the US Navy’s fleet from 11 aircraft carriers to 10 absent additional funding. But the truth is that America is currently a nine-carrier nation. Several years ago, Congress waived the 11-carrier requirement. As a result, the Navy currently operates 10 aircraft carriers until the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) joins the fleet in 2016. But one is in constant maintenance at all times and unavailable for global deployment. Whereas the question used to be “Where are the carriers?” a new question emerges—“What carriers?” Congress must now decide if America’s single-digit carrier fleet is enough to meet the global demands of a superpower. The short answer is no.
A New U.S. Approach to Gulf Security
By Frederic Wehrey
Carnegie Endowment
March 10, 2014
Policy Outlook
U.S. relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are strained by divergent policies toward a changing Middle East, the Gulf countries’ fears of being abandoned by the United States, and unprecedented intra-Gulf tensions. Washington has attempted to reassure Gulf partners of the strength of the security alliance while calling for liberalizing reforms. Increasingly, however, the Gulf states’ domestic policies have put them at odds with these calls. Contrary to some assumptions, the goals of reassurance and reform need not contradict one another: underscoring the urgency of much-needed institutional changes reinforces the U.S. commitment to durable regional security. The United States must focus more on promoting political and security sector reforms in the Gulf that are critical to long-term regional stability by better integrating its use of military and diplomatic tools.
How Far Backward Is Turkey Sliding?
By Marc Pierini
Carnegie Endowment
March 3, 2014
The Turkish political scene has been rocked by accusations of corruption since December 2013, when a number of people, including government officials and private citizens close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were arrested as part of a crackdown on graft. Meanwhile, the Erdoğan-led government is enacting policies that degrade rule of law in the country, with sudden policy shifts in the judiciary and the intelligence service, as well as an ongoing clampdown on media and individual freedoms. The government’s response to the accusations of corruption has been so severe that it has been seen as an attempt to cover up unpleasant realities. Ultimately, it is the sign of a fierce battle that Prime Minister Erdoğan is waging to retain his power. The crisis is likely to deepen in the run-up to critical elections in 2014—local elections in March and a presidential vote in August.
Iran‘s Evolving Maritime Presence
By Michael Eisenstadt and Alon Paz
Washington Institute
March 13, 2014
PolicyWatch 2224
On March 6, Israeli naval forces in the Red Sea seized a Panamanian-flagged vessel, the Klos C, carrying arms — including long-range Syrian-made M-302 rockets — destined for Palestinian militants in Gaza. The month before, a two-ship Iranian naval flotilla set out on a much-advertised three-month, 25,000-mile cruise that would, it is claimed, for the first time take Iranian ships around Africa and into the Atlantic Ocean. These two events illustrate the role maritime activities play in Iran’s growing ability to project influence far from its shores, and how the Iranian navy has emerged, in the words of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as a “strategic force” on the high seas.
Preventing an Iranian Breakout after a Nuclear Deal
By James F. Jeffrey and David Pollock
Washington Institute
March 12, 2014
PolicyWatch 2223
Assuming a final Iranian nuclear agreement is achieved, whatever the details, the task of the United States, the rest of the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, and Germany), and U.S. allies and friends in the region to manage the threat of an Iranian nuclear program will not slacken. Thus, the arrangements to encourage Iran to stick with an agreement will be every bit as important as the specifics of an agreement itself. It is thus important to begin thinking about these arrangements now. Furthermore, even with an agreement, the United States and its partners will face a long-term Iranian push for hegemony in the Middle East. That fact, plus analogous recent Russian and Chinese behavior and questions about U.S. responses, offers the context within which any nuclear deal, and plans to maintain it, must be considered.
Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst
C: 202 536 8984 C: 301 509 4144
