Gulf Security After the Decline of American Certainty:
The Need for a New Regional Horizon with Iran
Introduction:
From the Fragility of External Guarantees to the Question of Regional Security
The discussion on Gulf security is no longer centered, as it once was, on a narrow technical question about who possesses the tools of protection or who bears its costs. Instead, it has become tied to a deeper and more complex question: What regional structure can produce a less fragile form of stability at a time when the priorities of major powers are shifting, and the certainties of traditional alliances are eroding?
From this perspective, the experience of the Donald Trump administration does not appear to be a passing American anomaly. Rather, it reveals a broader tendency in international politics to subject security commitments to the logic of review, repricing, and pressure. For this reason, thinking about the future of the Gulf can no longer rely on the logic of imported protection. It requires a more mature vision that balances self‑capacity, regional understanding, and external relations governed by mutual interest rather than chronic dependency.
The consequences of the war on Iran and the exposure of the limits of American power have begun to surface, harming long‑term U.S. strategic planning. Former NATO Secretary‑General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called on alliance members to distance themselves from American “protection” and form a new coalition capable of confronting the United States (May 12, 2026, Copenhagen Democracy Summit). Rasmussen sensed the American predicament under President Trump, who “abandoned the leadership role, and therefore we need a new leader for the free world,” in order to confront what he described as economic pressures from countries such as China — and possibly the United States itself — on European allies.
First:
Why the NATO Experience Under Trump Is a Strategic Warning for Gulf States
The importance of recalling the NATO experience lies in its unusually clear demonstration of American behavior when the meaning of an alliance is reconsidered. If an alliance as large as NATO — with its history, institutional depth, and strategic weight — found itself facing explicit threats to the core of the American commitment, then less cohesive and more dependent security structures, such as the Gulf, appear even more exposed to the same fluctuations, perhaps in sharper form.
Several European capitals supported an idea — reportedly discussed with Riyadh — to “reconsider their security alliances” and craft an agreement modeled after the Helsinki Process of the 1970s, which reduced tensions in Europe during the Cold War. At its core would be a non‑aggression pact among neighboring states, including guarantees that Iran would not be attacked (Financial Times, May 15, 2026).
- NATO as a Miniature Model of What the Gulf May Face
During Trump’s first term (2017–2021), he did not merely express dissatisfaction with European defense spending. He articulated a coherent political position linking U.S. security commitments to the direct financial contributions of allies. This translated into repeated public threats to withdraw from NATO or reduce U.S. involvement unless European states raised defense spending to 2% of GDP.
These statements were not passing negotiation tools. They expressed a deeper vision of America’s place in the world — one that sees alliances as measured by direct returns rather than long‑term strategic commitments or stable geopolitical symbolism.
Within this context, “America First” emerged not merely as a campaign slogan but as a reference framework for reordering American priorities. Protection, in this view, is not a guaranteed right for allies, nor a moral or political obligation detached from benefit. It is a strategic service subject to repricing, revision, or reduction.
The message Europeans absorbed from the NATO experience was clear: Even the most institutionalized alliances can become subjects of bargaining when a U.S. administration changes or redefines the cost of America’s global role.
The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw thousands of U.S. troops from Germany — with similar measures hinted at for other European states — showed that military repositioning is not merely a theoretical possibility. From a Gulf perspective, this precedent must be read with great seriousness, because it confirms that reliance on American security guarantees, however solid they may appear at a given moment, remains tied to the calculations of the White House, the Pentagon, and U.S. domestic politics — not to the needs of regional partners.
The most important lesson for the Gulf is that American security commitments are neither eternal nor immune to change. What one president presents as a strategic pledge, another may redefine or empty of practical content. And when American protection continues, it is rarely free — politically or financially. It is often tied to increasing demands related to arms deals, political alignment, logistical and financial support in broader conflicts, and sometimes the imposition of political agendas that do not necessarily align with Gulf priorities.
If withdrawal threats targeted NATO — the most important alliance in the Western system — then assuming that similar behavior is impossible toward the Gulf is strategically unrealistic.
Second:
Trump’s Pressure‑Based Approaches Toward the Gulf and Their Strategic Meaning
- The Logic of “Pay for Protection” and the Repricing of Security Commitments
Trump repeatedly reframed the relationship with Gulf states in almost commercial terms: U.S. military presence must be matched by high payments from “wealthy” Gulf states. This approach reveals a fundamental shift in the understanding of alliances: instead of being long‑term security partnerships based on overlapping strategic interests, they become contractual arrangements adjustable according to the required financial contribution.
The danger of this logic is not only the increased economic cost of protection, but the fact that its continuity becomes tied to volatile political judgments about whether the payment is “sufficient.”
- Politically Conditioned Protection and the Problem of Geopolitical Bargaining
The financial dimension is intertwined with a more complex political dimension: the possibility of turning American protection into a tool for imposing major regional concessions. When the continuation of the security umbrella becomes linked to accepting specific political arrangements — such as normalization with Israel — protection itself becomes a mechanism for reshaping sovereign decision‑making.
- Limits of American Willingness for Direct Military Involvement
“America First” also leads to a reduced willingness to engage directly in Middle Eastern conflicts, even when the interests of close allies are at stake. This means that the maximum Washington may offer in some scenarios is arms sales, intelligence support, and defensive systems — not the political will to bear the cost of direct confrontation.
For Gulf states, this gap between bases and actual willingness to use force is a critical vulnerability.
Third: The Practical Limits of American Protection
The issue goes beyond the possibility of future U.S. withdrawal. A deeper question emerges: Has American protection — even at its peak — succeeded in producing real, stable security for Gulf states?
Recent crises showed that U.S. military presence does not necessarily provide an impenetrable shield. The presence of bases did not prevent drone or missile attacks on vital infrastructure. Advanced systems like Patriot and THAAD failed to intercept several threats. And Washington has repositioned assets during crises to protect its own forces first, even if that leaves allies more exposed.
Thus, the real question is not only What if the U.S. withdraws? but also What is the value of protection that cannot become a reliable guarantee during an escalating crises?
Fourth: Strategic Alternatives Available to Gulf States
If the traditional model of near‑exclusive reliance on the American umbrella has entered a phase of erosion or uncertainty, the solution is not merely to declare a desire for strategic independence. It requires developing realistic, gradual pathways toward a more balanced security system.
- First Alternative:
Gulf Defense Integration as a Path to Building Self‑Capacity
This alternative is based on the idea that addressing Gulf security fragility cannot be achieved by replacing one external protector with another. It requires raising internal capacity through:
- unified air‑defense and early‑warning systems
- joint command and operational planning
- shared defense‑industrial investment
Challenges include political sensitivities, differing priorities, and weak institutional integration. But difficulty does not mean impossibility — it means the path requires political will and gradual implementation.
- Second Alternative:
Diversifying External Partnerships
Relying on a single protector increases risk when that protector’s priorities shift. Diversifying partnerships creates a “multi‑layered safety net” and improves Gulf bargaining power. But it must be managed carefully to avoid conflicting commitments among competing powers.
- Third Alternative:
Serious Engagement with Iran — The Longest but Most Sustainable Path
Geography imposes a form of strategic coexistence. Engagement with Iran is not a concession but an attempt to organize conflict within manageable boundaries. It can begin with less contentious areas — trade, energy links, maritime security — and gradually expand toward:
- non‑aggression principles
- respect for sovereignty
- de‑escalation mechanisms
Success requires mutual political will and genuine Iranian readiness to address regional concerns.
- Fourth Alternative:
Self‑Deterrence and Its Practical Limits
Building independent deterrent capabilities is theoretically appealing but practically constrained by cost, coordination challenges, and the risk of triggering dangerous arms races. It is best viewed as a complementary option, not a primary path.
Fifth:
Interim Conclusions on Gulf Security Pathways
The NATO experience under Trump reveals the limits of relying on American guarantees as the foundation of Gulf security. Even at its strongest, the American umbrella has shown gaps.
Thus, Gulf states face three overlapping circles:
- Immediate: improve defense efficiency and internal integration
- Medium‑term: diversify partnerships
- Long‑term: build gradual trust with Iran
Security is not a ready‑made service. It is built slowly through a balance of self‑capacity, regional understanding, and well‑managed relations with major powers.
Sixth:
The Priority of a Gulf‑Iranian Security Framework
- Reordering Priorities: From Inside Out
A stable regional system must begin with a Gulf‑Iranian understanding that reduces hostility and contains conflict. External powers may shift or withdraw — but geography remains.
A sustainable security order requires making war politically unthinkable and strategically irrational.
Core Elements of Such a Framework
- Non‑Aggression Pact: a binding commitment to refrain from using or threatening force
- Conflict‑Resolution Mechanisms: a permanent body for dialogue and crisis management
- Joint Early‑Warning System: information‑sharing on cross‑border threats
- Arms‑Control Measures: gradual arrangements to reduce risks from WMDs and long‑range missiles
- Joint Maritime Security: coordinated protection of navigation routes and energy corridors
Building such a system faces major challenges: deep mistrust, conflicting regional roles, and external powers wary of losing influence. Early stages must therefore be framed as complementary to existing arrangements, not as replacements.
Seventh:
Coordinating the Regional System with External Powers Without Becoming Dependent on Them
Once a minimum level of regional understanding is established, external reinforcement becomes possible — not to hand over the system to great powers, but to provide limited support and balance.
- China
A pragmatic actor with ties to both sides; capable of diplomatic support and linking stability to economic projects.
- Russia
Influential but constrained by global conflicts and a polarizing image.
- Pakistan
A potential mediator with military weight, but cautious due to its own interests.
- Egypt
An Arab balancing actor with a direct stake in Gulf stability.
The goal is not to eliminate relations with major powers but to recalibrate them so they do not dominate the security system.
Eighth:
What This Reading Reveals About the Future of Gulf Security
The future cannot rest on a single option. The most sustainable path is a composite one:
- strengthening Gulf self‑capacity
- building a gradual de‑escalation track with Iran
- maintaining external relations as supportive, not decisive
This reflects a deeper shift: security is not imported but built internally.
Ninth:
Between Gradualism and Regression — Possible Trajectories
Three trajectories lie ahead:
- Continuity with minor adjustments
- Balanced gradualism
- Regression if trust‑building fails
Tenth:
Why This Path Is Difficult Despite Its Logic
Mutual mistrust, divergent priorities, and external sensitivities slow progress. A balanced system requires gradualism and shared interests.
Eleventh:
Conclusion
The Gulf’s dilemma is not finding a new protector but reimagining its security environment. Iran is a permanent neighbor; great‑power commitments are not. A regional system including Iran and the Gulf — even if slow — is the most reasonable long‑term option.
Three truths define the future:
- neighbors remain
- imported security is fragile
- arms races drain resources
A successful security model is built on rules, institutions, and mutual interests.
Twelfth:
Iraq and Yemen at the Heart of the Gulf Equation
Yemen
Requires a comprehensive political settlement, reconstruction, and economic integration with the Gulf.
Iraq
A potential geopolitical bridge linking the Gulf with Iran, Turkey, and the Levant.
A broader regional security forum could later facilitate their gradual integration.
