Week of October 10th, 2015

Executive Summary

Russian activity in Syria continues to be the focus on the think tank community.

Although the situation is fluid, the Monitor analysis tries to shed some light on the Russian military buildup in Syria. However, instead of focusing merely on numbers and type of aircraft, we look at the lifeblood of modern combat operations – logistics – Pilots, maintenance, consumables, and parts necessary to continue this air operation. We discover that contrary to some reports, the capability of the Russian force is modest compared to US but capable of engaging in more than limited operations, with some surge capability. With that in mind, we look at what Russia’s intentions are.

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The CSIS looks at the tangle of problems faced in Syria. They conclude, “It is time, however, to stop focusing on either ISIS or Assad, to pretend that Syrian “moderates” are strong enough to either affect the security situation or negotiate for Syria’s real fighters, and act as if a shattered nation could be united by some top down negotiation between groups that hate each other and have no competence in dealing with the economic, social, and governance challenges Syria now faces. The first step in solving a problem is to honestly assess it. No negotiation can work that does not deal with grim realities and divisions created by years of fighting. No amount of U.S. and Russian intervention and argument can bring security or stability. No UN effort at conventional negotiation can survive encounter with reality, and no effort of any kind that does not address the sheer scale of Syrian recovery and reconstruction.”

The Institute for the Study of War looks at how the Russian moves in Syria impact Iraq.   They say that this could increase Russian influence In Iraq if the US doesn’t counter it. They suggest it is, “necessary to improve the security situation in Iraq while convincing the Iraqi government that the U.S. is a more effective partner in the anti-ISIS fight than Iran and Russia. This possibility, however, would require U.S. personnel to leave their bases and expose them to greater risk, particularly from a wide range of militias, Iranian proxy and otherwise, who oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq. The potential use of JTACs (joint tactical air control) would dramatically increase the effectiveness of airstrikes and could be welcomed by pro-Coalition elements of the ISF, particularly those operating in Anbar province. The deployment of JTACs also requires infrastructure to support them, including quick reaction forces and medevac.”

In looking at Russia’s actions in Syria, the CSIS says it is important to note that Russia formally introduced many of the views of the U.S. and Western “destabilizing” impact on the Middle East and the developing world well over a year ago at a formal military conference in Moscow. The meeting focused on what Russian experts called the color revolutions. Russian analysts have used this term since—the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2012, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. Russian military officers tied the term color revolution to the crisis in Ukraine and to what they saw as a new U.S. and European approach to warfare that focuses on creating destabilizing revolutions in other states as a means of serving their security interests at low cost and with minimal casualties. It was seen as posing a potential threat to Russia in the near term, to China and Asian states not aligned with the United States, and as a means of destabilizing states in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia…The end result was a radically different Russian reading of modern history, of U.S. and European strategy and use of force, and of U.S. and European goals and actions from any issued in the West or in prior Russian literature.”

The Washington Institute suggests a possible alliance between Syrian Kurds and the Russian/Assad alliance. They conclude, “Western leaders have two options for responding to Russia’s intervention and its attendant ripples: do nothing and pray that Syria becomes Putin’s Afghanistan, or play by his rules and secure their own place in shaping the future Syrian peace process. In either case, they need to acknowledge that the Kurdish PYD will not hesitate to ally with Russia and Assad if that is its only path to a continuous territory in the north. Syrian Kurds have been told repeatedly that the West will not allow them to gain more territory, and they fear a potential anti-Kurdish offensive backed by Turkey, so for now they are looking favorably on the Russian intervention. Moscow may not be able to help Assad reconquer the entire north, but it could certainly prevent the Sunni Arab rebellion from threatening an expanded Kurdish Rojava. Accordingly, the United States and its partners face a decision: maintain the ban on Kurdish expansion or support the PYD’s bid to join Afrin with Kobane. The latter course would help weaken ISIS by cutting off its access to Turkey. Moreover, the Kurds are the only force on the ground that will back Western efforts against the Daesh, so keeping them in the U.S. camp would seem to be crucial.”

The Heritage Foundation says the next president should not accept Obama’s Iranian deal. They say, “Upon entering office, the next Administration should immediately review Iran’s compliance with the existing deal, as well as its behavior in sponsoring terrorism, subverting nearby governments, and attacking U.S. allies. Any evidence that Iran is cheating on the agreement (which is likely given Iran’s past behavior) or continuing hostile acts against the U.S. and its allies should be used to justify nullification of the agreement. Regrettably, Tehran already will have pocketed up to $100 billion in sanctions relief by the time the next Administration comes to office because of the frontloading of sanctions relief in the early months of the misconceived deal. Continuing to fork over billions of dollars that Tehran can use to finance further terrorism, subversion, and military and nuclear expansion will only worsen the situation.” The article provides 7 specific recommendations including expanded sanctions.

The Washington Institute suggests that the current move by Russia into Syria might help bring Turkey and the US back together. They note, “The latest events in Syria may encourage Ankara to change that equation and favor a lasting strategic alliance with the United States. The establishment of a Russian airfield on Turkey’s southern flank, reports of Syria-based Russian jets violating Turkish airspace, and increasing concern over the intentions of Syrian Kurdish forces have all given Erdogan a reason to reassess his cooperation with Putin. Erdogan may not want to look westward, but he shares Washington’s interest in containing Russia before it can broaden its footprint along Turkey’s borders.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks for a forward for Obama and Putin in Syria. They suggest the P5+1. They note, “The P5+1—the U.S., Russia, France, Great Britain, China, all U.N. Security Council permanent members joined by Germany—is a unique forum where the key parties can come together to seek a way to solve the Syrian crisis. In addition to the major powers, the P5+1 format has the advantage of being able to engage Iran, a critical actor in Syria without whom no solution can be found. The trust built up between the P5+1 countries and Iran in the course of the negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program, and the success of those talks make for a unique basis to address the Syrian crisis. The U.S. and Russia can ill afford to squander it.”

The Cato Institute says Obama must fight the calls to “do something” in Syria. They conclude, “Although the provision of arms might increase their ability to combat ISIS (and al-Assad), it would do nothing to increase their capacity to construct effective governance structures in the territory under their control. More arms would simply increase the eventual need for the international community to deploy some kind of post-conflict stabilization force when it comes time to rebuild Syria. Up to this point, President Obama has exercised commendable restraint in resisting pressure to “do more” in Syria. It would be folly to abandon that course in some sort of knee-jerk reaction to Russian intervention. Neither imposing a no-fly zone nor arming the Syrian rebels will contribute to the resolution of the war in Syria. As the President has said repeatedly, there can be no military solution to the conflict. He should continue to heed his own advice.”




Putin’s Russia Pushes Military Activity in Syria

In a series of moves that surprised most observers in the West, Russia began aggressively countering Syria’s military adversaries this week.

Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups throughout northwestern Syria, including areas along the Turkish border in northern Latakia Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also confirmed airstrikes targeting ISIS-held positions northeast of Palmyra. In addition, the Russian MoD declared its first airstrikes in Damascus Province on October 5.

Although some strikes were in Eastern Syria and against ISIS targets, it appeared that most of the air attacks were against rebels in the west, especially north of the Syrian cities of Homs and Hama. These attacks have been denounced by some NATO spokesmen as not targeting the biggest threat. However, they do make military sense as they are striking against anti-Assad rebels closest to Russian positions (especially those north of Hama).

Russian military, also engaged its naval forces by launching 26 medium-range cruise missiles on Wednesday from four warships in the Caspian Sea. Russian officials said the missiles — which traveled more than 900 miles, through Iranian and Iraqi airspace — struck 11 targets in Syria, but they did not specify which groups were hit.

It was speculated that the missile strike was coordinated with the ground offensive.

The Caspian Sea Fleet wasn’t the only Russian naval units involved. One cruiser, one destroyer, and two frigates have been deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean. these ships are more likely to provide a seaborne radar and air defense system from NATO attack.

What can be found at Bassel al-Assad International airport in Latakia, is more indicative of what Russia is planning to do.

Russia is only deploying 4 Su-30 Flanker fighters – which indicate that they have no intention of engaging NATO F-16s. Most of the aircraft are primarily ground attack, including 4 SU-34 Fullback fighter bombers, 12 SU-24 attack aircraft, 12, SU-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft, and 12 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters.

Although the offensive remains in its early stages, it is significant because it is the beginning of a wider, coordinated assault that reveals close collaboration between Syria and its main allies — Hezbollah, Iran and Russia.   According to the Daily Mail Hundreds’ of troops from Iran, Hezbollah, and Shiite rebels from Iraq have also converged on Syria over the last few weeks.
The Russian Strengths

What Russia has on its side is an aggressive air warfare tempo that appears to be hitting Syria rebels harder than comparable Turkish/NATO/American air ops. It also has allied ground forces – Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran (a more formidable force than the US backed Syrian militia that numbered less than a dozen).

Although not skilled in overseas deployments like NATO militaries, this exercise has gone well. Although some of the information from the front must be considered controlled or guided, it appears that the strikes have been effective, although there are claims of civilian causalities.

The Russian aircraft deployed are actually more ideal to the fighting in Syria than the F-16s deployed by NATO forces.

The Russian aircraft like the Su-25 and Mi-24 are designed for counter insurgency warfare. Although they might not be ideal for long range strikes like those against ISIS in Eastern Syria, these two aircraft are perfect for supporting allied ground forces. They are slow enough to provide accurate ground support and are heavily armored.

The F-16, which is the main aircraft for most of the American alliance is not designed for close ground support and is primarily an air superiority aircraft. It is notorious for providing inaccurate close air support compared to the A-10 close air support aircraft that, ironically, the US is positioning in Eastern Europe against Russian tank forces.

With a better air/ground mix and an aggressive pace of air operations, Russia has an edge in pushing back Syrian rebels,, especially those in Western Syria,, where the loiter ability of the Russian aircraft can be used to advantage.

Russian potential logistical difficulties

It is an adage amongst military professionals that, “Amateurs talk strategy and tactics, professionals talk logistics.” This is an important fact here.

Although Russia has maintained a heavy air operations schedule in the first couple of weeks, modern aircraft are dependent on maintenance and a regular supply of parts. This reliance on logistics support only grows as combat operations continue.

Although Russia has established an air bridge to Syria, there is still the question of their staying ability. Russia doesn’t have the supply support capability of the US and they haven’t tried to provide this level of support in another country since Afghanistan.

There is also the question of manpower to support combat operations.   Does the detachment have the number of pilots and ground crew to launch several sorties with each aircraft every day? If they don’t, then the Russian Air Force can only provide a couple dozen sorties a day to support widespread operations.

Since one military aircraft needs tens of hours and tens of thousands of dollars in fuel and parts to support just one sortie, it’s easy to see that 24 hour operations in Syria, with each aircraft carrying out 3 to 4 sorties during a 24 hour period will be maintenance intensive. And, this doesn’t include the cost of maintaining the “air bridge” aircraft supporting the logistical effort.

It appears that Russia is well aware of the long term cost of combat operations. Reports on Wednesday spoke about only 8 close ground support missions and an additional 12 combat air patrol sorties. This indicates a sortie rate of less than one sortie per aircraft – a level that is sustainable for a long period of time, but isn’t one that will overwhelm the Syrian rebels.

NATO Response

Russian warplanes violated Turkish airspace and harassed Turkish F-16s in at least two separate incidents over Hatay Province of southern Turkey on October 3 and 4, prompting an emergency NATO meeting on October 5.   In addition, Russian fighter jets shadowed U.S. predator drones on at least three separate occasions high above Syria since the start of Russia’s air campaign last week, according to two U.S. officials briefed on this latest intelligence from the region. Meanwhile, a U.S. aircraft flying over Syria had to be rerouted to avoid a Russian fighter jet at least once.

Although Turkey is a NATO country, there remain questions about how to respond. There are major divisions between eastern NATO members, who want to keep the focus on the Ukraine crisis, and others who worry about ISIS – hampering a unified response from the 28-nation North Atlantic alliance.

France and Britain, want to see the alliance use its new 5,000-strong rapid reaction force beyond NATO borders, potentially helping stabilize post-conflict governments in Libya or Syria.

Others nations, including Poland and the Baltics, want a permanent NATO presence on their territory to act as a credible deterrent to any further effort by Russian President Vladimir Putin to gain influence in former Soviet states.

In the meantime, there is an immediate concern about protecting Turkish airspace with Patriot air defense missiles. NATO deployed its Patriot missiles in January 2013 in Turkey. Currently, the US, Germany, and Spain now have five batteries in place.

However, the United States will withdraw its two Patriot batteries any day for modernization. And, Germany’s defense minister said Berlin would go ahead with plans to switch off its two Patriot batteries in Turkey next week and withdraw most of the soldiers operating them before Christmas. All soldiers and materiel are due to be withdrawn by the end of January.

“This decision (to withdraw the Patriots) is right,” Ursula von der Leyen said as she arrived for the meeting.

“The question is what danger can be warded off in which way,” she said. The comments appeared to suggest that the Turkish air force is capable of intercepting fighter jets.

France and Italy are understood to be willing to join Spain, but no decision has been taken, people familiar with the discussion say.

The Russian Mission

Despite the news surrounding the insertion of the Russian force into Syria and the relatively few missions it has carried out in the past few days, it is obvious that Russia isn’t planning for intensive operations on a long term basis.

The Russian force is designed for effective, but limited, close air support of Syrian or other allied forces. Its fighter aircraft contingent is capable of patrolling Syrian airspace and discouraging NATO overflights of Syria. It is unlikely to challenge NATO aircraft further east as it is at the far reach of its range and any ISIS targets there would be of little concern to Russia.

It’s also important to note that the Russian force would be challenged to effectively stopping any determined NATO air incursion into Syria, but no indication is there to suggest such dangerous course anyway.

Putin has put Syria and President Assad in a much more powerful position. The force is large enough that the rebels are facing a nearly impossible route to taking Damascus and defeating Syrian Arab army.

The Russian presence and air attacks against rebels around Homs and Hama have secured the Syrian coast.

Assad is not only the legitimate head of Syria, his control of the populated and economically important regions of Eastern Syria make him a necessary member of any negotiations. And, should negotiations fail, he will remain in control of the most important part of Syria – the east and the coastline. He will also retain Syrian UN membership.

Should the Syrian rebels and ISIS start to falter, the Russian air contingent has the ability to kick into high gear and launch a short burst of up to 50 to 75 sorties a day for a very few days. This could be decisive in an offensive supported by allies of Syrian ground forces.




The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the Next President Should Do

By James Phillips

Heritage Foundation

October 2, 2015

Issue Brief #4468

The failure of Congress to halt the implementation of the Obama Administration’s nuclear agreement with Tehran means that the U.S. is stuck with a bad deal on Iran’s nuclear program at least for now. Iran’s radical Islamist regime will now benefit from the suspension of international sanctions without dismantling its nuclear infrastructure, which will remain basically intact. Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon is unlikely to be blocked by the Administration’s flawed deal, any more than North Korea was blocked by the Clinton Administration’s 1994 Agreed Framework. The next President should not passively accept Obama’s risky deal with Tehran as a fait accompli. Instead, he or she should immediately cite any violations of the agreement by Iran, its continued support for terrorism, or other hostile policies as reason to abrogate the agreement. The Bush Administration, faced with bad deals negotiated by the Clinton Administration, eventually withdrew from both the Agreed Framework and the Kyoto Protocol.

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Obama Must Resist ‘Do More’ Calls on Syria

By Brad Stapleton

Cato Institute

October 6, 2015

Russia’s recent intervention in Syria has ruffled feathers in Western capitals. On Tuesday came claims from NATO that Russia had moved ground troops into Syria, only a week after Russia launched its first airstrikes in the country. The moves prompted renewed calls from many in Washington — including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — for the Obama administration to impose a no-fly zone and begin arming the Syrian rebels in earnest. President Obama should resist such clarion calls and refrain from escalating the conflict in such a manner. Indeed, he should be wary of much of the talk we are hearing about “doing more,” lest he risk exacerbating an already growing crisis. Western powers were able to impose a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 with ease, making it tempting to try to repeat the trick in Syria. But Libya was an unusually permissive environment for such action, and NATO aircraft faced virtually no resistance. That would surely not be the case in Syria. Indeed, now that Russian pilots are flying throughout western Syria, any attempt to impose a no-fly zone would present an unacceptable risk of direct hostilities between U.S. and Russian forces.

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The Long War in Syria: The Trees, the Forest, and All the King’s Men

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

October 1, 2015

Clichés are clichés, but sometimes it really is hard to see the forest for the trees. In the case of Syria, the “trees” include the UN debate between Obama and Putin over Syria and the fight against Islamic extremism, Russia’s sudden military intervention in Syria, the failure of the U.S. training and assist missions in both Syria and Iraq, and the developing scandal in USCENTCOM over exaggerated claims of success for the U.S.-led air campaign in Syria and Iraq. The most important “tree,” however, is trying to negotiate an end to the fighting from the outside, as if Assad was the key issue and as if it would be possible for some diplomatic elite or mix of power brokers to bring Syria back to some state of stability if only Assad would agree to leave and the United States and Russia could agree on how to approach the negotiations.

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The Background to Putin’s Actions in Syria and the UN: Russia’s New View of the US and Western Strategy: The Color Revolution

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

October 2, 2015

Far too much of the commentary on Russian military intervention in Syria, Vladimir Putin’s speech at the United Nations, and Putin’s relations with Barack Obama reverts to the mindreading era of Kremlinology. It takes Putin’s actions out of context and often says more about the author’s prejudices than it does about Putin. It is important to note that Russia formally introduced many of the views of the U.S. and Western “destabilizing” impact on the Middle East and the developing world well over a year ago at a formal military conference in Moscow. Russian high-level officers and diplomats reacted strongly to the criticisms and sanctions resulting from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They shifted radically away from a past focus on improving military relations with Europe—and to a lesser degree the United States.

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A Way Forward for Obama and Putin in Syria

By Eugene Rumer

Carnegie Endowment

October 7, 2015

The crisis in Syria has become a standoff between the U.S. and Russia. Each side is blaming the other for it. Moscow charges the Syrian tragedy is the direct consequence of U.S. unilateral, delusional pursuit of democracy in the Middle East. Washington insists that Russian support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is the cause. The most the two seem to be able to agree on is to talk about de-conflicting their air operations to avoid a mid-air collision between their planes. With no solution in sight, it is time to resort to what has worked in other seemingly unsolvable crises: the P5+1 mechanism. The P5+1—the U.S., Russia, France, Great Britain, China, all U.N. Security Council permanent members joined by Germany—is a unique forum where the key parties can come together to seek a way to solve the Syrian crisis. In addition to the major powers, the P5+1 format has the advantage of being able to engage Iran, a critical actor in Syria without whom no solution can be found. The trust built up between the P5+1 countries and Iran in the course of the negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program, and the success of those talks make for a unique basis to address the Syrian crisis. The U.S. and Russia can ill afford to squander it.

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Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria

By Patrick Martin

Institute for the Study of War

October 7, 2015

The Russian formation of a coordination cell in Baghdad is an inflection point aimed at undercutting U.S. influence over the direction of the anti-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria. However, the Russian footprint in Iraq is much smaller than in Syria, while U.S. influence over the ISF and Iraqi state are much greater than U.S. influence in Syria. The U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition can maintain its position as Iraq’s essential ally in the anti-ISIS fight by increasing advisory, materiel, and aerial support to the Iraqi state, without substantially increasing its ground presence. Such changes must prepare Iraq to recapture territory from ISIS quickly in order to demonstrate the value of cooperation with the U.S.

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Syria’s Kurds Are Contemplating an Aleppo Alliance with Assad and Russia

By Fabrice Balanche

Washington Institute

October 7, 2015

PolicyWatch 2499

Despite repeated Russian statements to the contrary, Moscow’s most pressing goals in Syria are safeguarding Bashar al-Assad’s regime and expanding its own military presence on the Mediterranean coast, and it can meet these goals even if Damascus and its allies are unable to regain territory outside the Alawite heartland. Yet if Vladimir Putin wants to be at the center of the Syrian chessboard, he will need to push his pawns further into the country’s interior. In particular, Aleppo could be his next target because all of the war’s major players are currently vying for control of the key northern metropolis. Losing the city would be a major political and strategic setback for Assad, weakening his regime in future negotiations. Currently, the Syrian army still controls a third of Aleppo, which is connected to the rest of the government-controlled zone by a narrow road. But this corridor is being squeezed by the Daesh/ISIS on the east and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra on the west. To win the battle for Aleppo, Assad will therefore need to cooperate with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian franchise of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PYD is eager to connect its cantons around Kobane and Afrin and open a corridor to Sheikh Maqsoud, the Kurdish district of Aleppo. An October 1 al-Monitor interview with PYD leader Salih Muslim suggests that the group may be seeking a strategic alliance with Assad and Russia in order to achieve that goal.

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Putin’s Syria Adventure Is an Opportunity for Washington and Ankara

By Lt Col John R. Barnett

Washington Institute

October 6, 2015

PolicyWatch 2498

While all eyes are on Moscow’s dramatic entry into the Syria conflict, policymakers and military planners should not forget about Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in Russia’s “near abroad,” including the South Caucasus republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. By capitalizing on existing structures and interoperability, the United States and Turkey can thwart Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in the area, obliging Moscow to rein in its plans further abroad and allocate more resources closer to home. But it will not be an easy marriage. Over the past decade, relations between Ankara and Washington have ebbed and flowed. The rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party gradually distanced Turkey from the West, and both governments have had difficulty establishing shared interests on emerging issues in the Middle East and elsewhere. Moscow has sought to fill this vacuum by increasing its sway over Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. Yet the latest events in Syria may encourage Ankara to change that equation and favor a lasting strategic alliance with the United States.

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