Think Tanks Activity Summary
The Washington Institute looked at what was said (and what wasn’t said) by Clinton and Trump on the Middle East in their debate this week. “In terms of the fight against IS, both candidates replayed stock lines from stump speeches. Overall, Hillary Clinton’s paragraph on defeating the group was much more detailed than Donald Trump’s; it included support for Kurdish and Arab allies, a focus on targeting IS leadership, and a sequence of action (liberate Mosul by the end of 2016, then focus on squeezing the group in Raqqa), all done with enhanced U.S. air support but not ground forces. For his part, Trump did not go far beyond a commitment to massive military action against IS, falling back on his critique that the Obama administration permitted the group’s rise by precipitously withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq and mishandling Libya. Neither candidate, however, addressed what most experts believe to be the most serious challenge — what to do the day after liberating IS-held territory so that it does not become the base for the next iteration of radical Sunni jihadists.”
The CSIS says the United States and its allies do need to look beyond the fighting, and beyond tactical victory in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. .They look at history and note, “War unleashes forces that make it the prelude to anticipated changes—many of which begin during the conflict and regardless of the intensions of the combatants—and that can only be influenced by a sustained effort that often would have to last a decade or more. They also involve some form of “nation building,” regardless of how unpopular the term has become—precisely because even a power like the United States cannot anticipate many of the key variables involved, help find a workable solution, and overcome the range of problems that cause lasting instability or shape the next conflict. These are not academic or theoretical issues at a time when the Obama Administration has to deal with five immediate conflicts, and with the reality that even the best possible defeat of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq will immediately raise critical issues for the Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’ites, Arab Alawites, and Kurds in each country. The broad ideological struggle for the future of Islam now goes far beyond ISIS, or even Islamic extremism. Iran and the Arab Gulf states increasingly are making it struggle between all Sunnis and Shi’ites.”
The Hudson Institute looks at the break down in the Syrian ceasefire. They note, “Like virtually all the decisions this administration has taken since the Syria war first erupted, it is a decision that looks like the path of least resistance at the moment but that stores up the maximum amount of pain for the Syrian people, trouble for the international order, and humiliation for the Obama administration (and, unfortunately, the United States) in the slightly longer run. “There is no alternative,” to humiliating negotiations with arrogant and vindictive Russians, say Obama Administration spokespeople when challenged. What that means is that the White House wrung its hands haplessly as its options narrowed and its choices worsened, never really thinking through one of the most basic ideas in foreign policy: while you never really can know in advance how something will turn out, if your choices get better and more numerous as time goes on, you are on the right track. If your choices keep narrowing, and the remaining options keep looking uglier, that is a pretty good sign that you are doing it wrong.”
The Washington Institute looks at Jordan’s decision to buy Israeli natural gas. They explain, “The notion of Amman buying large quantities of gas from Jerusalem to generate the bulk of its electricity has been commercially logical but politically fraught, since most Jordanians do not particularly want their country to buy Israeli gas. But the deal has become economically necessary, at least in King Abdullah’s view. Egyptian gas is no longer available for import, leaving the kingdom dependent on liquefied natural gas tankers arriving at the Red Sea port of Aqaba — a stopgap measure at best because the floating facility is only leased and supplies are vulnerable to price fluctuations and the good grace of the current provider, Qatar. Proposals for Russian nuclear power stations or gas deals with Iraq have apparently been rejected as infeasible (the former for financial reasons, the latter for political).”
The Carnegie Endowment looks that Iranian nuclear deal. They conclude, “IAEA should not rush implementation in Iran or draw hasty safeguards conclusions to accommodate timetables or deadlines sought by member states. Furthermore, given Iran’s past track record of deception and the JCPOA’s critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation, should the IAEA give Iran a broader conclusion, the agency must thereafter continue to obtain sufficient information, especially from Iran, to maintain confidence that the broader conclusion still has merit. Above all, and in advance of any decision to give Iran the broader conclusion, the IAEA and its member states must ensure there is a common understanding of (1) what the broader conclusion means and what it does not mean, (2) how the broader conclusion is reached, (3) on what basis a state’s broader conclusion should be renewed, and (4) how the IAEA and states should respond if it is not renewed.”
The American Enterprise Institute looks at presidential debate charges that it wasn’t Obama who allowed Iran to develop its nuclear weapons infrastructure. They note, “Bush’s policy toward Iran was a bit schizophrenic. Thanks to foot-dragging by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice if not outright subversion by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a huge gap developed between Bush’s coercive rhetoric and the reality of his administration’s policy. That said, the Bush team managed to achieve several unanimous or near-unanimous UN Security Council resolutions augmenting pressure on Iran, especially after its covert enrichment program came to light…too much diplomacy may actually have been the problem. The European Union nearly tripled its trade with Iran between 1998 and 2005 while the price of oil quintupled. Iran took that hard currency windfall and invested it disproportionately in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Heck, Hassan Rouhani, at the time the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and a nuclear negotiator, subsequently bragged about how Iran had pulled a fast one.”
The American Enterprise Institute looks at this week’s override of Obama’s veto on legislation that allows suing of Saudi Arabia for 9-11. They note that the same charges can be brought against the US. They note, “But forget Saudi Arabia; the Kingdom can defend itself. Let’s be selfish here. Think of every drone strike in Yemen or Afghanistan, think of our paltry interventions in Syria and Iraq, think of every single thing the US Government and our servicemen and women and our diplomats do every day. Not terrorism, you say? That’s your opinion. But if citizens the world over claim the same right Congress has just bestowed, you can bet that there will be many definitions of terrorism.”
The Carnegie Endowment looks at the challenges of “fragile states” and the US role is helping them. They note, “The hard truth, however, is that for all the progress and hard-won experience of the past two decades, our performance is falling short of the mark, handicapped by bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of maximalist objectives on unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance short-term imperatives with long-term goals; the habit of lurching from one crisis to the next; missed opportunities to act preventively; and too much of a focus on how our bureaucracy looks, and not enough on how it works. There is no simple prescription to address fragility. The United States cannot—and should not—try to fix every fragile state. We can—and should—articulate sound and realistic policy principles to determine where and how to invest scarce resources and attention to maximum effect. And we can—and should—play a leadership role in shaping the global response and strengthening the capacity of key institutions and partners to do their part.”
The CSIS looks militancy in Western Africa. Looking at the threat, they note it is a “toxic spill over from Libya.” These organizations, including Boko Haram, al Qaeda, and other terror groups, have metastasized and present a serious threat to regional stability. Now these VEOs are transitioning. Under sustained pressure from French and regional security forces, and reeling from the loss of senior leaders, many of these groups feel backed into a corner. Despite setbacks, the groups continue to plague the region.
The Washington Institute looks at the life and death of Shimon Peres, whose career covered the while of Israel’s modern history. One piece of history thas shows his foc us on Israel instead of the whole picture, “Peres did not just keep his eyes on Washington. While Israelis saw Peres as perhaps the most accommodating of Israel’s leaders in dealing with the Arab world, the truth is that many bruising battles took place behind the scenes. One was with Egypt’s then foreign minister, Amr Mousa, in the Nineties. Mousa saw Peres’s effort for regional economic development not as something that could be a powerful positive force for both Egypt, Israel and the region, but rather as a move that could marginalize Cairo by a calculating Israel. Peres was attacked both by Israelis and Arabs for his call for a “new Middle East.” At one point, Peres told me he erupted at Mousa. Peres put things in a historic context as he thundered, “you did us a favor with the Arab boycott in the past, as it forced us to orient our trade to be more with the west. Israel will manage now either way.”
PUBLICATIONS
What Trump and Clinton Said (and Didn’t Say) About the Middle East
By Robert Satloff
Washington Institute
September 27, 2016
The Washington Institute looked at what was said (and what wasn’t said) by Clinton and Trump on the Middle East in their debate this week. “In terms of the fight against IS, both candidates replayed stock lines from stump speeches. Overall, Hillary Clinton’s paragraph on defeating the group was much more detailed than Donald Trump’s; it included support for Kurdish and Arab allies, a focus on targeting IS leadership, and a sequence of action (liberate Mosul by the end of 2016, then focus on squeezing the group in Raqqa), all done with enhanced U.S. air support but not ground forces. For his part, Trump did not go far beyond a commitment to massive military action against IS, falling back on his critique that the Obama administration permitted the group’s rise by precipitously withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq and mishandling Libya. Neither candidate, however, addressed what most experts believe to be the most serious challenge — what to do the day after liberating IS-held territory so that it does not become the base for the next iteration of radical Sunni jihadists.”
The “End State” Fallacy: Setting the Wrong Goals for War Fighting
Anthony Cordesman
CSIS
September 26, 2016
United States and its allies do need to look beyond the fighting, and beyond tactical victory in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. .They look at history and note, “War unleashes forces that make it the prelude to anticipated changes—many of which begin during the conflict and regardless of the intensions of the combatants—and that can only be influenced by a sustained effort that often would have to last a decade or more. They also involve some form of “nation building,” regardless of how unpopular the term has become—precisely because even a power like the United States cannot anticipate many of the key variables involved, help find a workable solution, and overcome the range of problems that cause lasting instability or shape the next conflict. These are not academic or theoretical issues at a time when the Obama Administration has to deal with five immediate conflicts, and with the reality that even the best possible defeat of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq will immediately raise critical issues for the Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’ites, Arab Alawites, and Kurds in each country. The broad ideological struggle for the future of Islam now goes far beyond ISIS, or even Islamic extremism. Iran and the Arab Gulf states increasingly are making it struggle between all Sunnis and Shi’ites.”
https://www.csis.org/analysis/end-state-fallacy-setting-wrong-goals-war-fighting
Kerry Accepts the Unacceptable
By Walter Russel Mead
Hudson Institute
September 25, 2016
The break down in the Syrian ceasefire is “Like virtually all the decisions this administration has taken since the Syria war first erupted, it is a decision that looks like the path of least resistance at the moment but that stores up the maximum amount of pain for the Syrian people, trouble for the international order, and humiliation for the Obama administration (and, unfortunately, the United States) in the slightly longer run. “There is no alternative,” to humiliating negotiations with arrogant and vindictive Russians, say Obama Administration spokespeople when challenged. What that means is that the White House wrung its hands haplessly as its options narrowed and its choices worsened, never really thinking through one of the most basic ideas in foreign policy: while you never really can know in advance how something will turn out, if your choices get better and more numerous as time goes on, you are on the right track. If your choices keep narrowing, and the remaining options keep looking uglier, that is a pretty good sign that you are doing it wrong.”
http://hudson.org/research/12866-kerry-accepts-the-unacceptable
Jordan’s Strategic Decision to Buy Israeli Gas
By Simon Henderson
Washington Institute
September 26, 2016
Jordan’s decision to buy Israeli natural gas, “The notion of Amman buying large quantities of gas from Jerusalem to generate the bulk of its electricity has been commercially logical but politically fraught, since most Jordanians do not particularly want their country to buy Israeli gas. But the deal has become economically necessary, at least in King Abdullah’s view. Egyptian gas is no longer available for import, leaving the kingdom dependent on liquefied natural gas tankers arriving at the Red Sea port of Aqaba — a stopgap measure at best because the floating facility is only leased and supplies are vulnerable to price fluctuations and the good grace of the current provider, Qatar. Proposals for Russian nuclear power stations or gas deals with Iraq have apparently been rejected as infeasible (the former for financial reasons, the latter for political).”
Arriving at an IAEA Broader Conclusion for Iran
By Mark Hibbs
Carnegie Endowment
September 22, 2016
“IAEA should not rush implementation in Iran or draw hasty safeguards conclusions to accommodate timetables or deadlines sought by member states. Furthermore, given Iran’s past track record of deception and the JCPOA’s critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation, should the IAEA give Iran a broader conclusion, the agency must thereafter continue to obtain sufficient information, especially from Iran, to maintain confidence that the broader conclusion still has merit. Above all, and in advance of any decision to give Iran the broader conclusion, the IAEA and its member states must ensure there is a common understanding of (1) what the broader conclusion means and what it does not mean, (2) how the broader conclusion is reached, (3) on what basis a state’s broader conclusion should be renewed, and (4) how the IAEA and states should respond if it is not renewed.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/09/22/arriving-at-iaea-broader-conclusion-for-iran-pub-64665
Who is responsible for Iran’s pre-deal nuclear progress?
By Michael Rubin
American Enterprise Institute
September 27, 2016
In the presidential debate it wasn’t Obama who allowed Iran to develop its nuclear weapons infrastructure. They note, “Bush’s policy toward Iran was a bit schizophrenic. Thanks to foot-dragging by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice if not outright subversion by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a huge gap developed between Bush’s coercive rhetoric and the reality of his administration’s policy. That said, the Bush team managed to achieve several unanimous or near-unanimous UN Security Council resolutions augmenting pressure on Iran, especially after its covert enrichment program came to light…too much diplomacy may actually have been the problem. The European Union nearly tripled its trade with Iran between 1998 and 2005 while the price of oil quintupled. Iran took that hard currency windfall and invested it disproportionately in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Heck, Hassan Rouhani, at the time the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and a nuclear negotiator, subsequently bragged about how Iran had pulled a fast one.”
http://www.aei.org/publication/who-responsible-irans-pre-deal-nuclear-progress/
JASTA is a sincere effort to hold Saudi Arabia accountable
By Matt A. Mayer
American Enterprise Institute
September 29, 2016
this week’s override of Obama’s veto on legislation that allows suing of Saudi Arabia for 9-11. They note that the same charges can be brought against the US. They note, “But forget Saudi Arabia; the Kingdom can defend itself. Let’s be selfish here. Think of every drone strike in Yemen or Afghanistan, think of our paltry interventions in Syria and Iraq, think of every single thing the US Government and our servicemen and women and our diplomats do every day. Not terrorism, you say? That’s your opinion. But if citizens the world over claim the same right Congress has just bestowed, you can bet that there will be many definitions of terrorism.”
http://www.aei.org/publication/jasta-sincere-effort-hold-saudi-arabia-accountable/
Militancy and the Arc of Instability
By Jennifer G. Cooke
CSIS
September 27, 2016
The CSIS looks militancy in Western Africa. Looking at the threat, they note it is a “toxic spill over from Libya.” These organizations, including Boko Haram, al Qaeda, and other terror groups, have metastasized and present a serious threat to regional stability. Now these VEOs are transitioning. Under sustained pressure from French and regional security forces, and reeling from the loss of senior leaders, many of these groups feel backed into a corner. Despite setbacks, the groups continue to plague the region.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/militancy-and-arc-instability?block2
Shimon Peres Was Israel’s Quintessential Zionist
By David Makovsky
The Washington Institute
September 28, 2016
The Washington Institute looks at the life and death of Shimon Peres, whose career covered the while of Israel’s modern history. One piece of history that shows his focus on Israel instead of the whole picture, “Peres did not just keep his eyes on Washington. While Israelis saw Peres as perhaps the most accommodating of Israel’s leaders in dealing with the Arab world, the truth is that many bruising battles took place behind the scenes. One was with Egypt’s then foreign minister, Amr Mousa, in the Nineties. Mousa saw Peres’s effort for regional economic development not as something that could be a powerful positive force for both Egypt, Israel and the region, but rather as a move that could marginalize Cairo by a calculating Israel. Peres was attacked both by Israelis and Arabs for his call for a “new Middle East.” At one point, Peres told me he erupted at Mousa. Peres put things in a historic context as he thundered, “you did us a favor with the Arab boycott in the past, as it forced us to orient our trade to be more with the west. Israel will manage now either way.”
