Analysis 06-06-2014

ANALYSIS

 

NATO – Revision 2.0

 

Probably the biggest news coming out of Obama’s trip to Europe this week was the increased focus on NATO’s defense against Russia. Advocates of such course admit the task isn’t one that can  be solved by a three day visit to Europe. To them it requires the restructuring of NATO from a rapid reaction force that could be used in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, back to a conventional land army that is tasked to defend Europe from the newly rising Russian threat.

Yet, this change isn’t merely a return to the old NATO of the Cold War.  That NATO was comprised of economically powerful nations with large conventional land armies.  And, although there were several countries bordering the Warsaw Pact nations like Greece, Turkey, and Norway, the major emphasis during the Cold War was on protecting West Germany from a massive armored attack across the German Plain.

Today’s NATO faces more challenges.  Not only are there more nations “threatened” by Russia projection of influence and power today, they are considerably more vulnerable than NATO was 25 years ago, when the Soviet Empire collapsed.  The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have no fighter aircraft of their own and can only muster three tanks between them.  Estonia is already spending over 2% of their GDP on defense spending (the NATO goal for member nations) and Latvia and Lithuania are promising to double their spending in order to reach that goal.

The other major European NATO powers are spending more, but are still falling behind.  Only Great Britain and Greece joined Estonia in hitting the two percent benchmark, and Greece reached that goal more as a response to Turkey than Russia.  Poland has been increasing military outlays, in a major arms modernization and spent 1.8 percent last year (that will go up to 1.95 in 2015). France and Turkey fall short. Germany comes in at 1.3 percent. Italy is at 1.2 percent. Overall, NATO hit 1.6 percent last year.

By comparison, America defense spending was 4.1 percent of GDP.

NATO’s Shifting Mission

One reason for the low defense spending by the other NATO allies is the shifting mission of NATO from a conventional military alliance to a post Cold War small, rapid reaction force.  Smaller, more mobile forces didn’t need the level of spending, which pleased NATO countries, which could use the additional money for domestic programs.

Many analysts even saw post Cold War NATO, not as a military alliance, but as an alliance of democracies.  Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote in 2002, “NATO can be usefully re-imagined. Its new role should be to serve as incubator for Russia’s integration into Europe and the West. It is precisely because NATO has turned from a military alliance into a trans-Atlantic club of advanced democracies that it can now safely invite Russia in…NATO is dead. Welcome, Russia, to the new NATO.”

Needless to say, that idea is now dead.  But, it can’t merely return to the old NATO concept with a massive conventional army in Germany.  There are more fronts to cover and several weak allies that must be protected until they develop more powerful militaries.

Obviously the keystone to an eastern NATO defense is Poland.  Poland has the largest military establishment in Eastern Europe and is strongly committed to its defense against Russia.  It has also contributed towards the mission in Afghanistan, which means it has a small core of combat trained troops.  It also has the largest army in Eastern Europe, with about 900 tanks and over 100 combat aircraft.  Although much of the equipment is former Soviet, they are aggressively modernizing with new German Leopard tanks.

US military strategists are looking in to the problem; however they see, with the exception of Turkey, the rest of the front line NATO nations are militarily weak and could be easily invaded by Russia.  That means NATO must not merely rely upon a massive, slow moving conventional military force in one place, but a mobile force capable of quickly deploying to a threatened NATO country and being capable of combating a Russian Army as soon as it enters the theater.

The US has already begun working on this.  In April, approximately 600 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland for training and NATO exercises.  In March the United States increased the Poland Aviation Detachment (AVDET) with additional F-16s.  These F-16s and airmen will act as a tripwire in Poland and improve coordination with the Polish Air Force.  In addition, three C-130J aircraft were deployed to Powidz Air Base, Poland, as part of a regularly scheduled two-week AVDET rotation.

Another need is for NATO to pre-deploy equipment and forces to front line nations that will not only act as a tripwire, but can allow for a rapid mobilization in a crisis.

One such operation is the NATO air operations in the Baltic nations.  In March, the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four F-15Cs already in Lithuania in order to have a quick reaction interceptor aircraft force to protect Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  The U.S. rotation began in January and ended in early May.  Since then, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, and Denmark, have assumed the air policing mission in the Baltic.

Although the threat in Southeast Europe is less, NATO has also increased its presence there.  Canada deployed aircraft to augment NATO air policing in Southeast Europe.  In addition, there is the Black Sea Rotational Forces (BSRF) based out of Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base, Romania, which includes 250 Marines.  There are also 500 U.S. troops and 175 U.S. Marines temporarily based out of MK Air Base.  The Marines are part of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) that is designed to respond to a broad range of military operations in Africa and Europe.

The NATO meeting this week in Brussels saw additional measures to rapidly reinforce NATO nations.  NATO defense ministers agreed to a Readiness Action Plan, which will improve the NATO Response Force’s (NRF) capability, upgrade NATO’s intelligence and awareness, pre-position equipment and supplies in frontline NATO nations, and focus NATO exercises on the threat from Russia.  The United States pledged several thousand service members to the NRF, including a brigade combat team from the 1st Cavalry Division, air-to-air refueling tankers, and escort ships.

NATO ministers also approved Germany’s initiative on “Framework Nations,” which will help boost multinational forces in Eastern Europe.  The NATO Secretary General welcomed the decision by Denmark, Germany and Poland to start work to raise the readiness of Multinational Corps North East in Poland. “This will strengthen our ability to address future threats and challenges in the region. And it is a significant contribution to our collective defense,” he said.

NATO will also have to increase cooperation with non-NATO nations friendly with the West.  NATO Defense Ministers met their Ukrainian counterpart Mykhailo Koval in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. They reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s security and defense reforms. A comprehensive package of measures aimed to increase the capacity and strength of the Ukrainian armed force will be finalized in the coming weeks.

Although NATO doesn’t have the manpower to station large combat units in the frontline NATO nations, they need to step up exercises that rotate more forces through these nations, while increasing cooperation with the militaries of these countries.  To that end, NATO launched a large-scale exercise, STEADFAST JAVELIN 1, in Estonia on May 16.  Around 6,000 troops from Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in the exercise which finished on May 23.  Many participants were already in Estonia taking part in the annual Estonian-led KEVADTORM14 exercise that began on May 5 and was merged into the NATO-led event.

Finally, individual NATO nations will have to reconfigure their militaries to the new reality.  This may mean that armored units that were scheduled for demobilization may remain active.  NATO nations that were anxious to retire main battle tanks too large for operations in places like Afghanistan may keep them active.  It may also mean more emphasis on armor technology than there has been in the past decade. US military industrial complex will get its lion share of course from any future military build up

And modernization by these countries…..

Is This Enough?

Although NATO’s defense forces are considerably smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War 25 years ago, the NATO nations have cobbled together a plan that will refocus NATO on the current threat, while giving the individual nations a chance to modernize their respective defense forces.

 

NATO does have several advantages that help.  First, it has more of a defense in depth that it during the Cold War.  25 years ago, most of Western Europe was within range of the Russian military.  Today, countries like Germany, France, and England are far removed from the potential front lines, which make it harder for Russia to deliver a decisive blow against NATO.

Another advantage according to US military leaders is that NATO’s military – especially the major nations of the UK, France, Germany, and the United States have more technologically advanced militaries than the Russian Army, which still relies on leftover equipment from the Cold War.  They can hit harder and more effectively than Russia can ever hope to.

Ironically, the post Cold War NATO also gives the alliance another advantage they claimed.  The focus on small rapid reaction forces that could carry out combat operations in Afghanistan is critical to countering the Russian threat today.  Since the Eastern NATO frontier is so large, NATO must rely upon the rapid movement of forces from theater to theater during a crisis.  These forces, which contain a large number of combat hardened troops that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be more capable than their numbers suggest.

NATO planners boast also that NATO has a much larger logistics chain – both in its military and its commercial infrastructure.  That means the military units of the US, France, Britain, and Germany can rapidly deploy into Eastern Europe in case of a crisis.

They stress finally, NATO has a much larger economic base than Russia.  Therefore, was the winning edge during the Cold War and, if anything, the advantage is even greater today than it was a quarter century ago.

To the military adventurists ,although Russia remains a threat to Europe, NATO has started to take the threat seriously.  Until several of the newer NATO nations upgrade their conventional combat capabilities, they will have to rely upon the major NATO nations to provide technologically advanced, highly mobile, professional forces to act as a tripwire and counter to Russian military might.  The only question that remains is if European NATO members will be able to sacrifice much needed funds for another illusion of preparing for a new cold war that only benefiting the trans-Atlantic military industrial complex.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

 

President Obama Goes to Europe: Top Five Policy Recommendations

By Nile Gardiner, Theodore R. Bromund, and Luke Coffey

Heritage Foundation

June 4, 2014

Issue Brief #4234

President Obama’s visit to Europe this week will be an important opportunity for the U.S. President to restate America’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership, strengthen the NATO alliance, and shore up European opposition to Russian aggression against Ukraine.  Across the Atlantic, President Obama should also take note of the mounting disillusionment with the European Union, expressed in recent European parliamentary elections, and voice his support for the principles of national sovereignty and self-determination in Europe, as well as economic freedom and free trade.  Below are Heritage’s recommendations for what the President should do and say in his meetings with European leaders and in his public and private statements.

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To Defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Stronger Counterterrorism Cooperation Needed

By James Phillips

Heritage Foundation

June 3, 2014

Issue Brief #4233

Iraq faces major political, national security, and economic challenges that should be addressed by the new government that emerges from the April 30 elections. Last year, more than 7,800 civilians and 1,050 members of the security forces were killed in political violence and terrorist attacks, making it Iraq’s deadliest year since 2008.  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), formerly known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has staged a bloody comeback and seized large swaths of territory in western Iraq. Its leader has threatened attacks against the U.S. homeland, and it is recruiting foreign fighters in Syria who could carry out this threat. Washington urgently needs to step up cooperation with Iraq to address this mounting threat.

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Our Freeloading Allies

By Christopher A. Preble

Cato Institute

May 29, 2014

One of the overlooked aspects of President Obama’s speech at West Point yesterday was his call for other countries to step forward, and do more to defend themselves and their interests. He also expected them to contribute “their fair share” in places like Syria.

It might have been overlooked because it was neither new, nor unexpected. Polls consistently show that Americans believe we use our military too frequently, and they are tired of bearing the costs of policing the planet. Meanwhile, the minority who believe that we should be spending more on the military  – 28 percent of Americans, according to a recent Gallup poll – might not feel that same way if they knew how much we spend as compared to the rest of the world, especially our wealthy allies.

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Iraq in Crisis

By Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 30, 2014

Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war in 2014. The country now faces growing violence, a steady rise in Sunni Islamist extremism, an increasingly authoritarian leader that favors Iraq’s Sunnis, and growing ethnic tension between Arabs and Kurds. The recent Iraqi election offers little promise that it can correct the corruption, the weaknesses in its security forces, and the critical failures in governance, economic development, and leadership. The problems Iraq faces in 2014 are a legacy of mistakes made during and after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, but increasingly the nation is dealing with the self-inflicted wounds of its leaders who abuse human rights, repress opposing factions, and misuse the Iraqi police and security forces to their own end.

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NATO’s land forces: Losing ground

By Guillaume Lasconjarias

American Enterprise Institute

June 4, 2014

The state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) land forces is something of a paradox. Although the alliance has no equal in terms of its gross domestic product, commands a wealth of human and social capital, and boasts the world’s largest aggregate defense sector, NATO’s land forces in particular have lost ground when it comes to their overall combat capacities.  In member states, the effects of the worldwide economic crisis on defense budgets have been compounded by dwindling public support for the continued commitment of national armed forces to apparently insoluble foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, as the alliance draws down its longest and costliest mission in Afghanistan, now is the time to review the lessons learned from a decade of sustained combat operations and to ensure they are implemented in time for the next major deployment. Overall, the idea is to shift from a “NATO deployed” to a “NATO ready” mode; the challenge, according to US General Philip Breedlove, current supreme allied commander in Europe, is to maintain the operational excellence acquired over the past decade

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Assad’s Election: A Security Quest

By Lina Khatib

Carnegie Endowment

June 2, 2014

On June 3, 2014, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad looks forward to securing a new seven-year presidential term in a sham election conducted in the shadow of regime violence. A key objective for Assad in his third term is consolidating his “counterterrorism” campaign—in other words, presenting his crackdown on Syrian opposition groups as a fight against jihadism. In doing so, Assad is betting on the eventual support of, or at least coordination with, the international community in this new “war on terror,” which would secure his position in power. Although Western countries have called the June 3 election a “parody,” Assad’s bet is not too far-fetched. The Egyptian case shows why.

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Can the EU Revive the Cause of Middle East Peace?

By Dimitris Bouris and Nathan J. Brown

Carnegie Endowment

May 29, 2014

Two very strong assumptions have governed much international diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the past decades. The first is that the solution is known, so all that is necessary is strong leadership—and U.S. determination—to arrive at that goal. The second is that European action is not likely to have much independent effect, so Europe can at best only support American efforts. The unhelpfulness of the first assumption is now apparent to all but a few diehards. That makes it an especially important time to demolish what remains of the second assumption. This is not to suggest that Europeans can succeed where Americans have failed. Rather, Europe might be able to have some long-term positive effects in precisely those areas where the United States has decided not to go. This conclusion flows not from unrealistic optimism but from a hard-nosed look at the past.

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Turkey’s Commitment to NATO: Not Yet Grounds for Divorce

By Richard Outzen

Washington Institute

June 2014

Research Notes 19

The history of Turkey’s relations with the United States and NATO has been characterized by stable commitment on security matters and remarkable volatility in political matters. In a time of great political change in Turkey — the end of military tutelage and the ascendance of political Islam over Kemalist secularism — how far from the North Atlantic political consensus can Turkey move without affecting its security role within NATO? The preliminary decision taken by Turkey last year to select the Chinese HQ-9 intercept system for its air defense network caused much speculation in Western capitals about whether this development marked a definitive change in Turkey’s strategic identity.

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Egypt After the Election: Advancing the Strategic Relationship

By Michael Singh

Washington Institute

May 30, 2014

PolicyWatch 2259

Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s apparent victory in Egypt’s presidential election this week marks the beginning of a new chapter for his country, though not necessarily the end of its political and economic turmoil. The past three years have not only left Egypt gripped by domestic troubles and economic malaise, they have also resulted in further deterioration of bilateral relations. Cairo has looked inward, immune to advice or influence, while Washington has looked on in bewilderment. Although American officials continue to describe relations with Egypt as “strategic,” they have in fact become transactional, with one side trading its immediate needs for the other’s: the United States needs a stable and cooperative Israeli-Egyptian relationship and preferential access to the Suez Canal, while Egypt needs military hardware and international recognition. Paradoxically, Egypt has had the upper hand in the relationship despite its troubles, mainly because it believes it can turn to others to meet its needs in the short run — Russia for military equipment, the Persian Gulf states for aid, and the international community for validation. Washington, in contrast, has no geopolitical substitute for Egypt.

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A Persistent Threat The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists

By Seth G. Jones

RAND

June 2014

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Based on an analysis of thousands of primary source documents, the report concludes that there has been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years. The author uses this analysis to build a framework for addressing the varying levels of threat in different countries, from engagement in high-threat, low government capacity countries; to forward partnering in medium-threat, limited government capacity environments; to offshore balancing in countries with low levels of threat and sufficient government capacity to counter Salafi-jihadist groups.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 30-05-2014

ANALYSIS

 

Is Obama Pivoting to Foreign Policy – Again?

 

The military academy at West Point has been “staged” to have the President of the United States as the keynote speaker for its commencement 14 times in its history.  Each time, the president used it to outline his foreign and military policy.  This year was no different.

But, there is one difference.  Polls show growing discontent with the incoherence of the Obama foreign policy.  He is perceived by voters and foreign leaders as weak and indecisive.

In order to counter this perception, Obama spoke to the graduating class of West Point on Wednesday in a speech that the White House said was to be a major foreign policy speech.  In reality, it was less a speech outlining Obama’s view of American foreign policy than a weak defense of his current policy, which has received criticism from both sides of the political spectrum.  In many cases, he took credit for policy decisions that he has fought for years.  For instance, on Syria, the new plan he announced – vaguely saying he’ll “work with Congress to ramp up support” for some Syrian rebels – is precisely the proposal that many members of his own Cabinet, and other politicians outside the administration, have been making for two years. He offered no explanation whatsoever for why he is now accepting advice he has been rejecting for all that time.

It was clear that the Commander-in-Chief was less than popular with the audience as only about a quarter of the attendees stood up and applauded when he was introduced.  Applause was tepid throughout the speech and reflected a military that is facing morale problems thanks to the growing political nature of the American military.  This is reflected in the hemorrhaging of mid career military talent as non commissioned officers and middle grade commissioned officers leave the military to seek jobs in the private sector.

Obama’s biggest applause line was not for a policy position, but in praise of a former West Point cadet who was wounded in Afghanistan.  Gavin White, “lost one of his legs in an attack,” Obama said. “I met him last year at Walter Reed. He was wounded, but just as determined as the day that he arrived here. He developed a simple goal.  Today, his sister Morgan will graduate. And true to his promise, Gavin will be there to stand and exchange salutes with her.”

Defending Obama’s Foreign Policy

In many ways, the speech contradicted itself, as Obama tried to defend himself from both liberal and conservative critics.  Early in the speech, he said, “America must always lead on the world stage.”  A few minutes later he reversed course and said, “we have to work with others because collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly mistakes.”

He defended his policy as the center road that lies between, “self-described realists” who resist foreign conflicts altogether and their extreme opposition, the “interventionists from the left and right.” He later took aim at “skeptics,” who “often downplay the effectiveness of multilateral action. For them, working through international institutions, or respecting international law, is a sign of weakness. I think they’re wrong.”  As he frequently does, Obama castigated those who offer “false choices” in foreign policy — intervention vs. isolation, war vs. diplomacy.  He also noted that he was elected to stop wars, not start them.  Yet, he failed to outline how his contradictory policy offers better results.

The speech was also political.  During his remarks, Obama went after his political opponents, saying that in their criticisms of a weakened U.S. they were “either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics.” He assured the audience that the United States would maintain its leading role in the world and said that “America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world,” He also criticized members of Congress for failing to “lead by example” on issues like climate change and the Law of the Sea treaty.

He urged a more measured approach to conflict abroad that would avoid what he described as the impulse of some to intervene militarily wherever problems exist.  And, he regularly referred to multilateral action.

“The military that you have joined is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only — or even primary — component of our leadership in every instance,” he said. “Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”

“You leave this place to carry forward a legacy that no other military in human history can claim. And you do so as part of a team that extends beyond your units or even our Armed Forces,” he concluded. “You will embody what it means for America to lead.”

Obama was quick to note his own accomplishments by noting that his administration had “decimated” al-Qaeda and that “Osama bin Laden is no more.”  He also defended his efforts in Syria and Ukraine, among other countries.

A Future Direction?

 

The White House had promised a major foreign policy speech.  However, with the exception of some details, such as the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, the establishment of a new Counterterrorism Partnership fund, and a renewed interest in Syria, there was nothing new in what he presented.

However, the speech did give an idea of how Obama viewed the world and how the US would pursue foreign policy in his final two years as he outlined, “my vision for how the United States of America and our military should lead in the years to come, for you will be part of that leadership.”

As expected for a speech at a military academy, Obama reiterated the fact that if American core interests demand it, he will use military force.  However, he was vague on when and where it would be used, saying, “when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger.  In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just.”

Obama did admit that decentralized terrorist groups comprise the most direct threat to America today. He told the graduates, “I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy — drawing on the successes and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan — to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.”  He said he will ask Congress for $5 billion to partner with and to train countries threatened by terrorists. This will include some funds for the moderate opposition groups inside Syria, although he said, “As frustrating as it is, there are no easy answers, no military solution that can eliminate the terrible suffering anytime soon.”

As he has stated numerous times, Obama said the U.S. must strengthen international institutions and alliances. These, Obama explained, provide the new leadership channels for 21st-century conflict resolution. He took credit for easing tensions in the Ukraine, by claiming the U.S. shaped world opinion and gathered European support that isolated Russia, “giving a chance for the Ukrainian people to choose their future.”  Obama tried to tie the Senate’s refusal to ratify a “Law of the Sea” treaty with Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.   He accused the Senate of “retreat” and “weakness.”

Obama also tied American foreign policy to the campaign for human dignity. He said, “America’s support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism — it is a matter of national security.  Democracies are our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war.  Economies based on free and open markets perform better and become markets for our goods.  Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence and terror.”  He claimed a victory in Burma due to American diplomacy.

Obama did speak directly about events in the Middle East.  He reiterated that he would continue to pressure the government in Egypt.  However, he did note, “In countries like Egypt, we acknowledge that our relationship is anchored in security interests — from peace treaties with Israel, to shared efforts against violent extremism.  So we have not cut off cooperation with the new government, but we can and will persistently press for reforms that the Egyptian people have demanded.”

Obama defended his approach toward Iran’s nuclear program.  He said, “Similarly, despite frequent warnings from the United States and Israel and others, the Iranian nuclear program steadily advanced for years.  But at the beginning of my presidency, we built a coalition that imposed sanctions on the Iranian economy, while extending the hand of diplomacy to the Iranian government.  And now we have an opportunity to resolve our differences peacefully.”

“The odds of success are still long, and we reserve all options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  But for the first time in a decade, we have a very real chance of achieving a breakthrough agreement — one that is more effective and durable than what we could have achieved through the use of force.  And throughout these negotiations, it has been our willingness to work through multilateral channels that kept the world on our side.”

Syria was clearly a major issue as he stated that the US would start providing more support for the Syrian rebels.  Although he made it clear that US troops wouldn’t be committed to Syria, he did say, “But that does not mean we shouldn’t help the Syrian people stand up against a dictator who bombs and starves his own people.  And in helping those who fight for the right of all Syrians to choose their own future, we are also pushing back against the growing number of extremists who find safe haven in the chaos.”

“So with the additional resources I’m announcing today, we will step up our efforts to support Syria’s neighbors — Jordan and Lebanon; Turkey and Iraq — as they contend with refugees and confront terrorists working across Syria’s borders.  I will work with Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators.  And we will continue to coordinate with our friends and allies in Europe and the Arab World to push for a political resolution of this crisis, and to make sure that those countries and not just the United States are contributing their fair share to support the Syrian people.”

Is this a Real Pivot or a Rhetorical One?

Over the past five years, Obama has said many things and promised “pivots” to critical issues.  But he has regularly failed to follow through on them.  Is this new, more aggressive foreign policy one of those?

Probably.  The reality is that 2014 is an election year – one that will shape the last two years of his administration.  And, elections pivot on domestic policy, not foreign policy.  Obama will be focused on keeping the US Senate in Democratic hands rather than focusing on what is happening overseas.

In the end, this was a political event – being seen in the presence of American soldiers as the Commander-in-Chief helps him as the US military is still widely respected by the American population.  It gave him a chance to boost his popularity, rebut his critics, and sound forceful.   However, it will not likely mark a change in the woefully lacking foreign policy of the Obama Administration.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Citizen-Soldiers in a Time of Transition – The Future of the U.S. Army National Guard

Report

By Stephanie Sanok Kostro

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 28, 2014

Currently, U.S. armed forces are facing a rapidly shifting environment. Even as the major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that defined the last decade are coming to an end, a wide variety of new and evolving challenges, both abroad and at home, are confronting the nation’s military. The U.S. Army National Guard faces a unique set of dynamics, given its role in domestic as well as overseas operations. As the Army National Guard considers its future, it asked the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program to provide an independent analysis of the strategic-level issues facing the Guard as well as its evolving roles and missions. This report provides policymakers and practitioners with objective insights and recommendations to assist in outlining potential future responsibilities for the Army National Guard.

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President Obama’s Announcement on Troop Levels in Afghanistan: No Plan, No Transparency, No Credibility, and No Leadership

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 28, 2014

President Obama announced troop levels for Afghanistan on May 27th in ways that make no effort to present a real plan or strategy. He simply set dates certain for the elimination of a meaningful U.S. military presence in 2015 – ignoring the fact that leaving half of 9,800 troops in Afghanistan in 2016 is too small in enabling capability to meet Afghan needs. He said: “Today, I want to be clear about how the United States is prepared to advance those missions.  At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 98,000 U.S. — let me start that over, just because I want to make sure we don’t get this written wrong.  At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield.  One year later, by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq.”

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Doubling down on a muddled foreign policy – The president has somehow managed to combine the worst features of isolationism and multilateralism.

By John R. Bolton

American Enterprise Institute

May 28, 2014

The Wall Street Journal

At West Point on Wednesday, President Obama told the graduating seniors that he had discovered a middle way in foreign policy between isolationism and military interventionism. To the White House, this was like “the dawn come up like thunder outer China,” in Kipling’s phrase.  Others were less impressed, especially since it took five-plus years of on-the-job training to grasp this platitude. Of course the United States has options between war and complete inaction. Not since Nixon has a president so relished uncovering middling alternatives between competing straw men.  When any president speaks, he engages in more than academic analysis. But playing with words, at which Mr. Obama excels, improves nothing in his record. Inattention to foreign threats and challenges as diverse as Islamic terrorism or China’s increasing belligerence in the East Asian littoral; inconsistency and ineptitude in pursuing his own policies, as in Syria and Libya; and indecisiveness in confronting threats like Russia’s pressure on Ukraine and Iran’s nuclear-weapons program all hang like albatrosses around his presidential tenure. Mr. Obama’s speech only further muddled the administration’s contradictory messages on foreign policy.

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A Russian Strategy for Afghanistan After the Coalition Troop Withdrawal

By Dmitri Trenin, Oleg Kulakov, Alexey Malashenko, and Petr Topychkanov

Carnegie Endowment

May 22, 2014

Twenty-five years after Soviet troops left the country, Afghanistan is facing another historical crossroads, this time on the eve of the withdrawal of U.S.-led international coalition combat troops, the International Security Assistance Force, scheduled to depart by the end of 2014. The country’s present is unstable, and its future is uncertain—will it develop progressively, or is it bound for chaos and regression, as was the case after the Soviet troop withdrawal?  Potential threats and risks associated with post-withdrawal Afghanistan are a matter of concern for neighboring countries and the international community. In addition, reduced American military presence and weaker U.S. interest in the country will increase the role other great powers and neighboring nations—mainly Russia and China, as well as Pakistan, Iran, India, and states from both the Gulf and Central Asia—will play in Afghanistan.

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Israel and the Middle East: Seeking Common Ground

Panel

German Marshall Fund

May 26, 2014

Video

On May 26, GMF hosted the first public panel discussion between a former Saudi head of intelligence, HRH Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, and a former Israeli head of military intelligence, General Amos Yadlin. The debate, which was moderated by David Ignatius, columnist and associate editor at The Washington Post, focused on the position of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East context and the current security situation in the region.  During a very engaging debate, the various efforts for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute were assessed.

Read more and watch video

 

 

Between Not-In and All-In: U.S. Military Options in Syria

By Chandler P. Atwood, Joshua C. Burgess, Michael Eisenstadt, and Joseph D. Wawro

Washington Institute

May 2014

Policy Notes 18

The Syrian war has left more than 150,000 dead and more than 9 million displaced. With diplomacy and sanctions having failed to achieve their objectives, the Obama administration is reportedly considering a more proactive role in the conflict. The impulse to refrain from military intervention remains understandable, but the costs of nonintervention may be even steeper: an al-Qaeda foothold and expanded Iranian influence in the Levant, a new generation of jihadists poised to migrate to other conflicts, social tensions and political instability in neighboring states, and growing doubts about U.S. credibility. Nor does military intervention necessarily imply boots on the ground. Many options entail lower levels of force, including strengthened sanctions and cyberoperations, force build-ups, or an enhanced effort to equip and train the moderate opposition. The window may have closed for seeking a positive outcome in Syria, but by acting wisely yet assertively, the United States may yet secure its interests.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 23-05-2014

ANALYSIS

 

Iron Beam – Analyzing Israel’s Next Anti-Missile System

 

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and about 1,000 American soldiers are holding a biennial exercise to test joint their abilities to respond to missile attacks.  The exercise, termed Juniper Cobra, will include simulations of various threats to Israel’s home front, including various missile attacks.

The American troops, who belong to the United States European Command, are designated to reinforce Israel’s anti-ballistic defense systems in case of an attack.  The US force also includes two American ships in the Mediterranean equipped with the Aegis Combat System, which can intercept missiles.

With the addition of the Aegis equipped American naval vessels, Israel is undoubtedly the most thoroughly protected nation against missiles.  Israel also has the US made Patriot missile.  In addition, it also has fielded several other antiballistic missile systems including Arrow 2, Arrow 3, and the Iron Dome.  It will also soon field David’s Sling, which will be able to intercept every missile threat that the Patriot is capable of and overlap some of the capabilities of the Arrow and Iron Dome systems.

However, a few months ago at the Singapore Air Show, Israel announced the fielding of a new anti-missile system, Iron Beam – a laser device.  Iron Beam is designed to intercept close-range drones, rockets and mortars which might not remain in the air long enough for Israel’s Iron Dome system to intercept.    It is being built by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.  During the Singapore show, Rafael officials said test data show Iron Beam lasers are destroying more than 90 percent of their targets.  One advantage of the laser is that the cost to destroy an incoming missile with a laser is considerably less than the cost to destroy that same missile with an interceptor missile.

But, is it as effective as claimed?

The reality is that there is a big difference between the laser weapons of science fiction movies and the actual fielding of a laser weapon on the modern battlefield.  That’s why the US, which has spent more on laser weapons development than any other country, has only one prototype placed on a Navy ship – a prototype that is considerably less effective than what Israel claims the Iron Beam can do.

So, has Israel made a major technological breakthrough in laser weapons?  Or have they developed a laser system that has major flaws?

If one looks carefully, one can see the flaws in Iron Beam.

High energy lasers have held a lot of promise as defensive weapons, but have several problems that have prevented them from being little more than prototypes.  Early crystal rod lasers and gas discharge tube lasers were very inefficient and most of the energy was wasted as heat.  Therefore, a high energy laser would create so much waste heat as to damage the equipment.

The chemical laser changed that.  Chemical lasers are more like rocket engines than the common laser. A laser propellant, comprising a suitable mix of chemicals, is burned or reacts in some way and the chemical exhaust is then directed into an expansion nozzle. The exhaust stream from the expansion nozzle contains highly energetic molecules, which due to the choice of propellants and added agents have effectively been pumped to a state where laser action can occur. If a pair of aligned mirrors is placed to either side of the exhaust stream, laser action will occur as photons bounce between the mirrors, and power can be extracted if one of the mirrors is optically leaky.

While that sounds simple, the technology is much more complex.  The chemicals react at temperatures as high as 1000 to 2000 deg C, depending on the laser fuel mix used. The expansion nozzles require very precisely controlled flow conditions to work, which results in a complex exhaust system designed to produce the required pressure and flow rates. Some laser fuels and their exhaust can be highly corrosive and toxic. Mirrors must have very low optical losses, since even a 1 percent loss in a 1 Megawatt laser sees 10 kilowatts of waste heat dumped into the mirrors.

It is this complex chemical laser system that is at the heart of the Iron Beam.  However, instead of being a single laser, it actually uses batteries of smaller lasers and a mirror to produce the final high power output beam.

The Israelis have been quite cagey about the specifics of the Iron Beam laser and have tried to intimate that it is a solid state laser.  However, unless they have made a dramatic leap forward in solid state laser design that hasn’t been replicated by other nations, that is probably false information designed to mislead other nations.

The principal problems with solid state laser technology are cost, scalability and power handling capability. As with the older lasers, at best they only turn 10% of their energy into laser power, leaving the other 90% as waste heat that can damage the solid state laser diodes. The American solid state laser that is being deployed on a ship this summer is estimated to have a power of only 15 – 50 kilowatts (the actual figure is classified).  And, it is only effective against approaching small aircraft or high-speed boats.

Harder targets, like that the Iron Beam is designed to stop, require much more power.  100 kilowatts, is enough power to destroy soft targets like small boats and drones.  To shoot down a hard target like a cruise or ballistic missile, megawatts of power would be needed. Solid state lasers aren’t close to doing that

This leaves us with the chemical laser solution, which has the megawatts of power to shoot down hard targets.

Although very little has been released about Iron Beam, Rafael’s research into laser weapons has been well documented.  The Iron Beam appears to be a derivative of the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) that was developed by the US and Israel.

The design aim of the THEL system was to provide a point defense weapon which was capable of engaging and destroying short range rockets like Katyushas, artillery shells, mortar rounds and low flying aircraft – the same goal of the Iron Beam system.  Although details are classified, it was a megawatt power laser.

The THEL demonstrator was tested between 2000 and 2004, and destroyed 28, 122 mm and 160 mm Katyusha rockets, multiple artillery shells, and mortar rounds, including a salvo attack by mortar.

The demonstrator THEL system was built around a deuterium fluoride chemical laser operating at a wavelength of 3.6 to 4.2 micrometers (Mid-Wavelength Infrared, also called thermal infrared). The weapons system burns ethylene in Nitrogen Trifluoride gas, which is then mixed with deuterium and helium, to produce the excited deuterium fluoride lasing medium.  This gas is then fed into expansion nozzles similar to that of other chemical lasers.

Untitled-1

The THEL prototype tested by Israel and the United States

Since the exhaust of this laser is hazardous to humans, a complex exhaust system must be used to absorb and neutralize the highly corrosive and toxic deuterium fluoride exhaust gas. However, the exhaust gasses contain much of the waste heat that made weapons grade lasers so difficult in the past.

The original demonstrator system was too large and took up three semitrailers.  However, Rafael has miniaturized Iron Beam enough to be relatively mobile.

But, size hasn’t been the only problem with fielding lasers as weapons.  In fact, it was these problems that caused the US to drop the program and stop funding it, although Israel continued to develop it.  And, it appears that many of these problems still plague the Iron Beam.

One of those problems is “blooming,” the phenomena caused by the high energy laser interacting with the atmosphere.  This causes the laser to spread out and disperse energy into the surrounding air.  The best way to counteract this is with a very short burst of laser energy that destroys the target before the blooming starts.  However, these shorter bursts limit the damage that the laser can do to a larger target.

The laser beam can also be absorbed, either by dust, water vapor, clouds, fog, snow, or rain.  Although the 3.6 – 4.2 micrometer wavelength of the laser is able to travel well through the dry atmosphere, humidity of any kind seriously attenuates the beam.  Carbon dioxide and hydrocarbons also seriously degrade the beam at this wavelength.  This makes it more effective in the drier, less populated parts of Israel, but significantly less effective in the humid, populated corridors along the seacoast.

Since water vapor limits the range, Iron Beam is only effective as a terminal defense system, protecting a small area around the missile site.  If, as has been claimed, Iron Beam is designed to stop missile and mortar attacks from Palestinian areas like Gaza, this failure to operate effectively in humidity makes it appear to less effective than claimed by Rafael.

The final problem is the high cost per shot.  The Iron Beam laser is similar to the hydrogen fluoride lasers that operate at 2.7-2.9 micrometers. This wavelength, however, is absorbed by the atmosphere, effectively attenuating the beam and reducing its reach, unless used in the vacuum of space.

Rafael solved the problem by opting for a more exotic, very scarce, and expensive fuel.  When the rare hydrogen isotope deuterium is used instead of hydrogen, the deuterium fluoride lases at the 3.6 – 4.2 micrometer wavelength. This makes the deuterium fluoride laser usable as a close in anti-missile system.  The fuel, however, is very expensive (deuterium only accounting for 0.0156% of all hydrogen on the earth), which means each shot can cost thousands of dollars.   A paper written by a member of the US Air Force Weapons Laboratory in 1980 said the cost of the laser fuel (used industrially) would be $1,000 per megawatt per second.  The THEL was estimated to cost $3,000 per shot.

No wonder the cost of the fuel and the problem of supplying and storing unusual chemical compounds of fluorine, and deuterium led the US to push for electrically pumped lasers instead of chemical lasers.

In the end, the effectiveness of the Israeli Iron Beam remains questionable.  It is capable of intercepting and destroying incoming missiles and artillery rounds.  However, it uses a technology that was cast aside by the Americans as being too expensive, logistically difficult to support, requiring highly toxic chemicals, and limited by range and humidity.

In the end, the Iron Beam may be so costly that it should be named the platinum beam.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Measuring Military Capabilities: An Essential Tool for Rebuilding American Military Strength

By Richard J. Dunn, III

Heritage Foundation

May 16, 2014

Backgrounder #2911

In the fall of 1945, much of Europe and Asia lay in ruins. The Soviet hammer and sickle flew over the German Reichstag and most of Eastern Europe, and Mao’s red star rose higher over a China devastated by almost a decade of war and Japanese occupation. The world had paid an extraordinarily high price in blood and treasure to defeat Nazi and Japanese aggression. Moreover, the war unleashed the political, economic, and social instability that contributed enormously to the rise of totalitarian, hostile, and expansionist Communist regimes, which required more decades of Cold War vigilance and hot war sacrifice in Korea and Vietnam to restrain.

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Middle East Notes and Comment: A Partnership for Egypt

By Jon B. Alterman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 21, 2014

Newsletter

The night Hosni Mubarak fell from power, Egyptians of all shades, sizes, and beliefs came together to celebrate the end of a fading dictatorship and the beginning of a bright new future. Amidst singing and fireworks, flag-wrapped Egyptians wept with joy.  As Egypt faces presidential elections this weekend, the future looks less bright and less new than any would have predicted three years ago. The military is clearly back, the economy is in shambles, and political space is constricting.  On a recent trip to Egypt, I met old friends who were triumphant that the Islamists had been set back. Yet I also saw palpable despair, not only among Islamists, but among liberals too. “I need to take stock this summer and decide if I have a future here,” said a friend, who had served in an interim government. “I just need a break from Egypt,” one political activist told me, gaunt-faced and weary.

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Post-Election Transition in Afghanistan

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 19, 2014

Report

Ever since Vietnam, the US has faced three major threats every time it has attempted a major counterinsurgency campaign in armed nation building:  The actual hostile forces, both in terms of native insurgent elements and outside support from other states and non-state actors.  Existing challenges in host country, including corruption, internal tensions, weak governance, and uncertain economics, that make it as much of a threat in practical terms as the armed opposition.  The failures within the US government to deal honestly and effectively with both the military and civil dimensions of the war, including attempts to transform states in the middle of conflict rather than set realistic goals; levels of costs and casualties that make sustaining the US effort difficult or impossible; and a failure to sustain the effort necessary to achieve a lasting impact.

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Syrian rebels don’t love Israel! OMG!

By Danielle Pletka

American Enterprise Institute

May 19, 2014

AEIdeas

My friends over at the Free Beacon have just posted an article revealing that the Syrian rebels armed by the United States seek “the return of all Syrian land occupied by Israel,” going on to explain that this “stance that could potentially complicate US military support to the armed rebel group.” Um, guys, what?  What exactly should the rebels say? Perhaps that the Golan Heights should stay with Israel? Sure! Why not! Or what they believe the “vetting” by US interlocutors ought to be: “How do you feel about the Jews?”  This is unserious for a whole lot of reasons.

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US Media Outreach to the Arab World: Reaching a Larger Audience More Effectively and for Less Money

By Joseph Braunde

Foreign Policy Research Institute

May 2014

America’s considerable spending on Arabic-language media ventures goes primarily to one pan-regional television network and one pan-regional radio network, both based on a model envisioned in the months following September 11 that is far less relevant to the region today: At the time, pan-regional TV networks like Al-Jazeera dominated the public discussion. Today, they have lost considerable market share to national television networks with a greater focus on domestic debates in their respective countries. The ongoing American attempt to address the entire region all at once, from Casablanca to Baghdad, is less likely to succeed than in the past. Political discourse in the early years following September 11 was largely caught up in perceived struggles between dark and light: America vs. the Muslim world; Israelis vs Palestinians. While these themes remain prominent, they occupy far less airtime than in the past. The greater concern which dominates Arab public discussions, in this ongoing period of upheaval and change, is the internal dynamics of Arab societies and debates over the future direction of each country. As such, what was once a prime directive for America’s Arabic broadcasts — to improve perceptions of the United States among Arab publics — is less urgent than in the past.

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Fallout in Lebanon: The Impact of Yabroud

By Geoffrey Daniels

Institute for the Study of War

May 16, 2014

The Syrian regime’s decisive victory over rebel forces in the Qalamoun stronghold of Yabroud, bolstered by support from Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian National Defense Forces, has significant implications in the overall context of the three-year conflict. Yet also worth a careful examination is the impact of the fall of Yabroud on Syria’s fragile neighbor, Lebanon, whose own security situation remains fragile as the conflict continues to spill across the border. The ripple effects from Yabroud test the resilience of Lebanon, a country less than one decade removed from a 29-year Syrian military occupation, by flooding the border regions of Arsal and Wadi Khaled with militants, weapons, explosives, and refugees while threatening tenuous sectarian divisions.

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Iraq’s Election Results: Avoiding a Kurdish Split

By Michael Knights

Washington Institute

May 21, 2014

The votes are in, but Baghdad will need to resuscitate the revenue-sharing deal with the Kurds in order to steady the already-troubled government formation process.  On May 19, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) released the results of Iraq’s April 30 national elections, and Shiite prime minister Nouri al-Maliki scored strongly on two fronts. First, his State of Law Alliance held its ground, winning 92 seats in the new 328-seat parliament compared to 89 in the previous 325-seat assembly. Second, he surpassed his personal vote count of 622,000 in 2010 by collecting 727,000 votes this time. Although rival Shiite parties and Kurdish and Sunni Arab oppositionists collectively won around 160 seats — just shy of the 165 required to ratify a prime minister — opponents of a third Maliki term would have to set aside their differences and demonstrate near-perfect cohesion to unseat him. Maliki is therefore the front runner for now, though his victory is not a foregone conclusion by any means.

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Libya’s Growing Risk of Civil War

By Andrew Engel

Washington Institute

May 20, 2014

PolicyWatch 2256

Long-simmering tensions between non-Islamist and Islamist forces have boiled over into military actions centered around Benghazi and Tripoli, entrenching the country’s rival alliances and bringing them ever closer to civil war.  On May 16, former Libyan army general Khalifa Haftar launched “Operation Dignity of Libya” in Benghazi, aiming to “‫cleanse the city of terrorists.” The move came three months after he announced the overthrow of the government but failed to act on his proclamation. Since Friday, however, army units loyal to Haftar have actively defied armed forces chief of staff Maj. Gen. Salem al-Obeidi, who called the operation “a coup.” And on Monday, sympathetic forces based in Zintan extended the operation to Tripoli. These and other developments are edging the country closer to civil war, complicating U.S. efforts to stabilize post-Qadhafi Libya.

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Between Not-In and All-In: U.S. Military Options in Syria

By Chandler P. Atwood, Joshua C. Burgess, Michael Eisenstadt, and Joseph D. Wawro

Washington Institute

May 2014

Policy Notes 18

The Syrian war has left more than 150,000 dead and more than 9 million displaced. With diplomacy and sanctions having failed to achieve their objectives, the Obama administration is reportedly considering a more proactive role in the conflict. The impulse to refrain from military intervention remains understandable, but the costs of nonintervention may be even steeper: an al-Qaeda foothold and expanded Iranian influence in the Levant, a new generation of jihadists poised to migrate to other conflicts, social tensions and political instability in neighboring states, and growing doubts about U.S. credibility. Nor does military intervention necessarily imply boots on the ground.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 16-05-2014

ANALYSIS

 

Syria: What is happening on its Southern Border?

Since the beginning, news reports have focused more on the Syrian  war in the north and the battles around Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.  However, there has been a second front, along Syria’s southern border that has become just as important, especially given the recent setbacks to the military and political campaign of the Syrian Rebels.

“For the past two months the Syrian army has suffered some serious setbacks in the southern sector, at least in the short term,” Ehud Yaari told the BBC.  “I have always believed that the key to the conflict would be in the southern sector and it’s beginning to tilt that way.  The way the Syrian army and its allies like Hezbollah are deployed means that there is an opening in the south.”  Yaari is a fellow for the Washington Institute and a commentator on Israeli television.

Although it has received less media coverage, the southern front, which runs along the Jordanian/Syrian/Israeli border, is probably the most important at this point of time.  First, it is a major pipeline for material assistance from the GCC nations like Saudi Arabia.  Second, it is the base for training camps run by American, British, and French Special Forces.  Third, the front hasn’t become an extension of Jordan’s foreign policy in the same way the northern front has become an attempt by Turkey to extend its control.  Finally, the southern front is where Israel is aiding the rebels in hope of keeping the occupied Golan Heights under control.

All of this has come into focus as Syrian rebels have launched an offensive in the Golan Heights.  The immediate goal of the rebels seems to be the crossing point between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Syrian-controlled territory at Quneitra, and the roads leading to the town itself.  They are making significant headway against the two Syrian army brigades – the 61st and the 91st – that once guarded the Israeli/Syrian border.  The rebel attacks have been so strong that both brigades are now considered nearly inoperative.

In most reported accounts, despite heavy artillery support, the 61st brigade was outmaneuvered by the rebels at the Tel al-Jabia military base near Nawa. The 91st brigade lost control over much of the border area with Israel, including the high ground of Tel al-Ahmar (the Red Hills) and Tel Kudna.  Units of the Syrian 3rd Division still hold the northern part of Derra, while rebels hold the rest of this border town.

The Jordanian Connection

The reason for the relatively successful push against the Syrian army in the south has been the slow build up of trained Syrian rebels and arms in Jordan.  Here, Western nations and several GCC countries are training and arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

The training appears to be from Special Forces of France, Britain, and the US.  There have also been reports of American private security contractors in the training camps too.

The lessons have focused on small and medium arms, as well as mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), man portable anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft cannon.  There has been no training on sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles like the Stinger because the West is afraid that they will end up in the hands of” non friendly or moderate” terrorists.

Training has focused on Russian supplied arms like the AK-47, AK-74, RPG-7, the Russian-designed 14.5-millimeter antitank rifles, Concourse antitank missiles, 82-millimeter recoil-less rifles, and 23-millimeter antiaircraft weapons.  The reason for training on Russian arms is that these are the type most likely to be captured from Syrians military arsenals.  They are also the type supplied by the American CIA, which according to reports has transferred many captured Russian arms from Libya to Syria, via Turkey and Jordan.  The course of training for the rebels is about two weeks long and usually designed to train about 40 rebels at a time.

Although there has been a reticence to giving the rebels portable surface to air missiles, it appears that they have been given some Russian systems.  The Strela-2 (NATO designation, SA-7 Grail) is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude surface-to-air missile system with a high explosive warhead and passive infrared homing guidance. It was the first generation of Soviet man-portable SAMs, entering service in 1968, with series production starting in 1970.  It has been used by the Syrian Army in Lebanon and there are reports that the CIA acquired stocks of them from Libya.

There has been considerable reticence to provide the rebels with American made arms.  There are several reasons for this.  The CIA has for decades stocked a supply of foreign made (frequently Russian) weapons that can be supplied to pro-American guerillas.  This has allowed the CIA to hide its involvement in a civil war and gives the American government plausible deniability.  These were the type of arms given originally to the Afghan rebels in the late 1970s.

These arms have come from several sources like Libya and even former Warsaw Pact countries.

Russian made arms are also easier to support in Syria as the ammunition for them is available from captured soldiers and arsenals.

Finally, the US is not eager to pass its technology to groups that may pass them on to terrorist organizations.

That, position, may have finally changed.  Recently, there have been a few American BGM TOW-71 anti-tank missiles provided to the FSA.  It is produced by Raytheon in Tucson, Arizona, but these are probably drawn from Saudi military stocks and passed to the rebels with American approval.  The Israel Defense Forces used TOW missiles during the 1982 Lebanon War. On 11 July Israeli anti-tank teams armed with the TOW ambushed Syrian armored forces and destroyed 11 Syrian tanks.  They were also used effectively in Operation Desert Storm against Iraqi tanks.

The TOW missiles that have been seen in the hands of Syrian rebels are being used by Harakat Hazam, a Free Syrian Army group that is mostly composed of survivors from the now-defunct Kataeb Farouq FSA group. They are less militant than the Islamic Front, and General Idris has been the most active solicitor of American aid for the FSA. This indicates that the Obama Administration is being careful in who receives these weapons.  These weapons have been used in battle and have been responsible for destroying Syrian tanks and preventing the Syrian Army from counterattacking in the south.

Interestingly, Harakat Hazam also been seen with some shoulder fired surface to air missiles recently (frequently called man portable air defense systems – MANPADS).   According to Fox News, some of the TOWs provided to rebels since March are equipped with a complex, fingerprint-keyed security device that controls who can fire it.  It’s likely that any American MANPADS like the Stinger will be similarly equipped.

The appearance of these weapons in the Syrian theater indicates that the US has decided to increase pressure on the Assad regime.

Rather than allowing the newly trained forces reenter the war in small groups, they have been dispatched back into Syria in larger battalion or brigade strengths.  This indicates that rather than allowing the rebels to continue operating as small guerilla forces that merely harasses the Syrian Army, the focus is on larger, more conventional units that can engage similar Syrian forces and win.  Some observers think the rebel strength in the south is around 20,000 men.

This focus on larger, more conventional forces is clearly seen in recent operations in southern Syria, where the FSA has pushed back the Syrian Army’s 61st and 91st brigades despite their superior artillery firepower.  However, they do not have the strength to force the Syrian Army out of the town of Quenitra.

Clearly, the Syrian Arab military forces are stretched and he doesn’t have regular, reliable army forces to reinforce the southern front – leaving the regime to rely upon loyalist militias.  At this time, President Assad must rely upon the 9th Division to hold the door to Damascus closed.  The 9th Division is stationed in al-Kiswah, Qatana, and Kanaker on the Damascus outskirts

The Israeli Factor

But Quenitra isn’t just a town on the road to Damascus.  It is just a mile from the Israeli/Syrian cease fire line and rebel control of the border would mean that the Syrian Army would not be facing the IDF – a fact that the Israelis would like.  And, if the rebels are backed by Israel, they can carry out an offensive against Assad and Damascus without worrying about a hostile force in their rear.

Although not as visible, the Israelis have been an active partner in the internal Syrian war.  Ehud Yaari, has said, “It would not be wrong to assume some kind of contact between the Israel Defense Forces and certain rebel groups.”

Yaari also writes, “These groups are making sure — among other things — not to provoke the Israelis across the border, although rebel-regime fighting often does occur within meters of the 1974 separation line agreed upon between” Israel” and Syria.  It seems Presiden Assad does not have sufficient forces to protect the southern sector, which is proving to be the regime’s soft underbelly, and he cannot raise the reinforcements necessary to block the coming offensive already promised by the rebel command. Assad is also aware of the rebels’ strict avoidance of any clashes with Israel. Indeed, the rebels view Israel as “having their back” on the Golan Heights, so that many reliable sources are pointing already to the IDF of “facilitating” the rebels’ moves during their Quneitra offensive, explained by Israel’s declaration of the Golan border area as a “closed military zone.” The area is restricted for civilian movement, and both security and intelligence operations have been intensified.”

Some 1600 wounded Syrians, many of them rebels have been tended by Israeli hospitals.  There has also been some “humanitarian” assistance given to villages across the frontier.

Although the official Israeli position is that they will not interfere unless there is some violence leaking across the border, Israel does benefit if President Assad falls.  Assad regime is seen in Israel as a key link between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  If Assad falls, Hezbollah loses its strategic position of strength in Lebanon.

Recently, the Abu Dhabi-based newspaper The National reported that Israeli agents giving large sums of cash to Syrian rebel factions.  The newspaper cited a source from one of the rebel factions in southern Syria who claims that at least three opposition groups fighting Assad have received numerous payments totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars from Israeli agents who sought information about the identities of all Islamist militants who have established bases near the Syrian-Israeli border.

But, Israeli cooperation with the rebel movement goes further than” humanitarian assistance” and money for information on Islamic radicals.  According to reports, it is secretly working with Jordan, which also is worried about al-Qaida-linked groups targeting its own government.  Jordan could also be assisted with Israeli intelligence and technological assistance.

The Future of Syria

Given the facts on the ground – Rebel advances in the south and the appearance of supplying technologically advanced American weapons; it appears that America has finally decided to move more aggressively on Syria.  In fact, General Bashir of the FSA’s Supreme Military Council said the United States has been heavily involved in the recent increase of advanced arms to parts of the Free Syrian Army. He argued that the FSA’s handling of the TOW anti-tank missiles should give the American government enough confidence to start providing anti-aircraft weapons, as well.

This turnaround was also signaled this week in Washington as Syrian rebels were greeted by a somewhat apologetic Secretary of State Kerry.  In a private meeting with Syrian opposition leaders, Secretary of State John Kerry said he believed the international community “wasted a year” by not working together to help topple Assad.  Kerry told Syrian Opposition Coalition president Ahmad Jarba that the various countries trying to help the Free Syrian Army had failed to coordinate their efforts effectively for a long time.  And, that lack of coordination had dramatically set back the drive to stop Assad and counter the growing terrorism threat in Syria.

Jarba also met with Obama and Rice during the Washington visit.  Although the meeting was described and, “encouraging and productive,” little of substance appeared to come out of it.

It has been reported that Kerry has been frustrated with the Obama administration’s Syria policy for a long time and has been quietly advocating a more robust aid to the rebels, only to be stopped repeatedly by the White House.  The collapse of the Syrian talks in Geneva only made the case for support of the Syrian rebels that much clearer.

The visit was to push for more aid for the rebels, especially MANPADS.  General Bashir noted, “The FSA has been dealing very well with the TOW missiles. Under our protection, people are trained to use them, and it is with the collaboration and under the supervision of the United States…The main purpose for our visit is to get anti-aircraft weapons to protect innocent civilians inside Syria, and we are hoping the United States is going to help us push aside Assad’s air force.”

Although the supply of American arms has increased, much depends on how the weapons are used effectively.  There remain strong voices in the White House that would want to stop the arms flow if the Syrian rebels either fails to advance or are discovered selling the arms to unfriendly elements.  The next few months in the south of Syria may very well determine the course of Syria’s internal war and the future of the country.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Transition in Afghanistan: A U.S. Leadership Vacuum that Urgently Needs Hard Decisions and Real and Honest Leadership

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 12, 2014

Ever since Vietnam, the U.S. has faced three major threats every time it has attempted a major counterinsurgency campaign and exercise in armed nation building:  The actual hostile forces both in terms of native insurgent elements and outside support from other states and non-state actors.  The corruption, internal tensions, weak governance, and uncertain economics in the host country state that make it as much of a threat in practical terms as the armed opposition.  The failures within the U.S. government to deal honestly and effectively with both the military and civil dimensions of the war, the effort to transform states in the middle of conflict rather than set realistic goal, a resulting level of costs and casualties that makes sustain the U.S. effort difficult or impossible, and a failure to sustain the lesser level of effort necessary to achieve a lasting impact.

Read more

 

 

Has Iran overplayed its hand in Iraq?

By Michael Rubin

American Enterprise Institute

May 13, 2014

Al Qaeda’s seizure of Ramadi and Fallujah in January 2014 propelled questions of sectarianism in Iraq to the forefront of Iraqi politics. Sectarianism, of course, is nothing new in Iraq. While some analysts attribute the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq with unleashing sectarianism, the tension between Sunni and Shi’ite Iraqis long ­predates Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ba’athism, the ideology that late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein embraced, was inherently sectarian. While it embraced Arabism as its central pillar, Saddam and many of his aides saw true Arabism through a sectarian lens. He suspected Shi’ites of harboring loyalty to Iran; indeed, he often labeled Iraqi Shi’ites “Safawi,” the Arabic name for the 16th-century Safavid dynasty that converted Iran to Shi’ism. Beginning in the 1960s with the Ba’athist seizure of power and then in the 1980s with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Ba’athist regime stripped tens of thousands of Shi’ites of Iraqi citizenship and deported them to Iran. The Shi’ites, however, have from the beginning of Iraqi statehood considered themselves and their more traditional tribal ways as representing a more pure Arab identity.

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Beyond the Great Game: Towards a National Political Process in Afghanistan Post-2014

By Frederic Grare, William Maley, and Amitabh Mattoo

Carnegie Endowment

May 12, 2014

Australia India Institute

As the end of the drawdown of international forces approaches in Afghanistan, concerns are mounting about its potential impact on regional stability. By the end of 2014, all Western combat forces will have left the country. Yet despite official rhetoric, twelve years of war and billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan have neither eliminated the country’s insurgency nor dealt effectively with any of the regional irritants that have historically motivated Afghanistan’s neighbors to lend their support to various actors in the conflict.  Regional involvement in Afghanistan has been pervasive since the end of the 1970s and the Soviet invasion of the country. For more than 30 years, India and Pakistan, in different ways, have projected their fierce rivalry into Afghanistan; Pakistan and Iran have done the same. China, Russia, and a number of states in Central Asia observe the evolution of the US presence in the country and the resurgence of the insurgency with equal anxiety.

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Kuwaiti Salafism and Its Growing Influence in the Levant

By Zoltan Pall

Carnegie Endowment

May 7, 2014

The internal developments and dynamics of Salafism in Kuwait have global significance. In the Middle East, where Salafism’s influence has been rising since the Arab revolutions began in 2011, diverse Kuwaiti Salafi groups and networks have forged close contacts with Salafis in other states. But competition among Kuwaiti Salafi currents has produced corresponding fissures in local Salafi communities in Lebanon and Syria, with far-reaching consequences for each country.

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The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the “Cleansing” of Deir ez-Zour

By Valerie Szybala

Institute for the Study of War

May 14, 2014

Following the January 2014 uprising by rebel groups in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), ISIS contracted its footprint in Syria. The group was pushed out, tactically withdrew, or went below the radar in cities and towns across much of Idlib, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zour. It continued to battle the Kurds in Hasaka, but constituted most of its strength in ar-Raqqa, where it is in firm control of the provincial capital and several other towns. In Syria’s eastern province of Deir ez-Zour, ISIS is attempting a resurgence. At the end of March 2014, ISIS began to move forces from the north into place for an offensive back into the heart of rebel territory in Deir ez-Zour province. This resurgence has come in the form of an offensive largely against Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front, which are predominant in the province. Local tribal militias have come to play an increasing role as well.

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Surprise Rotation of Saudi Defense Officials

By Simon Henderson

Washington Institute

May 14, 2014

A series of royal orders issued today in the name of King Abdullah at the stated request of his heir apparent and defense minister, Crown Prince Salman, has radically changed Saudi Arabia’s political and professional military command. Perhaps most newsworthy is the appointment of Prince Khaled bin Bandar as deputy defense minister. Out goes the thirty-seven-year-old Prince Salman bin Sultan, who was just appointed to the role last August after replacing a lesser royal who had assumed the post four months prior.

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Turkey’s Presidential Prospects: Assessing Recent Trends

By Soner Cagaptay

Washington Institute

May 2014

Research Notes 18

The outcome of Turkey’s March municipal elections and other recent developments offer new insight into how the country’s upcoming presidential election season will unfold. To win the presidency in August, the governing Justice and Development Party’s presumed candidate, Prime Minister Erdogan, will need to win at least 50 percent of the vote — a considerable task even for a longtime leader with several electoral victories under his belt.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 09-05-2014

ANALYSIS

 

The Ukraine Crisis – New Cold War, Containment, or What?

Even though Putin has promised to pull Russian forces back from the Ukraine border, policy makers are still busy “resetting” relations towards Russia.  The generation of friendship has passed and the world is once again looking at an defiant and strong Russia that is feared by its neighbors, carrying out naval and air patrols of NATO countries, and exporting weapons to allied nations.

Unfortunately, many see the new conflict in terms of the old Cold War, with the NATO forces pitted against the Soviet empire and the Warsaw Pact.  Such an assumption is misguided and could lead to serious miscalculations.

The best way to view it is first through the eyes of the nation who has the initiative, Russia and its leader Putin.

The Putin Outlook

Russian pride in their country is at a point that it hasn’t seen since the days of the Soviet Union.  Russia is expanding and flexing its political and military muscle under the leadership of Putin.  Former Soviet satellite nations and former parts of the USSR are looking with foreboding at events in the Ukraine and the potential dismemberment of that country.

For all this joy, Russia is facing serious problems.  The Russian bear that is worrying Eastern Europe is not the same as the Soviet bear of 50 years ago.

The rump Russia of today isn’t the vast Soviet Union of 25 years ago.  Russia, is smaller, has a smaller economy, fewer industrial resources, evolving strong bureaucracy free of corruption, and an older population than before.  Meanwhile, NATO is economically and militarily larger by statistics.  Since military might is a reflection of economic power, Russia is clearly outnumbered by NATO.

It’s also important to remember that Russia no longer has the satellite nations of the Warsaw Pact to back it up militarily or economically.  In fact, the majority of those nations are members of NATO and openly hostile to Russian expansionism.

Although Russia has continued to pursue military technology, they have fallen even further behind the West in many areas.  While they have tried to maintain some edges in fighter technology, air defense, and space, they have been unable to invest in other areas.  For instance, their Main Battle Tank is the T-90, a modernization of the T-72.  Purchases have been limited recently as the Russian Army has decided to save money now in order to invest in the T-99 Universal Combat Platform due to enter service in 2020.

Even, when they have the technology, they have been unable to upgrade due to cost and production issues.  The Russian Air Force wanted to upgrade its existing Mig-29 fleet to the modernized MiG-29SMT configuration, but financial difficulties have limited deliveries.  Design problems have already forced a two-year delay in implementing a state procurement order for thirty-seven Su-35 aircraft, which will not be fulfilled until 2016.  And, there remains the Soviet era issue of quality control.

Another example of Russia’s inability to stay in step with technological development is the list of high tech weapons they must import.  These include, drones from Israel, the Iveco light multirole vehicles from Italy, and the Mistral amphibious assault ships from France.  These are all weapon technologies that are likely to be unavailable to Russia in the future.

This inability to modernize all parts of the Russian military is compounded by the state of Russian equipment right after the breakup of the USSR.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent republics became host to most of the formations with modern equipment, whereas Russia was left with lower-category units, usually with older equipment. As the Russian defense budget began to shrink, the amount of new equipment fell as well, and by 1998, only ten tanks and about 30 BMP infantry fighting vehicles were being purchased each year.

Although defense spending has grown in recent years, much of that money is going to personnel costs as Russia strives to build a professional army.  Equipment modernization is failing to catch up.  In the meantime, conscripts, who only serve one year, still make up half of the Russian Army.

This lack of modern equipment may be part of the reason for the Russian insurgency operations in the Ukraine.  Although Russia has engaged in several invasions, starting with the Russian invasion of Dagestan, the post Soviet army has yet to be seriously tested.  And, although modern aircraft can defeat the Ukrainian Air Force, it is the soldier and his equipment that must occupy the Ukraine in order to declare success.

Here Putin faces another problem.  Russian conscripts due to rotate back to civilian life this year are due to be mustered out starting this month, which will cause a decline in the quality of Russian Army forces on the Ukraine border.  This may force Putin to either react quickly and invade in the next few weeks or wait until the new Russian conscripts are combat ready.  Clearly, the lack of modern equipment and battle readiness of much of the Russian Army will give Putin some reason for concern.

In the meantime, Putin is facing a weakened economy.  Although Russia has natural energy resources and willing buyers in Europe, the rest of the economy is weak.  He is also facing economic sanctions, a declining ruble, money fleeing the country, and a lower credit rating for the type of borrowing that Russia needs to modernize its military.  Therefore, a serious military buildup would threaten the economy and damage his popularity at a time, where he is clearly the most popular Russian politician.

What Putin needs is a Ukrainian conquest on the cheap.

Although a conventional invasion of the Ukraine would have been faster, Putin opted for an insurgency campaign that would provide enough political cover to freeze NATO leaders so they wouldn’t take any aggressive action.  It relies on a small number of highly professional Special Forces instead of the larger Russian Army, which is made up of 50% conscripts.

Not only is the insurgency operation cheaper than a conventional military invasion, it offers a variety of political and military outcomes that can be modified depending on the need.  An insurgency can weaken the Ukraine in such a way that allows a pro-Russian government to take power.  It can also force a split of the Eastern Ukraine and leave the pro-European Ukraine a shadow if its former self.  It also weakens the Ukraine military in such a way that it would pose less of a threat if an invasion is attempted.

The insurgency war, however, isn’t without its problems.  There is a historical hatred between the Ukraine and Russia, which means the Ukrainians might start insurgency operations against ethnic Russians in areas under Russian control.  This will be helped by the Ukraine military, which has ample numbers of small arms to smuggle to Ukrainian insurgents.

Such a war would pose major problems for the Russian Army if it decided to move in to “protect” ethnic Russians in the Ukraine.  The Russian Army has been equipped for conventional warfare on the open plains of Central Europe.  Just as the American Army had problems adjusting to guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq after they had successfully completed their invasion, so, the Russian will find their army bogged down in a war that it is not doctrinally designed or equipped to fight.  It is also dogged by poor logistics, which prevent protracted combat operations.

An insurgency war also benefits NATO, who can secretly support it with equipment or special forces.  The war would not only tie up and weaken Russian forces, it would buy breathing space for NATO countries to rearm.

If the insurgency option doesn’t work for Russia, it still has the conventional invasion option.  It creates a fait accompli to NATO and reduces the risk of the Ukrainian crisis evolving into a more serious international situation.

However, a conventional invasion doesn’t solve all the problems.  An insurgency by Ukrainians in the western part of the country is likely, tying down large numbers of Russians.  Such operations would force the military to switch its procurement from conventional purchases of tanks and armored vehicles to counter-insurgency weapons, which have marginal use in a conventional military context.  And, there is a great likelihood that some NATO countries would actively support such guerrilla activities (there was already a mention of NATO training assistance by the Ukrainian foreign minister a few weeks ago).

A guerrilla war in the Ukraine would also hamstring the Russian military, which relies on Ukrainian parts for its war machine.  According to a 2009 survey by Kiev’s Razumkov Center, Ukrainian factories produce the engines that power most Russian combat helicopters; about half of the air-to-air missiles deployed on Russian fighter planes; and a range of engines used by Russian aircraft and naval vessels. The state-owned Antonov works in Kiev makes the AN-70 transport aircraft. These factories could be damaged in combat or sabotaged by Ukrainian insurgents.

A conventional invasion of the Ukraine would also mean more economic sanctions and the loss of international customers who are reticent about dealing with an aggressive Russia.  For instance, there is already economic fallout for an international economic conference in Russia.  The top executives of such giants as Alcoa, Goldman Sachs, PepsiCo, Morgan Stanley, ConocoPhillips and other multinational companies with business in Russia have either pulled out of the conference or plan to do so. Corporate officials predicted that nearly every American C.E.O. will now skip the forum in St. Petersburg.

A conventional invasion would also spark more NATO activity.  The forces that have been recently deployed to Eastern European NATO nations would be supplemented.  More active patrolling of land, sea and air boundaries would take place.  Needless to say, NATO countries would expand their military spending.

The long term outlook for Russia is murky.  Its Ukrainian intervention will spark an arms race that it is economically unable to win.  Its army is still burdened with outmoded, technologically out-of-date weapons.  And, it will not be able to rely upon foreign customers to buy its weapons, which means that costs to outfit its forces will go up (for instance, in 2013, American civilians bought more AK rifles from Russia than the Russian military and police forces combined.  This is unlikely to continue in current circumstances).

The NATO Outlook

NATO is currently in a reactive mode, as it models its policy to account for the latest Russian moves.  It clearly doesn’t want to return to a Cold War mentality and during the last generation, it has developed economic and technological ties to Russia that it is loath to sever.  Europe relies on Russia for a portion of its energy needs.  The US relies on Russia to commute to and from the International Space Station.  And, the US needs Russia’s logistical help as it pulls out of Afghanistan.

However, as the Ukrainian crisis has grown, NATO has moved to contain the Russian threat.  The US has sent F-16 and F-15 fighter aircraft to Poland and the Baltic States.  They have also sent Marines to Poland and Romania.  They have also moved more naval vessels into the Black Sea.  The UK, France and Denmark have also contributed aircraft to the Baltic State air defense mission.  Although these are not sizable forces, they will act as a tripwire that will discourage Russia from expanding its control westwards.

The US has also stationed paratroopers and C-130 aircraft to Poland, which gives the US a rapid deployment force in the east.

The US has also moved early warning aircraft to Eastern Europe to patrol the easternmost border of the NATO community.  And, joint maneuvers with NATO and Ukrainian forces are still scheduled.

Other containment actions will come.  The US will be more aggressive in positioning its missile defense ships in order to lessen the threat of Russian missile to NATO countries.  This could include the Eastern Mediterranean and Baltic.  There will probably be a renewed interest in stationing ABM systems in Eastern Europe as well.

Another important policy move for NATO will be a rapprochement with Turkey, which has been largely ignored as a result of Erdogan’s political moves.  Turkey has one of the largest armies in NATO and is the anchor to NATO’s southern flank.  Turkey is critical for a continued stationing of naval forces in the Black Sea and offers military bases for the stationing of troops and air assets that will be within reach of southern Russia and the Ukraine.

There are also long term goals for NATO.  The first is to economically and technically disengage from Russia.  This will hurt a Russia, whose economy needs that money and technology to grow.

In the mid to long term Europe will also move towards energy independence from Russia.  This includes larger American exports to Europe and European exploration of the Mediterranean, which has promising energy reserves.

NATO will also increase its defense spending and redirect its focus.  While groups like al Qaeda remain a threat, the NATO militaries will move away from a counter-terrorist and counter insurgency warfare focus and look at modernizing and increasing their conventional military forces.  They also will refocus on Europe instead of being a worldwide rapid reaction force.  Those modernized forces then will be forward deployed into Eastern European NATO countries like the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania.  In fact, Poland has requested two NATO brigades be permanently stationed in their country.

Another key focus must be an ABM system, which was planned during the Bush Administration, but was downgraded under Obama.  Aegis interceptors are scheduled to be stationed in Poland in 2018, but the current crisis may push that date up.  An interceptor site will be placed in Romania in 2015.  An effective missile defense will greatly enhance European security, not only against Russia, but  potential nuclear Iran.

A push for a more aggressive NATO may increase Poland’s stature in the alliance.  Poland has one of the larger militaries in the alliance, is strongly committed to its defense against Russia, is contributing a larger portion of its GDP to defense spending, and has deployed its military to Afghanistan and other nations.  It also has the largest army in Eastern Europe, with about 900 tanks and over 100 combat aircraft.  Although much of the equipment is former Soviet, they are aggressively modernizing with new German Leopard tanks.  They also carry out joint exercises with the Ukraine.  In a new NATO that is more focused on Russia, Poland is likely to be the cornerstone in NATO’s Eastern European defense.

Conclusion

Although it easy to see the Ukrainian crisis in a Cold War viewpoint, it’s critical to note the differences.

This isn’t a Soviet Empire against NATO.  This is a rump Russia against a vastly larger NATO, which contains most of its former Warsaw Pact allies.  Russia is clearly economically and militarily outnumbered.  The image of a vastly outnumbered NATO alliance facing a horde of modern Soviet tanks in Central Europe is long gone.  “It used to be when people talked about the Russian military, the point was it was a steamroller,” Mr. Kipp, of the Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office told a reporter. “Got steam up very slowly. It had a capacity to mobilize echelon on echelon. That’s what we feared at NATO: large, competent forces right on the Germany border and then the capacity to mobilize the entire society for a high-intensity industrial war.

“There is no great mobilization capacity in Russia today,” he said. “What that means is, in a crisis, if the military gets into problems, the Kremlin has some very unappealing options.

On the other hand, NATO has more men, tanks, and aircraft.  They are also more modern and have the deep industrial capacity to mobilize.

Putin has tried to pick up Ukrainian territory on the cheap, with an insurgency that gives him a degree of political cover.  However, insurgency works both ways and an Eastern Ukraine in pro Russian hands could face Ukrainian insurgents.  And, that same insurgency problem will be compounded if Russia decided to invade areas inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, Putin wants to modernize the Russian military to make it more of a force in international affairs.  However, war is expensive and tends to downgrade armies as they wear down current equipment and delay modernization.  He also has a military that is relatively untried and any failure on their part would be a major political disaster.

NATO is trying to understand Russia’s weaknesses and exploit them.  Russia is in dire straits with a crumbling economy supported only by large energy resources, but hamstrung by pockets of corruption.  Putin can only succeed if NATO overestimates his strength and imagines that this is a new Cold War, with two relatively equal rivals.

The Ukrainian crisis is helping Putin’s popularity at home, but it can blow up in his face if NATO can respond as an effective united pact, but there are no strong signs of such reality so far.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Strengthen Bilateral Defense Cooperation with Georgia

By Luke Coffey

Heritage Foundation

May 5, 2014

Issue Brief #4214

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel will soon meet with his Georgian counterpart, Irakli Alasania. Georgia has been a steadfast ally of the United States. Thousands of Georgian troops have served alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hundreds have been wounded, and dozens have been killed.  This meeting offers an opportunity for Secretary Hagel to thank Georgia for its contribution in Afghanistan, congratulate Georgia on its military reforms, and lay the groundwork for deeper bilateral cooperation. Few countries in the Euro-Atlantic region express as much enthusiasm for NATO as Georgia—even though it is not yet inside NATO. Georgia also welcomes the presence of U.S. forces. Currently, a small detachment of U.S. Marines located at the Krtsanisi National Training Center is preparing Georgian soldiers for combat operations in Afghanistan. In addition, elements of the U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force and U.S. National Guard and reserve units visit Georgia for joint training missions.

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The Afghan Civil Transition Crisis: Afghanistan’s Status and the Warnings from Iraq’s Failure

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 6, 2014

For more than a decade, the U.S. and its allies have been issuing claims about the progress being made in Afghanistan, and have tended to focus on success as measured in holding elections rather than the quality of governance and real world economic progress.  It is now a matter of months before the U.S. and its allies withdraw virtually all of their combat troops from Afghanistan. As yet, the U.S. has no meaningful public plan for transition, has not proposed any public plan for either the civil or military aspects of transition, and remains focused on the quality of the Afghan election rather than the quality of the leadership, governance, and conditions of Afghan life that will follow.

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Israel’s missile defense bluff

By Michael Rubin

American Enterprise Institute

May 5, 2014

Iron Dome has become Israel’s first line of defense against missile attacks from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, Hezbollah-run areas of southern Lebanon, and any other potential combatants. On 1 April 2014, however, the Iron Dome system near Israel’s southernmost city of Eilat launched due to a false alarm. The system failure led to a number of Iranian officials ridiculing Israel and publicly questioning whether the Iron Dome system is more propaganda than real. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Ramezan Sharif, for example, told Fars News that not only is Iron Dome unable to provide security for the Israeli “occupiers,” but the system itself also poses a serious threat to the Zionists.

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Iranian flotilla docks in Djibouti

By Michael Rubin

American Enterprise Institute

May 5, 2014

The Islamic Republic continues to expand the operational reach of its navy. Whereas once Iranian ships limited themselves to the Persian Gulf or nearby littoral waters in the Indian Ocean, in recent years the Iranian Navy has expanded its reach, sending ships through the Suez Canal, into the Pacific Ocean, and around southern Africa and into the Atlantic Ocean. The Iranian presence in the Red Sea and off the Horn of Africa has become even more frequent.

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What the United States Wants in Egypt

By Thomas Carothers

Carnegie Endowment

May 1, 2014

During the last several years numerous Egyptian friends have repeatedly expressed to me puzzlement, regret, and sometimes anger about U.S. policy toward their country. Their complaints are many, but one powerful theme stands out: they are convinced that the United States, both under George Bush and Barack Obama, has favored the Muslim Brotherhood. When I ask people why they think the United States has taken a pro-Brotherhood line, they say the United States wants to weaken Egypt, and that stirring up divisions in the country and having the Brotherhood come to power is a way to do that. They also believe Americans have an Orientalist view of Egypt, one that implies Islamist rule is the country’s natural destiny.

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Disclosure: Iran’s New Diplomatic Weapon

By Ilan Berman

The American Foreign Policy Council
May 5, 2014

Give the Iranian regime credit for creativity. In the midst of extensive nuclear negotiations with the West, officials in Tehran have apparently hit upon a new way to play for time.  On the heels of the most recent — and largely fruitless — round of consultations in Vienna between Tehran and the P5+1 (the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, France, and Germany), Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization has proffered a full tally of the country’s nuclear project. In what is ostensibly intended as a confidence-building measure, IAEO spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi has confirmed  that the Islamic Republic is preparing a “comprehensive document” detailing the extent of its quarter-century-old nuclear effort. But the product won’t come quickly; “This is time-consuming, as we need to coordinate with other government bodies, but we hope to have it finished in eight months,” Kamalvandi has maintained.  The timing is telling.

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Turkish Stakes in the Ukraine Crisis

By Ian Lesser

German Marshall Fund

May 6, 2014

Over the longer-term, a more competitive and conflict-prone relationship between Russia and the West will test the foundations of recent Turkish foreign policy. It will also test Ankara’s cooperation with transatlantic partners. First, the current crisis underscores the return of hard security challenges on Turkey’s borders. Second, the crisis in relations with Russia comes at a time of considerable unease in Turkey’s relations with NATO partners, many of which are not on the same page when it comes to Syria and other questions of deep concern to Ankara. Third, and more positively, the Ukraine crisis is likely to drive NATO strategy and planning in directions Turkish strategists will prefer.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 02-05-2014

ANALYSIS

 

Prospects of Civil Unrest

in the United States?

Last week’s analysis of the stand off between armed federal agents and American protestors and militia members was well received by our readers and elicited questions about the potential stability of the United States.  What are the chances of civil unrest in the US?  What sort of threat do these militias pose to the US?  Are divisions in the US really that serious?  What sort of outcome could come of this?

America is a unique nation.  Unlike most nations, it isn’t ethnically based – it is multicultural and multiethnic.  It hasn’t had a hereditary ruling family.  It is based on the concept that each person deserves the maximum amount of personal liberty and freedom from government – rights recognized in the US Constitution.  This freedom of the individual means that there are a multitude of tensions as each person pulls in their own direction.

This set of circumstances has made for a durable society, but one that does have serious tensions in it.  Over the years, these tensions have broken out into violence – the American Revolution, Shays Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, the Civil War, the Haymarket Affair, the great labor strikes in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Bonus Army, Battle of Athens, the race riots of the 1960s, the student riots of the 1970s, Oklahoma City Bombing, and many more.  This doesn’t include the rioting that is common when the electrical power fails in urban areas.

While most violence causes Americans to coalesce, some cause even greater divides, especially when some deep philosophical differences are behind the violence like the race riots of the 1960s.  The opening shots at Lexington and Concord at the beginning of the Revolutionary War and the firing on Fort Sumter at the beginning of the Civil War were such cases.  The situation at the Bundy Ranch in Nevada is one that is showing those philosophical differences and could lead to a greater civil unrest, if both sides aren’t careful.

Currently, the situation at the Bundy Ranch is stable and quiet.  The federal agents haven’t returned and much of the militia force has left.  However, several small militia units remain and they are receiving logistical support from around the country.  It remains a flashpoint.

Potential Instability in the US

The greatest threat to stability in the United States is not political, but its aging infrastructure.  As has been noted in past reports, America’s electrical infrastructure is aging and over stretched.  Not only that, electrical demand is growing, while many aging coal powered plants are being forced off line by environmental regulations.  Power outages are becoming more common and longer, especially during extreme weather.

Urban areas are more susceptible to disruptions in power than suburban or rural areas.  Cities do not have large warehouses nearby to store groceries for their populations.  Consequently, they rely heavily upon transportation to move food and other necessities into the city.  Electrical outages cause refrigerated foodstuffs to spoil and prevent a smooth flow of groceries into the city.  A simple snowstorm or power outage can quickly empty grocery store shelves within hours.   Even stores that remain open with food will not be able to process credit card transactions.

Without food or electricity, city residents can quickly riot and break into closed stores to loot food supplies – causing a level of civil violence that local police and National Guard can’t contain.

An example of how a widespread infrastructure dislocation can cause havoc was Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Katrina was the strongest hurricane of the 2005 hurricane season and the sixth most powerful in American history.  Shortly after the hurricane moved away on August 30, 2005, some residents of New Orleans who remained in the city began looting stores. Many were in search of food and water that were not available to them through any other means, as well as non-essential items.

Reports of carjacking, murders, thefts, and rapes in New Orleans flooded the news. Some sources later determined that many of the reports were inaccurate, because of the confusion. Thousands of National Guard and federal troops were mobilized (the total went from 7,841 in the area the day Katrina hit to a maximum of 46,838 on September 10) and sent to Louisiana along with numbers of local law enforcement agents from across the country who were temporarily deputized by the state.

Many are unaware of the level of tension in the area.  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco was to say, “They have M16s and are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and I expect they will.”   Congressman Bill Jefferson (D-LA) told ABC News: “There was shooting going on. There was sniping going on.”

The fact is that the federal government is unable to handle severe problems that threaten civil unrest.  In the case of Katrina, the government had planned to send evacuates to facilities such as the Louisiana Superdome (designed to handle 800, yet 30,000 arrived) and the New Orleans Civic Center (not designed as an evacuation center, yet 25,000 arrived).

Electric power industry and government officials are well aware of how fragile the American electrical power grid is and have recommended improvements.  However, these will take years and billions of dollars.  In the meantime, the government is aware that any electrical power outage covering a large sector of the nation for a period of time can spark widespread violence.

The concern is for more than extreme weather or a cascading technical failure of the electrical grid.  The US power grid is also extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack – either domestic or foreign.  Last year, there were two attacks against the electrical infrastructure; an attack at a Tennessee nuclear power plant that involved gunfire and an attack by an unknown group of armed men against a substation in California, which destroyed 19 transformers.  Fortunately, the California attack was at night, when power demand was minimal and resources were available to shift the load.  However, if the attack had taken place during the day, the area would have experienced a blackout.  In both cases, the attackers escaped.  Many power companies are rushing to better protect their substations from such attacks in the future.

Although civil disturbance due to an electrical blackout is the biggest threat against the social fabric of the US, the threat of an armed conflict between the government and citizens has grown, especially in light of the Bundy Ranch confrontation.  And, at the tip of that threat are the mysterious militias – groups of armed Americans who are at odds with the federal government.

Little is known about these groups, although the Bundy Ranch confrontation has brought some of them out in the open.  The foremost of these is Oathkeepers, a group of about 3,000 who are either former or serving military members or police, who have sworn that they will not obey unconstitutional orders given by the government.

Oathkeepers created a high profile for itself in the Bundy Ranch standoff because their headquarters are in Las Vegas and their nationwide network of members was able to quickly funnel money and supplies to the people at the Bundy Ranch.  Although not a militia, the presence of armed Oathkeepers and their visibility gained a lot of attention for the organization.

Several other militias are also present at the Bundy Ranch, although their numbers are unknown – although they undoubtedly number less than an infantry company in total.  Texas, Montana, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Nevada militias have claimed to have sent forces to the Bundy Ranch, although numbers aren’t mentioned.  Other militia groups include the West Mountain Rangers, 912 Movement, and the III%.  In most cases, the numbers from each group probably are probably less than a dozen, although the amount of supplies streaming into the site indicates that a large number of supporters are providing logistical support.

The reality is that these militias are more of an armed presence than an actual military force.  Although many have former military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, each militia has a separate command structure and disagreements on tactics are frequent.  Each militia group also has differing agendas – ranging from simply protecting the Bundy family to seeking an armed confrontation with federal agents.

As was mentioned in the analysis last week, the Bundy Ranch has the potential to become a tipping point for rebellion in America.  In fact, many of the extremist militia members at the ranch are aware of this and are hoping for a confrontation with federal agents that will spark a rebellion that spreads across the country.  Fortunately, it appears that the government is also aware of the situation and has decided not to push them and to let the militia members drift home.

At this time, the Bundy Ranch situation is less of a flashpoint than it was a few weeks ago.  That could, however, change if the federal government stages a raid that results in a loss of life.

However, even if the Bundy Ranch situation is peacefully defused, that doesn’t mean there won’t be political consequences.  Another rebellion took place in the early days of the nation that has many similarities.  It changed the complexion of the political landscape and led to the creation of the two party system in America and led to the election of Thomas Jefferson.  That event was the Whiskey Rebellion.

Although the 1794 incident was a vastly larger rebellion than the standoff at the Bundy Ranch, the situations share important parallels including the use of what many people in each situation considered the disproportionate use of force by the government.  It also reflects the differing political views of the people in the more urban parts of the country and those in more rural areas.

The rebellion began in 1791 when Congress passed an excise tax on distilled whiskey with the firm backing of President George Washington and Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s plan was to federalize the debt accumulated by the states during the Revolutionary War and pay it off through a variety of measures, including domestic taxation. On top of that, Hamilton wanted to fund a more widespread extension of government investment in the new country’s military and infrastructure. The tax was excessively high–about 25 percent of the value of each gallon of whiskey.  Needless to say, it encountered almost immediate opposition.

Opposition was fierce on the western frontier (then around Pittsburgh, PA), where farmers would turn excess corn into whiskey.  Not only was whiskey cheaper to transport over the dirt roads, in the money starved west, it was used as a form of money.  In addition, frontier people rarely saw the benefits of federal spending.  In a quote vaguely similar to the statements coming from the Bundy Ranch, one westerner wrote, “To be subject to all the burdens of government and enjoy none of the benefits arising from government is what we will never submit to.”

Western Pennsylvania rose up.  In four western counties of Pennsylvania, excise officers were terrorized; the Pittsburgh mail was robbed; federal judicial proceedings were stopped; and a small body of regular troops guarding the house of General John Neville, excise inspector for western Pennsylvania, was forced to surrender to the rebels.

Patriotic organizations, called “democratic  republican societies” were formed, which were viewed as subversive by the federal government.  President Washington would later write, “I early gave it as my opinion to the confidential characters around me, that if these societies are not counteracted (not by prosecutions, the ready way to make them grow stronger)… they would shake the government to its foundation.”

Historian John Miller would later write that Hamilton “knew that he was committing the government to a trial of strength with Westerners, but he deliberately courted the contest” to display the power and legitimacy of the federal government. Goaded by Hamilton, Washington assembled one of the largest armies built in America up until that time. The president, with the treasury secretary by his side, would lead this force from the capitol in Philadelphia into to wilds of western Pennsylvania.  The size of the assembled army was astounding given the threat.

This force, called the “Watermelon army” by detractors, ended up arresting 30 rebels without any resistance.  Although the rebellion was quashed, the political damage was enormous.

Some Americans viewed the sudden expansion of government power as a blow to the principles fought for during the Revolution, and worried about a government quick to pull the trigger on legitimate freedom of assembly and protest.  The author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, attacked the excise tax an “infernal tax” and said that the “conduct of the ‘rebels’ was no worse than riotous.” He and many others called for an elimination or reduction of the hated tax.

From the scattered protests of leaders like Jefferson and others, a new party was formed to oppose the administration. Panicked Federalists, sensing the rise in support for “Republican” opposition, started to become more repressive in their tactics. Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 under President John Adams in response to the Republican protest during the short “Quasi War” with France, which severely curtailed civil liberties. The acts targeted Jefferson’s supporters. The political storm was growing, and Jefferson and Madison wrote the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, calling out the laws as unconstitutional and repressive.

The Resolutions became a political platform for the new party, and a massive wave of supporters was swept into office in 1798. That year’s election became known as the “Revolution of ‘98” and marked a major change in American politics.  Jefferson was elected president in 1800 and he appointed Albert Gallatin, who had spoken up for the rights of the western farmers, as his treasury secretary.  By tapping into these “patriot” societies of the time, he was able to politically establish a political counterbalance to the Federalist Party.

Although the political parties of that time have disappeared, they have set up the continuing philosophical differences of the two parties of today – one calling for more federal control, and one calling for more state and local control.

In the end, the fallout of the Bundy Ranch standoff may not be violence, but political reform – just as it was for the Whiskey Rebellion.

But, in the background, the threat of civil upheaval remains.  Although the situation at the Bundy Ranch has cooled considerably, the fractures in American society remain and social upheaval is still a possibly – either through a massive disruption of the electrical infrastructure or some sort of standoff like that at the Bundy Ranch.

 

PUBLICATIONS

Palestinian Intent to Accede to 15 Treaties and U.S. Response

By Brett D. Schaefer, Steven Groves, and James Phillips

Heritage Foundation

April 30, 2014

Issue Brief #4209

President Mahmoud Abbas announced on April 1 that the Palestinian Authority (PA) will seek to join 15 international conventions and treaties. This is a new facet of the existing Palestinian policy of seeking international recognition by other governments and membership in international organizations to bolster claims of statehood absent a negotiated peace treaty with Israel.   Now that the April 23 Hamas–Fatah reconciliation agreement has provoked Israel to suspend negotiations with the Palestinians, Washington should reiterate to Palestinian leaders that they cannot gain statehood by doing an end run around Israel. Such a unilateral strategy would kill any chances for a genuine Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. The United States has, correctly, opposed this effort and should take additional steps to dissuade the PA from further pursuing this strategy and discourage United Nations organizations from abetting it.

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Evolving Threats and Strategic Partnerships in the Gulf

By Anthony Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

April 30, 2014

The current US and P5+1 negotiations with Iran may or may not remove nuclear weapons as a major new threat in the Gulf. Nuclear weapons, however, are only one aspect of the threats that affect US allies in the region. The full range of threats includes the following seven major categories of strategic challenges to the US strategic partnership with its Gulf allies: Internal stability: The internal tensions and instability within each GCC state are a threat that each Gulf state must address largely on a national basis. Economic growth, distribution of wealth, demographic pressures and major problems in employing young men and women, the role of foreign labor, the impact of social change and hyper-urbanization, and the role of religion and religious extremism within the state are very real issues that compete for resources with military forces.

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Getting it right: US national security policy and al Qaeda since 2011

By Mary Habeck

American Enterprise Institute

April 24, 2014

Current national security policy is failing to stop the advancement of al Qaeda and its affiliates throughout the Muslim-majority world. While there are many reasons for this failure, three key issues stand out: a poor definition of the enemy, an incorrect view of its objectives, and the adoption of a strategy that will not defeat the latest evolution of this adaptive organization. If the US understood al Qaeda as it is: the leadership and field army of an insurgency with worldwide linkages that hopes to impose its extremist version of shari’a, govern territory, and overthrow the leaders of every Muslim-majority country, the current national strategy for combating al Qaeda would not be confined to counterterrorism and attrition, but would instead make counterinsurgency—without large numbers of American ground forces—its main technique for confronting and defeating the organization.

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Is the Armed Rebellion in Syria on the Wane?

By Yezid Sayigh

Carnegie Endowment

April 24, 2014

Syria’s armed rebellion has undergone visible consolidation both in the field and at the command level since September 2013. Long overdue, this is a highly positive development. Still, it is unlikely to be enough to best the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. While the armed rebellion is far from being defeated, it has plateaued, both militarily and politically.  Fragmentation and dysfunctional competition among the rebel groups persist, and new rebel alliances have not yet demonstrated a notable increase in operational effectiveness. Credible estimates, moreover, indicate that overall rebel strength has not increased over the past year, suggesting that the rebellion has a “shrinking population of potential new recruits,” as a Carter Center report based on exhaustive field data noted in March 2014.

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Good Riddance to John Kerry’s Middle East Peace Talks

By Fred Fleitz

Center for Security Policy

April 29, 2014

The U.S.-mediated peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians ended today after Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah leader and Palestinian president, announced an alliance last week with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Hamas is the Palestinian group which controls Gaza and has been designated a terrorist organization by Israel and the United States, and the European Union. Islamic Jihad is a terrorist organization backed by Iran.  Israel’s decision to end the talks was long overdue. Like several prior U.S. administrations, the Obama administration has tried to bring about a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, the peace process begun by Secretary of State John Kerry last year differs from past U.S. efforts due to an inexplicable anti-Israel bias.

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The Thin Red Line: Policy Lessons from Iraqi Kurdistan

By David Danelo

Foreign Policy Research Institute

May 2014

The hotel maid in Sulaymaniyah had red hair, weathered eyes, freckled skin, and a wide smile. Shirin was originally from Baghdad; she spoke the slang Iraqi Arabic jargon I had learned a decade before. As a Kurdish woman, she had married, settled, and somehow survived. In 2007 she fled north, escaping chaos and civil war. In Sulaymaniyah she had a husband and young son, but she also had a husband and son in her past. “Saddam,” she said, drawing her finger across her throat. She paused and repeated the name and gesture, smiling. It seems Saddam killed them, and that she was happy the dictator is dead.  Shirin, along with the other Iraqi Kurds I met in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, is among those few Iraqis who still celebrate the 2003 U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation.

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How the Kurds Got Their Way, Economic Cooperation and the Middle East’s New Borders

By Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway

Wilson Center

April 29, 2014

The surge of ethnic and sectarian strife in Syria and across the Middle East has led a number of analysts to predict the coming breakup of many Arab states. This potential upending of the region’s territorial order has come to be known as “the end of Sykes-Picot,” a reference to the secret 1916 Anglo-French agreement to divide up the Middle Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire into British and French zones of control. Because the European treaties that created new Arab states in the aftermath of World War I upheld the outlines of that agreement, Sykes-Picot became the convenient shorthand for the map that colonial powers imposed on the region, one that has remained essentially constant to the present day.  With bloodshed from Aleppo to Baghdad to Beirut, it is indeed tempting to predict the violent demise of Sykes-Picot. But although the worst fighting is spilling over borders and pushing some countries, such as Syria, toward fragmentation, there is another force crossing national lines and even realigning national relationships: trade. New transnational zones of economic cooperation are making Middle Eastern borders more porous, but in a way that does not directly challenge existing states. Instead, mutual economic interests, especially in the oil and gas industries, may signal a softer end to Sykes-Picot.

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Lebanon’s Presidential Race

By David Schenker

Washington Institue

May 1, 2014

PolicyWatch 2245

Last week, Lebanon’s parliament convened for the first round of balloting to elect a new president. While Samir Geagea — who leads the Christian “Lebanese Forces” party, which is aligned with the pro-Western March 14 coalition — received the most votes, he failed to secure the requisite two-thirds parliamentary support. In the coming weeks, legislators are slated to continue meeting until a president is selected. Unlike last week’s session, in which the Hezbollah-led March 8 bloc did not challenge Geagea’s candidacy, the voting promises to become increasingly contentious in subsequent rounds. Perennial sectarian tensions exacerbated by the war next door in Syria have complicated the historically wrought and arcane election process. Should a compromise candidate not emerge by May 25, the term of current president Michel Suleiman will expire, leaving the post vacant.  In the past, the presidency — which by law must be held by a Christian — was the dominant office in Lebanon’s government. But the 1989 Taif Accord effectively stripped the position of its powers, delegating them to the prime minister, who must hail from the Sunni Muslim constituency. Given the post’s largely symbolic nature, some might argue that the tense selection process is much ado about nothing. Yet the presidency remains an emotionally evocative issue for Lebanese Christians, and both the March 8 and March 14 blocs see a sympathetic chief executive as an important advantage worth fighting for.

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Assad’s Reelection Campaign Matters — Really

By Andrew J. Tabler

Washington Institute

April 30, 2014

The Atlantic

The United States and the international community have spent the better part of the last year backing peace talks in Geneva to bring about a “political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people,” and ultimately end the war between the Alawite-dominated regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Sunni and Kurdish-dominated opposition. But Assad has his own transition in mind: running for a third seven-year term as president. On April 28, the Syrian president nominated himself as a candidate in Syria’s June 3 presidential poll, “hoping the parliament would endorse it.”  This was hardly a surprise. Assad has hinted at his candidacy for months, and “spontaneous rallies” calling for him to run — many complete with images of Assad beside Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah — have sprung up across regime-controlled areas of the country, while shopkeepers have been encouraged to paint their storefronts with Syrian flags and slogans supporting the leader.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 18-04-2014

 

 

 

Has America’s Drone Policy Really Changed in the Last Year?

 

It’s been nearly a year since Obama outlined America’s new drone policy.  Last May, he outlined stricter rules and regulations for drones, which have been used to target suspected militants in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and other countries. Critics had blamed these drone strikes for high numbers of civilian casualties.

 

Under the new policy, the Defense Department, not the CIA carries out drone attacks, and only in established conflict zones.  However, the policy that governs these assassinations is classified – although Obama insisted that his administration would only ever launch a drone strike against any suspect to stop a planned attack, when it was not possible to capture a suspect, and when there was “near certainty” that civilians would not be injured or killed.

 

Yet, the drone attacks continue and critics say that Obama isn’t carrying out his own policy outlined in May.  The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates unmanned aerial vehicles have killed between 2,296 and 3,718 people, as many as 957 of them civilians.

 

In fact, the drone war has increased so much in the last few years that there is a manning shortage for drone pilots.  A recent government report also said that these drone operators are not receiving adequate training, which may cause additional civilian casualties in the future.

 

In December 2013, a drone strike on a wedding procession in Yemen raised questions amongst human rights groups.  The December 12th attack killed 12 men and wounded at least 15 other people, including the bride.  US and Yemeni officials said the dead were members of the armed group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but witnesses and relatives told Human Rights Watch the casualties were civilians. This was in direct conflict with Obama’s statement that US policy requires “near-certainty” that no civilians will be harmed in targeted attacks.

 

In February, the European Union, with an overwhelming vote of 534-49, passed a resolution calling on EU Member States to “oppose and ban the practice of extrajudicial targeted killings” and demanding that EU member states “do not perpetrate unlawful targeted killings or facilitate such killings by other states.” This resolution was designed to pressure individual European nations to stop their own production and/or use of weaponized drones (especially the UK, Germany, Italy and France), and to stop their collaboration with the US drone program.

 

On February 13, the World Council of Churches–the largest coalition of Christian churches, came out in opposition to the use of armed drones. The Council said that the use of armed drones poses a “serious threat to humanity” and condemned, in particular, US drone strikes in Pakistan.

 

The continued use of drones led the UN Human Rights Council to issue a report a few weeks ago that asked the administration to review its drone policy and reveal how it picked its targets. The report said the United States should give more information on how it decided someone was enough of an “imminent threat” to be targeted in covert operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia and other countries.  It should “revisit its position regarding legal justifications for the use of deadly force through drone attacks,” investigate any abuses and compensate victims’ families, the committee added in its conclusions.

 

There is a push for the UN to review drone warfare policy.  Pakistan is trying to pass a resolution in the council that would mandate an impartial investigation into U.S. drone strikes there that may have violated human rights, and the council had its third discussion about the topic on March 19. The resolution would also ensure a more accurate record of death totals from those attacks, according to “Foreign Policy.” The U.S., which claims the strikes are necessary to thwart potential terrorists, says the council shouldn’t have jurisdiction over human rights violations that come from drone strikes, so it won’t be a part of the conversation.

 

The U.S. vowed to be a collaborative member of the council when it decided to join in 2009 but has so far refused to declassify much of the information it has on drone strikes in Pakistan.  “We just don’t see the Human Rights Council as the right forum for discussion narrowly focused on a single weapons delivery system,” an unnamed State Department official told “Foreign Policy.” By avoiding the talks, the US can ignore any rules that come from the discussions.

 

Nor will there be any domestic pressure to modify the drone policy, especially since the US federal courts have given Obama legal cover for his drone attacks.  Two weeks ago, federal judge Rosemary M. Collyer dismissed a lawsuit brought by Nasser al-Awlaki, the relative of two U.S. citizens who were killed by American drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan.

 

Attorney General Eric Holder asserted Anwar al-Awlaki was directly and personally involved “in the continued planning and execution of terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland.”  The administration also believed that al-Awlaki was directly linked to the 2009 attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Detroit-bound jetliner and the 2009 FortHood shooting.

 

But in reaching that conclusion, the court also found it “plausible” that Awlaki’s Fifth Amendment due-process rights were violated. Ultimately, the judge decided, there was no remedy available, so the lawsuit was dismissed. But this sets a dangerous precedent for the targeted-killing program because it means there is no legal recourse for anyone attacked by a drone.

 

Ironically, the problem began with the Obama administration itself, which argued several years ago that the determination to target Awlaki complied with due process.  The essence of due process, as Harvard Law Professor Noah Feldman recently argued at an Intelligence Squared debate, is that “the government would not kill its own citizens without a trial.” That principle comes from the English Magna Charta of 1215, and the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had that in mind when, in the Fifth Amendment, they wrote that no onemay “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

 

The question is when due process takes place and when the situation demands other recourses.  The Constitution is clear that due process is required before the federal government takes a citizen’s life. But in many cases, that would fly in the face of common sense.

 

Noted legal expert and law professor Alan Dershowitz points out a bank robber firing at police as he flees is not entitled to a trial before police can shoot back at him.  Rather, the dangerous and imminent threat posed by the robber justified an exception to due process. This exception is widened in the case of war, which is why the laws of war have never required a prior hearing before incapacitating an enemy combatant that is on the battlefield.

 

So, what does the US consider due process?  A Department of Justice white paper leaked last year stated that the current policy of the executive branch is that it can lawfully target and kill Americans abroad who pose an imminent threat of violent attack to the US.

 

The court in the al-Awlaki case agreed that he met this standard: The decision stated, “The fact is that Anwar Al-Aulaqi was an active and exceedingly dangerous enemy of the United States.”

 

But, the court did go on to say that it is plausible that Awlaki’s due-process rights were violated because the DOJ’s white paper argued that it actually is affording due process to targeted Americans.

 

This is an issue that will cause considerable debate because the definition is so flexible.  The DOJ argues that “the process due in any given instance is” determined by weighing the interests involved. The private interest involved, e.g., someone’s life, is weighed against the government’s asserted interest in protecting American lives. While both interests are weighty, the government’s interest is weightier, so due process can be expedited and simplified for those targeted.”  In other words, due process depends on how important the issue is, not by legal norms. According to the DOJ white paper, the administration thinks due-process requirements are met “where an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat.”  However, no one knows what constitutes a “high-level official.”

 

This is an interpretation that has been criticized by Administration critics on both sides of the political spectrum.  Conservative Justice Antonin Scalia vehemently criticized this malleable interpretation of due process in 2004 when it was applied to wartime detention.

 

The criticism also comes from Obama’s own party.  Democratic Senator Wyden asked, “Are there any geographical limitations to the president’s ability to kill people with drones? Put another way, could the president send a drone armed with a “Hellfire” missile to kill an American on American soil in their home?”

 

Although the number of drone strikes has declined in the last year (8 attacks in Yemen in 2014), the question of how they are used remains a hot subject – especially in the light of the federal court ruling and the growing use of drones for surveillance within the United States.  The secretive nature of the process bothers many because due process was written into the US Constitution to prevent governments from secretly ruling that people could lose their property, freedom, or life.

 

 

Drones have been used recently in the US to track and arrest American citizens.  The first known incident of a drone-aided arrest took place in North Dakota in 2011 when farmer Thomas Brossart was taken into custody after he refused to return some cows that had wandered onto his property.  Police across the US now regularly use drones for surveillance.

 

 

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is concerned about where that data ends up. “The trick is, we need a system of rules to ensure we can enjoy the benefits of drone technology without becoming a surveillance society,” said Allie Bohm, advocacy and policy strategist for the ACLU. “We want to prohibit drones for massive surveillance and still allow law enforcement to use them in cases of wrongdoing.” The ACLU supports the warrant requirements some states have enacted.

 

Although Obama promised a new drone policy last year, it’s clear that despite worldwide condemnation, the American Administration will continue use drones as a weapon.  The recent court case will only make it politically easier for them to continue on the same course.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

 

Evolving Threats and Strategic Partnerships in the Gulf

By Anthony Cordesman

 

Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

April 15, 2014

 

Key Threats: Internal ethnic and sectarian tensions, civil conflict, continued instability, failed governance and economy.  Syrian civil war. Iraq, Lebanon, “Shi’ite crescent.”  Sectarian warfare and struggle for future of Islam through and outside region. Sunni on Sunni and vs. Shi’ite struggles. Terrorism, insurgency, civil conflict linked to outside state and non-state actors.  Wars of influence and intimidation.  Asymmetric conflicts escalating to conventional conflicts.  Major “conventional” conflict threats: Iran-ArabGulf, Arab-Israeli, etc.  Economic warfare: sanctions, “close the Gulf,” etc.  Missile and long-range rocket warfare.  Proliferation, preventive strikes, containment, nuclear arms

 

race, extended deterrence, “weapons of mass effectiveness”.

 

Read more

 

 

 

The takeaway from the languishing Middle East peace process

By John R. Bolton

 

American Enterprise Institute

 

April 12, 2014

 

Barack Obama has announced a “pause” for a “reality check” in his Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, although no one is really deceived by this euphemism. His “peace process” is verging on collapse, despite a year’s investment of U.S. diplomatic time and effort. Not only will the negotiations’ impending failure leave Israelis and Palestinians even further from resolving their disputes than before but America’s worldwide prestige will be significantly diminished. Our competence and influence are again under question, Israel has been undermined and by misallocating our diplomatic priorities, we have impaired our ability to resolve international crises and problems elsewhere, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

 

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The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon

By Raphaël Lefèvre

 

Carnegie Endowment

 

April 15, 2014

 

As the conflict in Syria enters its fourth year, it continues to spill over the borders of neighboring countries and alter local dynamics, sometimes with significant consequences.   Lebanon, in particular, has been greatly affected by the Syrian civil war. An influx of Syrian refugees, now exceeding 1 million in a population of 4.4 million, has impacted the country’s local socioeconomic and religious fabric. The ongoing stalemate in Syria has also further polarized Lebanon’s already-tense domestic political situation, which is shaped by a schism between the March 8 coalition, broadly sympathetic to the Syrian regime, and the March 14 alliance, which is opposed to the government in Damascus. Most recently, the rise of Sunni extremism in the Syrian conflict has unleashed disturbing religious and security dynamics in Lebanon, with al-Qaeda affiliates that are fighting in Syria, such as the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, launching Lebanese chapters.

 

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The Next Huddle on US-Israel Security Technology Cooperation

By Ben Lerner

 

Center for Security Policy
April 7, 2014

 

One of the many benefits of the US-Israel relationship has been the extent to which American and Israeli security have been significantly bolstered by security technology cooperation.  Joint US-Israel missile defense programs such as Iron Dome and the Arrow system have demonstrated their utility in obstructing rocket fire directed at Israel by terrorist organizations and their Iranian patrons, and Elbit Systems will soon be bringing Israel’s border security expertise to bear on our persistent southwest border vulnerabilities.  As with missile defense and border security, the United States and Israel now need to huddle on another area of security technology that is emerging as an imperative for both nations: counter-drone technology.

 

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Ruling vs. Governing: Pluralism and Democracy in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia

By Sebnem Gumuscu and E. Fuat Keyman

 

German Marshall Fund

 

April 15, 2014

 

The past few months have been marked by critical developments in Turkey, where corruption allegations against the government ignited a power struggle between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gulen movement over control of the state. We contend that the AKP’s increasing tendency to rule through domination instead of governing through leadership in the ongoing political predicament exacerbates the crisis by undermining the rule of law and political pluralism. Political leaders may be tempted to rule and dominate rather than to govern and lead. However, as we see in Turkey (also in Egypt), this temptation makes incumbents weak and vulnerable while governing through leadership makes them stronger.

 

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Sending a Bunker-Busting Message to Iran
By Lt. General David Deptula, USAF (ret.) & Dr. Michael Makovsky

 

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
April 8, 2014

 

The Wall Street Journal

 

Prussian leader Frederick the Great once lamented, “The ways of negotiation have failed up to the present, and negotiations without arms make as little impression as notes without instruments.” The same could be said about nuclear negotiations with Iran. The Obama administration has cut a deeply flawed interim deal, forgone new sanctions, and effectively taken the military option off the table. It’s time to increase the pressure on Tehran by boosting Israel’s military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program.  It’s hard to imagine negotiations succeeding. The interim deal has undercut the leverage of the U.S. and its partners. It has triggered a rise in Iran’s oil-export revenue, while its nuclear-breakout timing remains unchanged due to increased centrifuge efficiency, as permitted in the deal. Tehran continues to deny inspectors access to key nuclear facilities. Recent tensions with Russia will only create new opportunities for Iran to exploit the U.S. in negotiations.

 

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Analysis 11-04-2014

Pivoting Towards Asia?

What it Means for the Middle East

The growing tension in South East Asia and the announcement that Obama will be visiting Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia, once again raises the question about America’s focus and whether it will pivot towards Asia, to the determent of the Middle East.

Each of these nations has been in the news recently.  Malaysia lost an aircraft and the ensuing investigation has raised many questions about aviation security in the region.  South Korea has been engaged in an artillery duel with its neighbor to the north, North Korea.  And, Japan and the Philippines have been forced to use their militaries to halt Chinese expansion over the South China Sea, although no shots have been fired yet.

Military tensions have grown in the last year.  Japan recently announced that Japanese fighter jets were scrambled a record high 415 times in response to Chinese aircraft (many Chinese fighter aircraft) approaching Japanese airspace in 2013.  That surpassed the previous record of 306 times the previous year.  The Chinese air activities are a result of a standoff between Japan and China over SenkakuIslands.  The tensions were heightened following Japan’s purchase in September 2012 of the main part of the Japanese-controlled, uninhabited islet group in the East China Sea.  Not only China, but Taiwan claim the islets and call them Diaoyu and Tiaoyutai, respectively.

Japan isn’t the only nation concerned about Chinese ambitions.  There is an ongoing situation between China and the Philippines over control of portions of the South China Sea.  Late last month, Chinese vessels blocked Philippine ships bringing supplies to a disputed shoal in the South China Sea that Manila effectively controls. The U.S. State Department criticized China’s actions as “provocative,” while Beijing retorted that it has sovereignty over the reef.

Malaysia is also concerned about the status of the South China Sea as it claims part of that basin.

The South China Sea issue is a critical one for all the nations in the region.  It is a major maritime route for all of the nations on the Pacific Rim – especially for the island nations of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.  De facto Chinese control of the sea could jeopardize commercial trade.

The area also has natural resources potential.  Philex Mining, the Philippines’ largest mining company, disclosed Monday that negotiations have halted with state-owned China National Offshore Oil over a joint exploration project in the South China Sea. Philex reported it was the Chinese who stopped negotiations.

Natural gas development in the South China Sea is crucial to the Philippines’ energy policy, but its private-sector companies do not have enough funds to carry out independent development. The Philippines hoped that the joint project with China would lead to a breakthrough in the territorial dispute.

One outgrowth of the Obama trip to the Philippines will probably be a new defense agreement with the US.  U.S. forces had once been stationed in the Philippines, but they withdrew in 1992 as the Cold War ended.  The economic stagnation had kept Manila from increasing defense spending after the US left.  The result is that that nation is being forced to play catch up, lest the Chinese take advantage of its weaker neighbor.

The Philippines currently has one of the weakest militaries in the region, possessing no fighter jets.  As a result, Manila has entered into a contract to buy 12 South Korean-made FA-50 fighter jets for $421 million, with two to be delivered as early as next year.  The government also plans to spend a total of $1.6 billion to modernize its military hardware, including the purchase of air search radar systems from Israel.

South Korea may be better armed, but it faces increased tensions with North Korea.  Last week, North and South Korean artillery batteries exchanged hundreds of shells across their western sea border Monday, a day after North Korea warned it was preparing to test another nuclear device.

This came after North Korea tested two medium range ballistic missiles and Japan threatened to shoot down any North Korean missiles.  North Korea responded and announced that it “would not rule out” a new nuclear test.

“(We) would not rule out a new form of a nuclear test aimed at strengthening our nuclear deterrence,” Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried by the state-run KCNA news agency. “The U.S. had better ponder over this and stop acting rashly.”

The statement did not specify what North Korea meant by a “new form” of test, and South Korea said there are no immediate signs of nuclear tests being carried out by the North.

America Reacts

Although the US is occupied with the Crimean situation, the recent Chinese actions have forced Washington to react.  US Defense Secretary Hagel travelled to China last week and told the Chinese that it would support America’s allies – a position that made the Chinese unhappy.

The US is also looking at revising its military alliance with Japan.  In January, the White House told the Japanese government through multiple channels of its intent to reinforce ties.  This bilateral agreement hasn’t been changed in 17 years and the desire to revise it reflects Obama’s concern about the situation in the region.

Since there is not a multi-national security framework like NATO in the Pacific area, the Japanese/American defense agreement is the keystone to countering Chinese moves.

Currently, the biggest issue will be whether to allow Japan the right to collective self-defense. The current interpretation of Japan’s constitution forbids this, but Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet are prepared to revise the charter.  The key issue will be defining self-defense and how it can be applied.  The new agreement will also focus on joint command structure and outlining how the US and Japan will respond to certain scenarios.

The Japan/America defense guidelines were originally drawn up in 1978 during the Cold War era to counter the threat from the Soviet Union. The current guidelines were last revised in 1997, with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton leading the efforts.  The changes were driven by tensions between China and Taiwan over a series of missile tests conducted by the Chinese military in waters in and around the Taiwan Strait.  Beijing backed down after the U.S. Navy dispatched two aircraft carriers to the region.

Today, however, the US would be hard pressed to field one aircraft carrier in the area, much less two.  They would also be more vulnerable to attack by Chinese submarines or missiles as they moved into the region.

This leaves US and Japanese forces in Japan as the major deterrent to Chinese military moves in the region.  It is currently stronger than Chinese forces, but is rapidly being overcome by a growing Chinese military presence.

The Chinese Threat

The Chinese military is rapidly evolving to be able to project its power at a distance.  China will raise its defense spending 12.2% to $131.9 billion in 2014, marking the fourth straight year of double-digit growth.  Much of that will go to naval and air forces, which can project power into the South China Sea.

Unlike in the past, China is developing a blue water navy capable of reaching far beyond its shoreline.  Beijing is now building a domestically designed aircraft carrier, which will join the Liaoning, a refurbished carrier originally built for the Soviet navy (which the Chinese showed to Secretary Hagel during his visit). China’s air force is also working hard on a stealth fighter, which can penetrate US/Japanese air defenses surrounding naval task forces.

China’s first naval goal is to be able to control the “First Island Chain,” which stretches from Okinawa’s main island to the South China Sea.  Its second goal is to control the “Second Island Chain,” which extends as far east as Tokyo and Guam.  At present, they can make it quite difficult for the US Navy to operate within the First Island Chain.  They even have sent intelligence gathering sips off the coast of Hawaii.

The US is responding.  The U.S. Defense Department released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on March 4, which calls for deploying more naval assets to the Pacific. The latest QDR, which serves as the basic guideline for the Pentagon’s game plan, calls for shifting 60% of U.S. naval assets to the Pacific by 2020, up from 50% now.  Although it doesn’t address the Chinese threat specifically, it does refer to countering “area denial” similar to the First and Second Island Chain strategy of China.

The Future and What it Means for the Middle East

This changing US strategy will impact the Middle East.  First, since the largest reserve of US Naval ships outside the Western Pacific is in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf, a crisis in the South China Sea will mean an immediate shift of forces out of the region.  Second, as the US shifts its diminishing military resources to Asia, forces in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and Europe will also drop.  All of these three theaters are usually used to increase an American military presence in the Middle East in time of crisis.

However, it’s also important to remember that Obama has frequently promised to pivot towards Asia – with few results.  The same could happen again.

It’s also important to remember that a desire by China to grow militarily doesn’t mean that they can easily threaten the US or its allies in the Pacific.

China is predominantly a land power and historically it is difficult for a land power, surrounded by many hostile nations, to divert the resources to an effective blue water navy.  China shares land borders with 14 countries and requires a huge number of troops to defend them. Its 1.6 million soldiers still represent the world’s largest standing army. Chinese and Indian troops continue to face each other across their mountainous border. And Beijing relies on the army to maintain order in its restive ethnic minority regions, including the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Land powers desiring to become a major naval power have failed miserably.  In the 18th and 19th centuries, France, the dominant land power in Europe tried to build a far reaching navy, only to fail when it ran into a numerically inferior British fleet at Trafalgar.  Imperial Germany tried in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to counter the British control of the sea, only to be forced back to port at the Battle of Jutland in WW I.  The Soviet Union tried during the Cold War, only to be outspent by the US.

Projecting power is also a function of aircraft carriers and the ability to effectively employ them.  The nations of Britain, America, and France have 70 to 80 years of experience in operating large deck carriers.  China has none.

The USSR discovered in the 1970s that building and deploying an effective large deck carrier is more difficult than it seems.  In the end, the carriers they deployed only carried a few ineffective vertical jump jet fighter-bombers.  When the Cold War ended, they were some of the first ships decommissioned.

Just because China has carriers doesn’t mean they can effectively deploy them, an important fact given China’s slowing economy.

As a sea power, China also suffers from the same problems that Germany and Russia did – lack of access to the open sea.  Their coastline is hemmed in by a chain of islands that belong to other nations (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea) that don’t approve of China’s ambitions.  As the British discovered in WW II, land based airpower can easily defeat a navy.

China can break through this island chain with the type of extensive amphibious operations employed by the US Navy in WW II.  However, it took three years to break through the islands protecting Japan, along with amphibious capability, air and naval control of the surrounding area, and a massive military logistics chain.  China does have some amphibious capability, but can’t guarantee it will control the sea and air around the islands.  And, it doesn’t have the vast military logistics ability to keep these islands supplied and carrying out extended offensive military operations.

In the end, China may not be able to project the power it wants in the near future, providing the US stands fast with it regional allies.  That being the case, the result may be that America will remain a major presence in the Middle East and few resources will permanently be moved eastwards.

 

PUBLICATIONS

Congress Should Avert Delays in the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Plans

By Dakota Wood and Brian Slattery

Heritage Foundation

April 7, 2014

Issue Brief #4194

The Army’s decision to transfer AH-64 Apache helicopters from the National Guard to the active force has sparked a debate that ultimately concerns the roles, missions, and contributions of these ground components. Congress should prevent unnecessary delays in the implementation of these plans while making a stronger commitment to providing the resources that the armed forces need to maintain national security.  The past decade of conventional combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which relied heavily on National Guard units, has led to a renewed recognition of the contributions made by Guard (and Army reserve) units to the security interests of the nation. It has also fostered a conviction that Guard units are primarily conventional combat units that should mirror active Army units in mission, equipment, and employment.

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The Challenges to Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2015

By Anthony Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

April 8, 2014

The final outcome of the election in Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s willingness to sign a workable Bilateral Security Agreement with the US are essential preconditions to any hope of a successful Transition. It is the quality of leadership and governance that follows the election, however, that will determine actual success. Similarly, how Afghan forces evolve, and the quality of US and other outside support to Afghan forces, will determine whether Afghanistan is secure enough for a Transition to work.

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Improving the US-GCC Security Partnership: Planning for the Future

By Anthony Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

April 8, 2014

The US and its allies in the Southern Gulf face great challenges, but they also have great opportunities. The P5+1 dialogue with Iran offers at least some hope of ending the threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, and of reducing the risk of further proliferation, if a comprehensive agreement is structured in a way that can eliminate the threat to the Southern Gulfs, the other states in the region, and the US.  More generally, however, improvements in the military forces of the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and in US power projection capabilities can create a far more effective deterrent against the threats posed by Iran, other regional states, and non-state actors. Additionally, enhanced military capabilities can help safeguard the flow of petroleum exports that are critical for the global economy.

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Empty rhetoric in the Obama administration’s Iran policy

By Maseh Zarif

American Enterprise Institute

April 07, 2014

The Obama administration has often responded to crises of confidence in its foreign policy by treating unease and skepticism among international allies and partners, and among critics at home, as a messaging problem. It has interpreted failure to secure buy-in or cooperation as a failure to communicate effectively, rather than as a potential sign of flawed substance.  Administration officials have attempted to dispel the “perception” in recent months that the U.S. is negotiating with the Iranian regime at the expense of American interests and the security and stability of its allies and partners in the region. They will continue to meet resistance, however, as long as the negotiations appear to be neither fully resolving the nuclear threat nor dealing with the broader challenge posed by Iran in the Middle East. The White House does not have a messaging problem regarding its negotiations with Iran; it has a policy problem.

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Erdoğan’s Pyrrhic Victory

By Sinan Ülgen

Carnegie Endowment

April 3, 2014

Turkey’s beleaguered Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have emerged victorious from this week’s local elections. Still, the AKP’s triumph is unlikely to ameliorate the country’s internal conflicts, much less revive its tarnished international standing.  The local elections were widely seen as a referendum on Erdoğan. The AKP received 44% of the national vote and now controls 49 of Turkey’s 81 metropolitan municipalities, including Istanbul and the capital, Ankara. The main opposition force, the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), received 26% and won only 13 municipalities.  The outcome can be seen as a vindication of Erdoğan’s strategy of using political polarization to consolidate his support and counter the challenge to his rule posed by followers of his former ally, the US-based Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. With the AKP’s initial support, the Gülen movement gradually infiltrated state institutions, particularly the judiciary and law enforcement, until the alliance eventually ended in an acrimonious split over the distribution of power within Turkey.

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U.S. Can’t Bribe Israelis, Palestinians To Make Peace

By Lawrence J. Haas

American Foreign Policy Council
April 3, 2014

International Business Times

“First as tragedy, second as farce.” It’s Karl Marx’s line about history repeating itself but, per the Jonathan Pollard trial balloon of recent days, the line could just as easily apply to America’s foreign policy.  We need not debate the merits of Pollard’s release, for which supporters and detractors each can mount a compelling case, to acknowledge that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aren’t the proper milieu for making the decision or that White House maneuvering over the possibility bespeaks an extraordinary ignorance, naivety, and desperation that dominates all-too-much U.S. foreign policy.  At the urging of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, President Barack Obama is considering an early release for Pollard, the former U.S. intelligence officer who’s serving a life sentence for spying for Israel, in exchange for Israel’s release of more Palestinian prisoners – all of it designed to prevent U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace talks from collapsing.

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Hezbollah in Syria
Institute for the Study of War

April 2014

Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Syria is one of the most important factors of the conflict in 2013 and 2014. Since the beginning of 2013, Hezbollah fighters have operated openly and in significant numbers across the border alongside their Syrian and Iraqi counterparts. They have enabled the regime to regain control of rebel-held areas in central Syria and have improved the effectiveness of pro-regime forces. The impact of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has been felt not just on the battlefield, where the regime now has momentum in many areas, but also in Lebanon where growing sectarian tensions have undermined security and stability.

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Tightening the Reins How Khamenei Makes Decisions

By Mehdi Khalaji

Washington Institute

April 2014

Policy Focus 126

When at age fifty Ali Khamenei, a middle-ranking cleric, was named Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor as the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader, he lacked not only his forerunner’s charisma but his religious and political credentials as well.  Gradually, however, over nearly two and a half decades, Khamenei has accumulated formidable centralized authority, aided by  transformation of the IRGC’s role in overseeing the country’s politics and economy. He now enjoys the final say on many issues, especially when it comes to foreign policy and the nuclear issue. Ironically, a leader once seen as an inadequate successor to Khomeini may now have accumulated more power than the first Supreme Leader, at least in some areas.

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PolicyWatch 2238

U.S. Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, Part II: Assessment and Prospects

By Robert Satloff

Washington Institute

April 10, 2014

The current impasse in Israeli-Palestinian talks is buffeted by a series of profound global and regional challenges, including Ukraine, Iran, and Syria, among others. In the immediate arena, while Israel and the Palestinian Authority may have dysfunctional political and diplomatic relations, they also have reasonably effective security cooperation and economic coordination. Therefore, a principal challenge for U.S. policy and for local leaders is to find ways to preserve, even enhance, the latter even as disagreement over the former worsens.  This is the environment in which Secretary of State John Kerry launched his peace initiative. In contrast to decades past, when one could argue that the strategic implications of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were clear, it is very difficult to make that argument today. Indeed, one could argue that some regional crises may even be aggravated by Israeli-Palestinian progress; neither Iran nor al-Qaeda welcomes a two-state solution, for example, and both would likely seek to undermine serious efforts to achieve it.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst
C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 04-04-2014

 

 2016 Republican Presidential Candidates Searching for Pro-Israel Campaign Money

 

It’s over two years until the 2016 presidential election, but several Republicans are exploring presidential runs and several are already in the race for pro-Israel campaign donations from Jewish Republicans.  This was evident last weekend in Las Vegas, Nevada, where the Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC) held its spring leadership conference.  Four governors, who have been mentioned as possible Republican presidential candidates came to the conference to meet potential donors, especially Sheldon Adelson, one of the richest people in the world, the biggest political contributor in 2012, and an American Jew with a very strong pro-Israel stance.

Clearly Adelson overshadowed the conference this year.  Adelson is a casino magnate and it was held in his hometown of Las Vegas.  It was also held in one of his casinos, the Venetian.  And, it was clear by looking at the guest list that included presidential possibilities and governors Jeb Bush (Florida), Chris Christie (New Jersey), Scott Walker (Wisconsin), and John Kasich (Ohio), that Adelson is looking for a presidential candidate to back.  No wonder many called the conference the “Sheldon Primary.”

The importance of Adelson was put into perspective by Ari Fleischer, who was press secretary to President George W. Bush, and is a member of the RJC.  Fleischer said, “The ‘Sheldon Primary’ is an important primary. …  anybody running for the Republican nomination would want to have Sheldon at his side.”  Adelson is the eighth richest man in the world according to Forbes Magazine.  He and his wife spent $93 million supporting Republicans in 2012 – $15 million for the presidential nomination bid by Newt Gingrich and then $30 million supporting Mitt Romney.

Despite the spending, Gingrich failed to get the Republican nomination and Romney lost to Obama.  That’s why Adelson is looking carefully for a 2016 candidate – one that can win.

Experience was clearly a criterion in picking the four governors who attended.  Like most presidents of the recent past (from 1977 to 2009) they are governors.  Given Obama’s lack of managerial skills, executive experience like that gained by a governor may be a critical issue, especially if the Democratic candidate is Hillary Clinton.

But, just as interesting is that each of these states has a sizable Jewish voter base – one that holds the balance of power.  Anat Hakim, writing for the Los Angeles Times in 2008, identified “nine states where the size of the Jewish population was larger than the size of victory for either President Bush or Sen. John Kerry in 2004:  Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.”  Note that the four governors are all from the states listed.  Note also that all four states went for Obama in 2008 and 2012.

Clearly, Adelson wants a governor who can appeal to Jewish voters and who can win in states with sizable Jewish voting blocks.

Who Wasn’t Invited

Although it appears that Adelson is trying to pick a candidate that Republicans and Americans can support, there is clearly an agenda behind his moves.  Several potential Republican candidates were clearly not on the agenda – Senators Cruz and Paul and Governors Perry, Huckabee, and Palin.

Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky was obviously not going to be invited.  He is on record as criticizing America’s support for Israel in the past.  Although he is popular with the Republican grassroots, he obviously would not appeal to the pro-Israel RJC.  And, as a senator, he lacks the executive experience that the four governors have and Adelson wants.

However, Paul has been the one candidate who has taken the Republican message out to typically Democratic strongholds to expand the Republican base.  Paul has expended a great deal of effort in reaching out to blue-state voters. He is going straight for the most left-wing constituency by finding common ground in opposition to the National Security Agency and other aspects of the anti-terror apparatus that was built up hastily and excessively (according to its critics on both left and right) in the wake of the Sep. 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Senator Ted Cruz of Texas was a more baffling non-invite.  Although he lacks the executive experience of a governor, he is very vocal in his support of Israel – probably more than any of the candidates who were invited.  He also polls well when Republicans are asked who they want to run for president.

Which is the problem.  Senator Cruz is popular with Republican grassroots supporters, but his conservative stands are not in step with Adelson.  That is also true for Huckabee, the former governor of Arkansas who consistently out polls Christie when Republicans are asked who they want as their presidential nominee.

Being considered too conservative is also the problem for Governor Perry of Texas, who became Texas’s governor when Clinton was still president and nearly has more executive experience than all of the four invited governors combined.  The same conservative taint holds for Governor Palin, who in a recent poll was the one woman Americans want to run for President if Hillary Clinton doesn’t run in 2016.

The fact is that amongst the four governors who spoke, only one has any degree of the grassroots support that decides presidential primaries – Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin.  The Republican grassroots isn’t fond of dynasties and Governor Jeb Bush is the son of President Bush 41 and brother of President Bush 43 – neither conservative favorites.  Christie’s faced doubts even before the investigation into the Ft.Lee traffic jam, especially on his stands on gun control and social issues.  Kasich lost ground with the Republican base in his pleading for Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion.

Interestingly, although Walker is the most popular of the four governors with the Republican grassroots, his speech was the one not attended by Adelson.  Adelson did sit in the front row for Christie and sat next to Kasich at lunch.

Which means that despite their money, Adelson and the other Jewish Republican donors may find themselves spending money on candidates out of step with the Republican base.

What Happened at RJC

Although the focus of the conference was the four governors, there was more.  Briefings were given on recent polling and changes to the Republican primary process in 2016.

According to the briefings, the Republican presidential primary season will be shorter, with four states having the right to hold primaries in February.  The other states will hold them in March, April, and May.  The Republican National Convention will be held in late June or early July, which will allow them to start spending general election money.

This news was probably welcome to Adelson because a shorter primary season means a candidate with serious funding at the beginning has a better chance to win the nomination.  That gives the Adelson backed candidate a serious advantage over other potential candidates.

Another change to the primary process is that the RNC will take control of the presidential debates during the primary much like Major League Baseball controls the televising and content of all baseball games.  This should be neutral for all candidates, but should benefit the eventual nominee in the general election.

One downside for Adelson is the one that changed the rules imposed by Romney supporters at the convention in 2012.  Those rules gave the Romney team the final say in who attended the convention as a voting delegate instead of the state parties.  The rules have been changed back, and the state conventions and the grassroots delegates now have the final say on who attends and represents the states at the national convention.  That means an Adelson candidate that is well funded, but has little grassroots support will face resistance at the national convention.

Finally, one embarrassing note for Nevada resident Adelson was the information that Nevada might lose its preferential treatment in the presidential primary process.  Traditionally Nevada has been allowed to hold an early primary.  However, as the state has evolved from Republican to Democratic, many in the Republican National Committee have argued that another Western state with Republican leanings be allowed to replace Nevada.  That decision will be made at the next RNC meeting in May and there is a possibility that Arizona, which has traditionally held an early primary, may be the state to earn the privilege.

But, briefings aside, the main attractions were the speakers.  Governor Bush, who is reportedly being pressured to make a presidential run, was the featured speaker at a VIP dinner last Thursday hosted by Adelson and his wife, Miriam. The dinner was held at the Sands’ private airplane hangar at Las Vegas Macarran International airport.

Christie, Walker and former U.N. ambassador John Bolton addressed the group during its meeting on Saturday morning, while Kasich spoke at a luncheon that day.

Clearly, the speakers were trying to say what the Jewish leadership wanted to hear.  John Bolton, in what was seen as an attack on the attitude of Senator Paul towards Israel, said he fears the “rising tide of neo-isolationism within the Republican Party.”

Walker, who is not Jewish, noted that his son’s name, Matthew, is from the Hebrew word for “gift from God.” He later added that he decorates his residence with Christmas lights and a “menorah candle.”

Meanwhile, Kasich kept mentioning Adelson by name and closed his remarks by speaking directly to Adelson.  He said, “In Ohio, we’re no longer fly-over [country], Sheldon. We want you to invest. We want you to get to know us.  Sheldon, thanks for inviting me.  I don’t travel to these things much, but this was one that I thought was really, really important.”

No one was more deferential to the RJC than Christie.  Christie, a Catholic, said he was overwhelmed by displays of religious tolerance during a recent trip to Jerusalem.

But, it was another comment that caused a lot of hostility from the listeners.  Gov. Chris Christie recounted his recent trip to Israel: “I took a helicopter ride from the occupied territories” and came “to understand the military risk that Israel faces every day.”

Christie’s effort at impressing his listeners boomeranged. An angry Morton Klein of the Zionist Organization of America confronted Christie to demand that he explain just what he meant by “occupied territories.”

Whatever Christie’s response, it did not satisfy the ZOA or Klein who declared: “Either [Christie] doesn’t understand the issue, or he’s hostile to Israel.”

With his visit to Las Vegas falling apart, Christie asked for a private audience with Adelson to apologize.  A source close to Adelson told reporters that Christie made clear “that he misspoke when he referred to the ‘occupied territories.’ And he conveyed that he is an unwavering friend and committed supporter of Israel, and was sorry for any confusion that came across as a result of the misstatement.”

Of course, it isn’t just the four governors who attended the meeting that are changing their positions on Israel.  Rand Paul has told top GOP donors that he is “evolving” on foreign policy, particularly when it comes to his positions on Israel. He has also increased his outreach to prominent pro-Israel donors to show he is interested in having a dialogue.

However, that may not be enough.  Several RJC donors have said that they will spend money to defeat Rand in the primaries.  Undoubtedly, Adelson would be one of them.

Who Wins the Sheldon Primary and Does it Mean Anything?

Although each of the four governors had a chance to meet personally with Adelson, there is no idea of which one will eventually get the nod.  Christie was an early favorite, but has recently fallen – both with the investigation into the Ft.Lee traffic jam and with his political positions to the left of the Republican base.  Donors at the RJC were decidedly cool about Christie now.

That probably leaves Bush as the next in line – providing Bush is willing to throw his hat into the ring.  But, there is no excitement in the Republican base about Jeb Bush.

But, there is more to the election than Adelson money.  The history of American politics is replete with candidates with money, who fail to win.  Hillary Clinton had the money in 2008, but lost to Obama.  George Bush Sr. had more money and was considered more mainstream than Ronald Reagan.

The problem is that Adelson, with all of his money, is not looking at candidates that have Republican grassroots support.  And, although money is the mother’s milk of politics, grassroots support is the t-bone steak of American politics.   His group of potential candidates don’t poll much more (and frequently less) than Governor Palin.  In fact, in a McClatchy poll in February that included Palin, she had the same support as Bush (8%), and more than Walker (7%) or Kasich (1%).   Christie, who hadn’t seen his support erode with the bridge scandal, yet, had 13%.  However, his recent ratings have been at 8%.

At this point of time, Rand Paul has the best grassroots organization in the Republican Party – thanks to the infrastructure built in the 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns by his father.  Cruz, Huckabee, and Palin have the national base to build a political machine should they choose to do so.  The rest of the potential field (Santorum, Perry, Christie, Walker, Kasich, Jindal, and Ryan) have only small campaign teams limited to their own state.

As a member of the Bush family, Bush would be the natural heir to the Bush machine.  However the Bush 2000 – 2004 team is long gone.  In addition, many of the more experienced members of that team of 10 years ago have probably retired from active politics, which means building a new team.

If Adelson’s goal is to make pro-Israel candidates stronger, he may be making a big mistake.  Polling shows Senators Cruz and Paul share some of the same voter base.  However, Cruz is pro-Israel, while Paul isn’t.  In that case, it would make more political sense for Adelson to support Cruz and, in the process, cripple Paul.  However, it appears that Adelson is committed to what he perceives as a more “mainstream” Republican candidate.

In the end, despite the media’s theme, Adelson and other Jewish American donors will not be picking the next Republican presidential nominee.  The money will be critical for advertising and buying a campaign team, but it will not buy grassroots enthusiasm.  Adelson may be well served to look further abroad for a candidate that Republicans actually like.

 

PUBLICATIONS

The Pollard peace process farce

By Danielle Pletka

American Enterprise Institute

April 1, 2014

Word is that the United States is on the verge of releasing Jonathan Pollard, the former US naval analyst convicted of spying for Israel. There is no question that Pollard was guilty as charged, and he doesn’t claim any different. But the narrative over the years has evolved, with Israel at first denying he was spying for them to the point that the man and his release have become a cause celebre in the Jewish state. Are there mitigating circumstances? Yep, he’s in ill health. Has Pollard served three decades? Yep. Still, what the hell?  Forgive me for believing that the peace process up to this point was not some game for the Israelis, and that security and sustainable peace were at the heart of concerns about how to move forward. Apparently not. Apparently, all that stuff about settlement expansion and natural growth and the rights of the Jewish people were all just a way of saying “no” to negotiations. If not, why trade away a Palestinian prisoner release and settlement freeze (the quo for the Pollard quid being reported) for a convicted spy who has nothing to do with peace? Either these are points of principle or they are points of negotiation.

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How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement

By Sarah Chayes

Carnegie Endowment

March 27, 2014

On a Saturday afternoon last October, in an ornate, scarlet-draped convention center bedecked with flags and white flowers, Tunisian labor leader Houcine Abbassi presided over a signing ceremony that would mark his country’s destiny and perhaps that of the Arab world. “Thank you for heeding the nation’s call,” he told the leaders of two dozen political parties, before each stood to sign what has come to be called the Road Map.  The event almost came off the rails. Some politicians were shocked to discover upon arriving that they would be forced to sign the document in front of television cameras—and thus be bound by its terms. On a tight calendar, the text called for three giant steps: the resignation of Tunisia’s entire cabinet and the appointment of a nonpartisan prime minister tasked to put together a new one, the formation of an independent election commission, and the modification and approval of a draft constitution.

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The Complexities of U.S. Oil Exports

By Deborah Gordon

Carnegie Endowment

March 20, 2014

National Interest

It’s unlikely that anyone can stop the flow of oil—one of the world’s most durable and sought-after resources. Nevertheless, since 1975, U.S. crude oil exports (with a few exceptions) have technically been banned. The president has executive authority to reverse the ban, but Congress and interest groups have begun to weigh in as U.S. oil production is projected to ramp up to 9.6 million barrels a day (bpd) in 2016—a peak not seen since 1970.  Should the forty-year-old decision to ban U.S. crude oil exports be reversed? The right answer is murkier than those in favor or against suggest. In reality, it depends on what the new rules are for the array of new oils surfacing around the globe. Given the contentious politics surrounding this decision, a healthy debate is necessary to avoid falling into traps set by numerous unanswered questions.

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The Islamic State of Iraq Returns to Diyala

By Jessica Lewis

Institute for the Study of War

April 2014

Anbar is not the only front in Iraq on which Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), now operating as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), is fighting in 2014. ISIS has also established a governorate in Diyala. Its spokesman has named the province the central front in the sectarian conflict he has urged. The security situation and sectarian tension in Diyala province are grave. ISIS has returned to fixed fighting positions within Muqdadiyah, Baqubah, and the DiyalaRiverValley. Shi’a militias are now active in these areas as well. Increasing instances of population displacement demonstrate the aggregate effect of targeted violence by both groups. It is important to estimate the effects of this displacement and the presence of armed groups within Diyala’s major cities in order to understand how deteriorated security conditions in this province will interfere with Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Furthermore, violence in Diyala has historically both driven and reflected inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian violence in other mixed areas of Iraq, including Baghdad. Diyala is therefore a significant bellwether for how quickly these types of violence will spread to other provinces.

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Erdoğan’s Secret to Success

By Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı

German Marshall Fund

April 2, 2014

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won yet another election victory in Monday’s municipal elections. While the results saw a five percent decline in support for his Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the 2011 parliamentary elections, it was also a 6 percent improvement over the AKP’s results since the last municipal elections in 2009. Erdoğan’s party will continue to control the metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara (although the Ankara results are disputed and may yet be reversed), and it won a few new major cities such as Antalya, an important tourist destination on the Mediterranean. What makes this victory even more significant is that it came in the aftermath of several setbacks for the AKP: the GeziPark protests, a corruption and graft investigation against a group that included ministers’ family members, and a torrent of wiretaps that embarrassed the prime minister, his sons, his ministers, and businessmen close to him.

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Understanding the Gulf States

By Simon Henderson

Washington Institute

Spring 2014

inFocus Quarterly

Money, they say, can’t buy you everything. But in the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf (or the Arabian Gulf as they prefer to call it), money can buy a lot.  What is the tallest building in the world? The Burj al-Khalifa in the sheikhdom of Dubai. What is one of the best airlines in the world? Washington, DC friends vacationing in Asia recently chose to fly there with Qatar Airways via Doha. The newness of aircraft, quality of on-board service and well-timed connecting flight trumped any political misgivings, such as Qatar’s support for Hamas in Gaza and the weapons it gives to some of the worst jihadists in Syria.

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Why Democracy in Egypt Still Matters

By Tamara Cofman Wittes

Brookings Institution

March/April 2014

Three years after the hopeful scenes of the Arab Spring, the situation in places like Syria and Libya looks more like a tragic mess. The most dramatic reversal of fortune, perhaps, is in Egypt, whose Tahrir (Freedom) Square came to symbolize the hopes of 2011. Egypt under longtime ruler Hosni Mubarak was an anchor of stability in the region, in large part because of its close ties to Washington and its historic peace treaty with Israel. But Egypt today is in turmoil: Its third post-revolutionary government, installed by the military, is cracking down on basic rights while facing an upsurge in violence from Islamist militants, an economic crisis and vicious anti-Americanism stoked by the media. The decimated Muslim Brotherhood rejects any hint of compromise and talks to its followers of martyrdom. Many outside analysts worry that the zero-sum confrontation now underway in Egypt is dragging the country over a cliff into further violence.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst
C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Analysis 28-03-2014

 

 Saudi Arabia Will Lead From the Front While Obama Leads From Behind

When national leaders visit another nation, the typical theme is the close relations the two nations share.  Not this time.  Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia is seen by many as an attempt to mollify a traditional ally that has been drifting away from America in the past five years.

After decades of working closely with Washington, Saudi Arabia is pursuing its own foreign policy, which is frequently in conflict with Obama’s foreign policy.  The reasons are many, but the kingdom sees current American policy as destabilizing the region and threatening the current pro-American governments in the Middle East.

The course of the” Arab Spring” heightened the concerns.  In Egypt, Obama sided with the Muslim Brotherhood and supported the overthrowing a pro-American leader – Mubarak. That, in turn, heightened Saudi anxiety with fears that Washington might back the Brotherhood in a power grab in the kingdom. That concern grew when the Brotherhood were accused of plotting a coup in Abu Dhabi and Obama ignored it.

Nor has Obama helped improve stability within the region. In the Saudi eyes, Obama has ignored the war in Syria and allowed radicals to gain influence in that war torn country.  He announced “red lines” on Syria but ended up giving Russia the final say in shaping US policy towards Syria.

Saudi Arabia is also concerned with America’s refusal to contain Iran.  The Saudis, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait are all concerned about what they see as Obama’s “caving in” to the mullahs in Tehran.  Obviously, Iran’s nuclear program is the major concern.

The result is that a nation that relies on subtle diplomacy has made it quite clear that Saudi Arabia and the US are embarking on different foreign policy courses.

Saudi National Security Council head Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was the Saudi Ambassador to the United States from 1983 until 2005, has said that Saudi Arabia will make a “major shift” in relations with the United States to protest what Saudis regard as American inaction over Syria’s internal war, among other factors.

A recent Reuter’s article cited an unnamed source close to Saudi policy as expressing a similar view. “The shift away from the U.S. is a major one,” Reuters quoted the source saying. “Saudi doesn’t want to find itself any longer in a situation where it is dependent.”

“Prince Bandar told diplomats that he plans to limit interaction with the U.S.,” continued the source. “This happens after the U.S. failed to take any effective action on Syria and Palestine. Relations with the U.S. have been deteriorating for a while, as Saudi feels that the U.S. is growing closer with Iran and the U.S. also failed to support Saudi during the Bahrain uprising.”

A Washington Post article last October said that Saudi King Abdullah privately expressed his frustration with U.S. policy in a lunch in Riyadh two days earlier with King Abdullah of Jordan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the U.A.E., citing “a knowledgeable Arab official.” The Saudi monarch “is convinced the U.S. is unreliable,” this official said. “I don’t see a genuine desire to fix it” on either side, he added.  Post reporter David Ignatius related that in the fall of 2011, Saudi officials in Riyadh told him that that they increasingly regarded the United States as unreliable and would look elsewhere for a partner to bolster their security. Ignatius noted that “Obama’s reaction to these reports was to be peeved that the Saudis didn’t recognize all that the U.S. was doing to help their security, behind the scenes,” but he believes that the problem lies not so much in U.S. actions but in our failure, diplomatically, to reassure the Saudis that we have their best interests in mind.

At the same time, The Daily Mail quoted a statement from Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former director of Saudi intelligence, who called Obama’s policies in Syria “lamentable.”  Prince Turki continued, “The current charade of international control over Bashar’s [Assad’s] chemical arsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly perfidious. And designed not only to give Mr. Obama an opportunity to back down (from military strikes), but also to help Assad to butcher his people.”

Another, more long term concern, is America’s growing energy independence.  Saudi Arabia has always been considered a major ally since it was the world’s largest petroleum producer.  Now that the US has taken that position, the kingdom’s importance to Washington is lessened.

The decline of Saudi Arabia’s influence and the normalization of relations between Iran and the Obama Administration are a concern.  Before the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, America and Iran were close allies and Iran was seen as the key ally in the region.  Former national Security Advisor and Secretary of State Kissinger even said that Iran and the US had similar strategic interests.  That being the case, it’s a logical concern that the US and Iran could once again become close allies, to the detriment of the GCC nations.

Saudi Policy – Can It Diverge From American Policy?

Although Saudi Arabia is seeking new alliances, it has limited options, considering its strategic interests.

Syria is now the main focus of Saudi Arabia’s attention in the region and much has to do with its rivalry with Iran. The Saudis consider the struggle between Assad and his opponents a proxy war against their own main adversary, Iran. The Kingdom has been the primary source of financing and weaponry for Syrian rebel forces fighting Assad’s army, which is backed heavily by Iran and Hezbollah.

Saudi Arabia has also focused on keeping pro-Saudi governments in power within the region by deploying forces in Bahrain during Arab Spring rioting and supporting the removal of Morsi in Egypt last year.  These moves also helped curb Iran’s influence in the region.

However, when considering the big picture, Saudi Arabia has few options to work with. Robert Jordan, U.S. ambassador to Riyadh from 2001-03, has said there would be limits to any Saudi alliances with other powers.  “There is no country in the world more capable of providing the protection of their oil fields, and their economy, than the U.S., and the Saudis are aware of that. We’re not going to see them jump out of that orbit,” he said.

The major reason is Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran.

Russia, the chief competitor for influence in the region is closely allied with Iran and actively supporting Assad in Syria.  In fact, Russian nuclear help at Bushehr has helped Iran move towards its goal of becoming a nuclear power.  This makes them an unlikely substitute for America, especially since Russia can’t provide the level of military protection that the US offers.

China is also a poor choice for an alliance.  Iran relies upon China’s membership and especially Chinese veto power on the Security Council to protect it from UN or US led sanctions.  In 1980, China refused to support the UN arms embargo against Iran and abstained from voting on US-based sanctions against Iran as well.  China is also a major supplier of missiles and missile technology to Iran.  And, it is Iranian operated, Chinese missiles in the Strait of Hormuz that threaten Saudi oil shipments

In the end, the probable beneficiary of a break in US/Saudi relations would be France.  The Kingdom has worked closely with France on several issues that concern Saudi Arabia like Syria and the Iranian nuclear deal.  France held a tougher line with Iran on the nuclear program than Obama and it has some influence in the region as the former colonial power in the Levant.  France is also a major arms supplier to Saudi Arabia.

France also offers the ability to protect the Saudi oil fields if necessary.  Although not as militarily capable as the US, France does have a rapid reaction force that could move into the Kingdom quickly if necessary.  Given recent events in Africa, they also seem more willing to act quickly than the US.

Britain, also offers some of the same advantages as France.  It was a colonial power in the region, still has interests in the Middle East, and has a mobile military that can quickly react if necessary.

However, in the end, the US offers the Saudis advantages that offset the current disagreements.  Saudi foreign policy is more in line with US foreign policy than that of the other major powers.  A major change of alliances would not change that.

In the end, Saudi Arabia will probably wait the current administration out.  Comments by high ranking Saudi officials make it clear that their problem is with the unreliable American president, not America as a whole.  Saudi King Abdullah doesn’t trust Obama and another member of the Saudi royal family was quoted in the Daily Mail as accusing Obama of “dithering” on Syria and the Israeli/Palestinian issue.

Nor, is Obama likely to change course in the Middle East.  More ideological and dogmatic than pragmatic, Obama has shown a tendency to stick to his policies even after they have proven to be faulty – comments on the Ukraine and Obamacare being prime examples.

That being the case, some officials in Saudi Arabia believes that their interests may be best served by waiting out Obama and his foreign policy.  Obama’s foreign policy only receives a 40% approval rating in the AP poll released this week.  A new American president will be elected in another 2 and ½ years and considering the criticism being leveled at Obama by both Republicans and Democrats for his foreign policy, the chances that his policy will outlive his presidency are limited.

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia will continue to exercise a more aggressive foreign policy that meets its strategic interests.  It will continue to counter Iranian influence by supporting rebels in Syria.  It will probably work closer with European powers to hinder the Iranian nuclear program.  And, it will work behind the scenes with Israel to neutralize Iran if it does get close to building a nuclear weapon.

Saudi Arabia’s other major interest will be pursue a degree of political stability within the region in order to maintain the continued reign of the House of Saud.  It has shown a willingness to support friendly governments in Egypt and Bahrain and will continue to do so.  It will remain a bone of contention between the kingdom and Obama, but one that will not cause Obama to act.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Afghanistan–Pakistan: U.S. Must Ensure that Its Military Gear Does Not Exacerbate Regional Tensions

By Lisa Curtis

Heritage Foundation

March 24, 2014

Issue Brief #4178

After 12 years of fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan and failing to convince Pakistani leaders to crack down decisively on terrorist bases on their side of the border, American military planners are considering providing Pakistan with billions in leftover equipment from the war. A Washington Post story from last weekend indicates that U.S. military planners are in discussions with their Pakistani counterparts about the possibility of leaving behind, for Pakistani use, armored vehicles and other equipment deemed too expensive to ship back to the U.S.  While giving the Pakistanis U.S. military equipment, including mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, might make sense from a cost and logistical standpoint, the U.S. also needs to take into account the impact of such decisions on regional security dynamics. Washington should ensure that any military equipment it leaves in Pakistan does not exacerbate regional tensions. Washington should also condition the transfer of such military equipment on Islamabad’s meeting certain counterterrorism benchmarks, including cracking down on groups that are destabilizing Afghanistan, such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network.

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U.S. Missile Defense Policy After Russia’s Actions in Ukraine

By Michaela Dodge

Heritage Foundation

March 21, 2014

Issue Brief #4177

Russia has invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in blatant disregard of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and international law. Russia’s crude steps carry important implications for U.S. missile defense policy.  Currently, the Administration’s policy is not to affect the “strategic balance” with Russia in terms of ballistic missiles. In reality, there is no strategic balance between the two countries. Given Russia’s demonstrated willingness to use force to alter nations’ boundaries and act against U.S. interests, it is clear that the U.S. should expand its ballistic missile defense to protect itself and its allies from Russia’s ballistic missiles.

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Iraq in Crisis

By Anthony Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

March 24, 2014

This most recent draft of Iraq in Crisis has been revised to take into account of outside comments covering the trends in violence, Iraq’s political crisis, the role of Al Qaeda in Iraq, problems in Iraq’s security forces, and challenges with the Iraqi economy and petroleum sector. In addition, numerous tables and charts have been added, adjusted, and update to serve as reference. These include data on Iraq’s security forces and the trends in casualties and the rising rate of Iraq’s internal violence.

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Five Questions for Sisi, Egypt’s Man of Mystery

By Michele Dunne

Carnegie Endowment

March 26, 2014

Egyptians are about to hand the keys to their country to Field Marshal and presidential candidate Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, with very little sense of where he plans to take them. In fact, they know relatively little about Sisi himself, which is problematic given the mountain of challenges Egypt faces. And in announcing his candidacy on March 26—still in uniform, his last act as a soldier—Sisi gave only a few hints.  Sisi emerged into public life only recently. As head of military intelligence, he was virtually unknown to the public until he cooperated with the then president, Mohamed Morsi, to ensure that he replaced Mohamed Hussein Tantawi as defense minister in August 2012 and then ousted Morsi in July 2013. Throughout the ensuing months of questions about whether he would install himself into Morsi’s job, Sisi has remained a man of mystery, receiving Egyptians’ popular adoration yet maintaining a public persona that is distant and undefined.

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Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability by the Numbers

By Michele Dunne and Scott Williamson

Carnegie Endowment

March 24, 2014

Egyptians have suffered through the most intense human rights abuses and terrorism in their recent history in the eight months since the military ousted then president Mohamed Morsi. The extent of this story has been largely obscured from view due to the lack of hard data, but estimates suggest that more than 2,500 Egyptians have been killed, more than 17,000 have been wounded, and more than 16,000 have been arrested in demonstrations and clashes since July 3. Another several hundred have been killed in terrorist attacks.  These numbers exceed those seen even in Egypt’s darkest periods since the 1952 military-led revolution that would bring Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. They reflect a use of violence that is unprecedented in Egypt’s modern political history.

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The fall of Yabroud and the Campaign for the Lebanese Border

By Isabel Nassief

Institute for the Study of War

March 24, 2014

Yabroud is located in the rugged terrain of the Qalamoun Mountains and sits astride the M5 highway which connects Damascus to Homs and the Mediterranean coast. Rebel control of Yabroud had disrupted the regime’s freedom of movement along the M5 highway and created a staging ground for rebel attacks against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. In mid- November 2013, the regime intensified operations to clear the area in order to regain control of the section of the M5 highway running from Qara to Yabroud. Regime forces supported by Hezbollah and National Defense Force (NDF) fighters pushed along the main highway moving from north to south, and seized Qara on November 15th, Deir Attiyah in late November, and an-Nabek in mid-December.1  Pro-regime forces then pressed towards Yabroud where their advance slowed until launching a renewed offensive against the town in February 2014.

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Obama and the Churches of Saudi Arabia

By Nina Shea

Hudson Institute

March 21, 2014

When President Obama visits Saudi Arabia next week, he will have an opportunity to follow through on his inspiring words at the Feb. 6. National Prayer Breakfast. There, he told thousands of Christian leaders that “the right of every person to practice their faith how they choose” is central to “human dignity,” and so “promoting religious freedom is a key objective of U.S. foreign policy.”  The freedom so central to human dignity is denied by the Kingdom. The State Department has long ranked Saudi Arabia among the world’s most religiously repressive governments, designating it a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act. Yet the Obama administration, like its predecessors, has not pressed Riyadh to respect religious freedom.

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Egypt‘s New Military Brass

By Gilad Wenig

Washington Institute

March 26, 2014

PolicyWatch 2229

Today, following months of speculation, Field Marshal Abdul Fatah al-Sisi announced his resignation as Egypt’s defense minister and his candidacy for president. Sedki Sobhi, former chief of staff under Sisi, has been promoted to colonel general — one rank below field marshal — and appointed as the new defense minister, while Mahmoud Hegazy, former director of military intelligence, has been promoted to lieutenant general and will be the new army chief of staff. The resultant restructuring of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will likely put some of Sisi’s closest allies in key positions and should provide him with a strong base of military support and influence once he wins the presidency as expected (click on the image below for a chart illustrating this projected restructuring).

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Nuclear Kingdom: Saudi Arabia’s Atomic Ambitions

By Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson

Washington Institute

March 27, 2014

PolicyWatch 2230

A major probable consequence of Iran achieving a nuclear weapons capability is that Saudi Arabia will seek to match it. With President Obama currently rating the chances of diplomatic success as 50-50 and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei giving a “zero” probability, this weekend’s U.S.-Saudi summit will be an opportunity to check whether Saudi planning can help the diplomacy rather than hinder it.  In 2009, a Saudi royal decree announced that “the development of atomic energy is essential to meet the kingdom’s growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources.” In 2011, plans were announced for the construction of sixteen nuclear power reactors over the next twenty years at a cost of more than $80 billion. These would generate about 20 percent of Saudi Arabia’s electricity, while other, smaller reactors were envisaged for desalination.

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Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst
C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144