Week of August 9th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

The African conference, which was hosted by the White House overshadowed events in Washington.  However, the continued fighting and uneasy ceasefire continued to garner considerable attention.

As of this writing, it appears that an uneasy ceasefire is holding.  In that light, the Monitor Analysis looks at the military lessons learned by both sides.  Obviously, one lesson was that Hamas fighters, who have been underestimated by the IDF, did much better than Israel expected.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The CSIS looks at the fighting in Gaza and what it should mean to US military forces.  They note, “The United States cannot rely on professional forces and superior technology alone to fight conventional wars, any more than it can rely on “soft power” and partnerships with weak and internally divided allies as a substitute for the use of force.  The United States must adapt its forces to fight at asymmetric levels of politico-military warfare. It must progressively improve its ability to selectively attack enemy with minimal civilian casualties and collateral damage. It must do a far better job of integrating its civil and military approaches to warfare, and it must focus far more on shaping the lasting strategic outcome of a conflict than on winning tactical victories.

Technology has not triumphed over the human dimension of warfare, and the United States must be prepared to engage in long, complex political and ideological struggles fought on local terms and under local conditions in a steadily more complex mix of state and nonstate actors.”

The Washington Institute argues that the US must provide more support for the Kurds in Iraq, who are fighting ISIS.  Although they note that poor disposition of forces and rivalries are hurting the Kurds, they also write, “Although the peshmerga suffered some hard knocks in the past couple weeks, they are already counterattacking — and far faster than the U.S.-trained Iraqi army, it must be said. The Kurdish military remains the ideal ally against ISIS: it is highly motivated, quite well equipped, and perfectly positioned to assault ISIS along a broad front. Now is the time to commence U.S. airstrikes in support of the peshmerga, and to greatly intensify broad-based U.S. security cooperation. The latter effort should be structured to last well beyond the current fight against ISIS and involve more than the provision of U.S. weapons.”

The Foreign Policy Research Institute looks at the instability in Jordan, an important American ally in the region.  Noting the threat of extremism inside Jordan, they say, “Despite reassurances from King Abdullah II and top government and military officials to the Jordanian public, the risk of smaller-scale attacks is higher. The potential for small groups inside the country to be seriously disruptive is not lost on anyone. Jordanian jihadists returning home from the battlefield pose a direct threat while also serving as sources of radicalization for the rising number of jihadist Salafists in the country. There is fear that the internal “fire under the ashes” will be fueled by the combination of domestic discontent, regional grievances, and battlefield successes of radical militants that inspire revolutionary-minded youth. Jihadist Salafist leader Abu Sayyaf, who coordinates sending Jordanians to fight in Syria, has made clear that with greater capacity “this regime [in Jordan] will not be left alone.”

The CSIS looks at the sectarian problems in the Middle East and say that regional political leaders are fostering much of it.  They conclude, “What is important to note about this process is that leaders use it consciously in a bid for political control. They seek to erect barriers so that they can govern (and exploit) all that is within their domain. They create threats so that they can then protect their subjects from those threats. They stake their future on the presence of enduring conflict and their ability to protect populations from it.  It is easier to erect these divisions than tear them down, but the first step in doing so is to recognize that they represent a departure from history rather than a return to it. Recreating shared interests that cut across identities is an important step, and creating security for all is another. Sectarian difference isn’t new, but its overwhelming importance is. Allowing that difference to determine everything is not a return to the past but a step into a different—and likely more violent—future.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at future relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey.  Part of the problem, they note is that, “In recent years, the EU has elected to deal with Turkey through a piecemeal approach that has had more to do with the union’s own bureaucratic intricacies (and the fallout from the Lisbon Treaty) than with political design. Meanwhile, Ankara has pursued its dense relationship with the EU in fragmented ways, seemingly convinced that it would derive greater benefit from such a method than from a more straightforward approach.  The EU and Turkey now face a substantially deteriorating geopolitical environment. Today’s situation in the Middle East and the Black Sea is full of uncertainties and risks for both partners. This calls for a comprehensive approach from the EU and an openness to dialogue from Turkey.”

The Center for American Progress looks at US relations with Turkey and the Kurds.  In arguing for a greater role for Kurds in the region, they write, “For the United States and Turkey, the rapidly changing political situation in Syria and Iraq underpins the need for new partners with whom to work toward regional stability and the provision of basic governance. This goal reaches beyond a narrow—albeit important—notion of national security, rooted in combating militancy and denying terrorist organizations space in which to operate.”

The Institute for the Study of War looks at how ISIS is governing in captured areas of Syria.  In noting its strengths and weaknesses, they write, “ISIS’s sweeping yet exclusionary method of governance is potentially one of the organization’s greatest strengths, but it may also become one of ISIS’s greatest weaknesses. ISIS maintains social control by eliminating resistance, but this in turn places technical skills that are essential to run modern cities in shorter supply. In the process of establishing its governance project, ISIS has dismantled state institutions without replacing them with sustainable alternatives. The immediate provision of aid and electricity, for example, does not translate into the creation of a durable economy. The consequence of ISIS’s failure, however, may not be the dismantling of the Caliphate, but rather the devastation of the cities and systems that comprise Iraq and Syria such that they never recover…Though ISIS certainly has demonstrated intent to commit resources to governance activities, it is yet to demonstrate the capacity for the long-term planning of state institutions and processes. Translating broad military expansions from the summer of 2013 into a well-governed contiguous zone will be ISIS’s most daunting task yet, and may prove to be a critical vulnerability.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Military Lessons from the Gaza War

As of this writing, the latest truce is holding and the IDF is withdrawing from much of Gaza.  The question now is if Israel achieved its goals and what lessons both sides learned from the fighting?

Obviously, Israel didn’t achieve what it set out to do, when it invaded Gaza.  It stated goal was to destroy Hamas.  But, as the fighting bogged down and Israeli Army casualties skyrocketed, the Israeli government cut back its goals – something that even senior IDF officers admitted to.  A senior Israeli military official told Jerusalem Online that attempting to destroy Hamas, “Would have required staying in Gaza for 2 years.”

Instead, the IDF changed its mission to destroying the tunnels in Gaza – a mission that was considerably easier, but still costly in terms of lives and resources.  However, it did destroy 32 tunnel complexes according to Israeli sources.

However, Israel’s decision to change the objective of the operation and then withdraw and claim victory doesn’t hide the fact that their thinking was faulty.

The first problem was the IDF’s decision to engage in a war in an urban environment.  As the Monitor Analysis pointed out several weeks ago as Israel prepared to invade Gaza, urban operations are very difficult and costly.  They are even harder on armored forces, which can’t use their mobility – as was proven by the number of Israeli soldiers who were killed in armored vehicles that were hit by resistance anti-tank rockets.

Part of the problem is the IDF’s belief in its invincibility.  Israel’s successes in the Sinai in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s have impacted its strategic thinking.  These swift victories in the barren Sinai have allowed the IDF to think that overwhelming armored power can defeat anything.  They, however, have forgotten that in 1967, in the battle for Old Jerusalem, the fighting was much slower and more costly in terms of ground gained.

The result was that Israel invaded Gaza with an army designed to fight an armored war in the Sinai Desert rather than an urban environment.

While the IDF forgot lessons from past wars, Palestinian fighters showed that they had learned from history.  They were well-trained and skilled in the use of conventional small arms.  They also took the initiative rather than wait for the IDF to attack first.  In Operation Cast Lead, in winter 2008-2009, Israel’s coordinated and massive first strike, lasted less than four minutes and killed a third of all the fighters lost during the entire operation. In Operation Pillar of Defense, in November 2012, Israel’s first strike eliminated most of the resistant long-range rockets. An early strike during Pillar of Defense also killed Palestinian military commander Ahmed Jabari. This time, Palestinian military assets seem to have been prepared for an Israeli counterstrike. The military leaders went underground, logistical units ensured that valuable assets were protected, and the entire military structure dug in for a protracted fight.

Palestinian fighters also learned the value of command and control in war. Despite weeks of targeted bombings by the Israeli Air force, they were able to maintain communication lines between rocket units, ground units, and military leadership, and carry out its operational plan.  Even as the IDF pounded Gaza, Palestinian units successfully launched combined operations involving artillery and infiltration of ground forces into occupied areas.

Palestinian fighters’ great innovation in the war was their use of tunnels.  In fact, it was Israel’s interception of a group of fighters who had emerged from a tunnel in mid-July that forced it to rush into ground operation.

However, the Palestinian tunnels were not merely a way of infiltrating into Israeli settlements and military sites but an integral element of the defense of the Gaza Strip itself.  As military thinkers have noted since the advent of armored warfare in WW II, the best way to defeat an armored attack is with a defense in depth that can channel armored vehicles and tanks into killing zones.

This is what the Palestinian fighters successfully executed.  The Israelis had underestimated the tactical significance of the tunnels and IDF tanks were hemmed into a relatively small and largely built-up space, and then attacked from the sides and rear by Palestinian fighters relying on the Gaza tunnel system.  It soon became clear that IDF losses would have continued to pile up if this attack would have continued – leading to Israel’s withdrawal.

Although the Palestinian resistance tactics of urban warfare were good, the strategic thinking on their missile offensive against Israel was an enormous moral and psychological victory for the resistance but was marginal in its military impact.  The rocket fire caused a small number of Israeli casualties.  In fact, shorter-range mortar fire nearer the Gaza border was considerably more effective than the missile attacks.

However, the resistance rocket strategy did surprise Israel, especially when its R-160 forced Israelis in the country’s central and northern sections to head for their shelters.  Although inaccurate, the chief impact of the rockets was psychological and disruptive – making normal life impossible as people rushed for the bomb-shelters. It also proved that Palestinian fighters can stand up to Israel in a conventional war.

The other goal of the resistance rocket strategy was overall successful – to try to exceed the saturation point of the Iron Dome air-defense system through heavy barrages.  The saturation attacks appear to have been successful.

That counters the claims that Iron Dome has been proclaimed an overwhelming success.  In fact, there is some criticism that Iron Dome is not as effective as advertised by the Israeli government and that the small number of Israeli casualties was due more to an effective civil defense system and inaccurate Palestinian rockets.  If a good civil defense system is partially responsible, that means that Palestinian needs to focus on this infrastructure as they rebuild Gaza.

Despite the inaccuracy of the rockets, resistance was able to maintain a steady if intermittent barrage of missiles over the course of the war despite the massive attacks from the Israeli Air Force and artillery.  According to Israeli intelligence estimates some 3,300 missiles were fired towards Israel. The IDF claims to have destroyed some 3,000 more. Its assessment is that some 3,000 missiles are left in Gaza.

Observation for the Next War

Military experts suggest that the IDF will focus more on defeating tunnels.  They already used robots for clearing tunnels and better models can be expected.  Also expect them to look at developing more effective weapons like thermobaric bombs that can kill soldiers hidden in tunnels and bunkers.  These are weapons that utilize oxygen from the surrounding air to generate an intense, high-temperature explosion.  They do however cause considerably more destruction when used inside confined environments such as tunnels, caves, and bunkers – partly due to the sustained blast wave, and partly by consuming the available oxygen inside that confined space.

Although Israel may feel smug about its anti-rocket capability, it needs to reassess it in light of the even larger rocket capability of Hezbollah.  Repots give it an arsenal of about 100,000 rockets – ten times the size of the Gazans arsenal.

In July 2006, Hezbollah fired close to 4,200 rockets at a rate of more than 100 per day. About 95% of these were Katyusha artillery rockets which carried warheads up to 30 kg and had a range of up to 19 miles.  22% of these rockets hit cities and built-up areas across northern Israel, while the remainder hit open areas. The attacks in that conflict included the Fajr-3 and Ra’ad 1 rockets both liquid-fuel missiles developed by Iran.  Israeli intelligence states that Hezbollah possesses the far more advanced  Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets, with ranges of 27 and 45 miles; and a huge quantity of simpler 107mm and 122mm rockets with ranges up to 12 miles. These rockets are capable of striking many cities in northern Israel.  And, although Iron Dome might intercept some of them, that would mean moving the batteries north and away from Gaza.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

The Middle East Unstitched

By Jon B. Alterman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

August 6, 2014

Commentary

It is easy to claim that everything going on in the Middle East today represents a return to the region’s status before World War I. After millennia of pillage, massacre, and looting, the story goes, Western powers brought order to a fractious region and helped create modern states. Now, critics say the borders of the modern Middle East have outlasted their utility. They are no match for the sectarian feuds and ethnic fault lines that have always underlain—and now tear apart—the region’s independent states.  One can use this argument to explain away many of the conflicts in today’s Middle East: the battles inside Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Bahrain, and even the battles between Israel and the Palestinians. These hatreds supposedly go back centuries, so how can anyone hope to sort these countries out?

Read more

 

 

The Real Revolution in Military Affairs

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

August 5, 2014

Commentary

It doesn’t seem all that long since the United States was considering how advancements in military technology would allow it to use advances in long-range precision weapons, intelligence sensors, and command and control capabilities to dominate conventional wars. The Gulf War in 1991, the fighting over Kosovo, the initial invasion of Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to topple a Saddam Hussein all seemed to prove that superior technology and tactics had led to a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) that would dominate modern warfare.  No one can deny the importance of such changes today. Precision strike capability combined with superior intelligence and command and control capabilities have changed the face of conventional warfare. At the same time, the Afghan War, the Iraq War, the fighting in Gaza, the fighting in Yemen, the fighting in Ukraine, and the other conflicts following the political upheavals in the Middle East have all involved a different kind of revolution.

Read more

 

 

A Turkey Road Map for the Next EU Foreign Policy Chief

By Marc Pierini

Carnegie Endowment

July 30, 2014

European Union leaders are currently busy selecting the next heads of the union’s key institutions. Among the new bigwigs to be appointed is the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy—in short, the EU’s foreign minister—who will succeed Catherine Ashton in December. The next high representative will inherit a lackluster record but, more importantly, will also have to tackle a host of thorny topics, from Ukraine to Syria to Iraq.  Turkey will be another of these critical issues. The country is not ablaze; on the contrary, for the EU and NATO, it is a pillar of stability in a highly volatile region. But in the eyes of Turkey’s Western partners, a number of domestic and international concerns could challenge that stability. Faced with an unstable regional context, how should EU leaders handle their southeastern neighbor?

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Jordan: Between Stability and Spillover

By Andrew Spath

Foreign Policy Research Institute

August 2014

The swiftness with which the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, now the Islamic State) assaulted and overran northern Iraq brings a new level of concern to policymakers. The offensive blew a hole in Washington’s desire to maintain “a ring of Syrian containment” that favored a political solution with limited measures to support rebels against the Assad regime. As the organization expands in number and territory, and ambitiously declaring the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, anxiety is growing among leaders and citizens in the neighborhood. Jordan, the key U.S. ally bordering territories held by the Islamic State and comprising a central part of its desired Sunni empire, is precariously situated on the frontline of the ISIL’s violent campaign.

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ISIS Governance in Syria

By Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds

Institute for the Study of War

August 2014

The Islamic State’s June 2014 announcement of a “caliphate” is not empty rhetoric. In fact, the idea of the caliphate that rests within a controlled territory is a core part of ISIS’s political vision. The ISIS grand strategy to realize this vision involves first establishing control of terrain through military conquest and then reinforcing this control through governance. This grand strategy proceeds in phases that have been laid out by ISIS itself in its publications, and elaborates a vision that it hopes will attract both fighters and citizens to its nascent state. The declaration of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria, however, raises the question: can ISIS govern?  Available evidence indicates that ISIS has indeed demonstrated the capacity to govern both rural and urban areas in Syria that it controls. Through the integration of military and political campaigns, particularly in the provincial capital of Raqqa, ISIS has built a holistic system of governance that includes religious, educational, judicial, security, humanitarian, and infrastructure projects, among others.

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What Iraq’s Kurdish Peshmerga Really Need

By Michael Knights

Washington Institue

August 7, 2014

PolicyWatch 2299

Prior to August 1, the Iraqi Kurds had not felt the full brunt of attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, which now styles itself “the Islamic State”). Yet after a string of powerful ISIS strikes on Kurdish peshmerga units between Mosul and the Syrian border, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s forces are fully engaged. On August 5, KRG president Masoud Barzani stated, “We have decided to go on the offensive and fight the terrorists to the last breath.”  The United States should certainly support its historic allies, the Iraqi Kurds, in this fight. However, amid a clamor of voices calling for Washington to arm the peshmerga, it is important to draw lessons from the recent fighting that highlight the Kurdish military’s more pressing needs.

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The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions

By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman

Center for American Progress

July 31, 2014

The past four years have swept away the old pillars of U.S. policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt, a traditional American security partner, is confronting a staggering political and economic crisis. Syria has descended into a horrific civil war with no resolution in sight. Lebanon is clinging to basic stability in the face of long-standing sectarian tensions and a massive refugee crisis. Jordan remains a strong U.S. ally but faces structural threats that stem from demographic trends and the war in Syria. Iraq is once again engulfed in a struggle against militancy stoked, in part, by perceptions that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters have institutionalized their ascendancy in a way unacceptable to Iraq’s minorities. Of course, governments across the region are struggling to confront the rising influence of violent Salafi jihadists. The seizure of Mosul—Iraq’s second-largest city and home to nearly 2 million people—by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, brought this reality into stark relief.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984             C: 301 509 4144

Week of August 01St, 2014

Executive Summary

 

Gaza remains a major area of focus in Washington, along with the growing tension in the Ukraine.

This week’s Monitor Analysis looks at the mid-term elections in the US in November and its impact on the Middle East.  Although Obama isn’t on the ballot, the election will revolve around him and his policies.  At this time, that means the Democrats will likely lose the Senate, which means that Obama will face more opposition in the last two years of his administration.  A Republican Senate will also have an impact on American policy in the Middle East – ranging from a very pro-Israeli Jewish American becoming a part of the Senate leadership, to the confirmation of ambassadors representing the US in the region.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The Carnegie Endowment looks at the fighting in the Gaza.  Although Israel claims it is winning on the battlefield, they note that they are losing politically as Hamas is becoming more popular amongst Palestinians.  They note, “Palestinian public opinion—as well as the mood across the Arab street—has significantly shifted in favor of Hamas. The pictures of civilian deaths on Arab television networks have been horrific, particularly the children and women. Israel’s claim of exercising caution to avoid hitting civilian targets is not believed in the Arab world.

The CSIS argues that the US must become more aggressive in attacking ISIS.  They note that Maliki is the major problem to solving the ISI issue and say the US must stop his reelection.  They state, “The United States should not try to force a leader on Iraq. It can, however, make it clear that the kind of aid that Iraq now desperately needs is conditional. It means Iraq must not give Maliki a third term or consider horrible alternatives like Ahmed Chalibi.  Success means pushing for a truly national Iraqi government needs with strong and independent Arab Sunni and Kurdish voices. It means that U.S. efforts to strengthen and rebuild the Iraq security forces will also means rejecting any aid to  Shi’ite militias, and creating truly national and professional forces that offer real opportunities to Sunnis and Kurds as well as Shi’ites. It means the United States must work with a new Iraqi government to limit Iranian and other outside roles to ones that do not compromise Iraq’s independence.”

The Washington Institute looks Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the force behind the ISIS.  The report says that a biography states, “that Baghdadi was indeed a descendant of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad — one of the key qualifications in Islamic history for becoming the caliph (historically, leader of all Muslims). It highlighted that Baghdadi came from the al-Bu Badri tribe, which is primarily based in Samarra and Diyala, north and east of Baghdad respectively, and known historically for being descendants of Muhammad.”  They conclude, “While we may not know the future of the Islamic State, it is clear that Baghdadi has steered the organization back to prominence. In many ways, he has eclipsed even the founder of the group Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last decade in prestige, resources, and potential for the future.”

His true significance will likely come more to light following his death, since, as we have seen with al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri has had a difficult time replacing Bin Laden. For now, the Islamic State’s “Caliph” is the new star of the ascendant “Caliphate Project.”

The Foreign Policy Research Institute looks at ISIS’s theft of some radioactive material in Iraq and the threat of a “dirty bomb.”  They look at the types of material that may be available to ISIS and other international terrorists and what damage these compounds could cause.

The Carnegie Endowment looks at the interesting relationship between Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.  Although close in the past, with the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the relationship has cooled considerably.

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Upcoming Election in America Could Impact Middle Eastern Events

 

Amidst the war crimes committed by Israelis and the carnage of Gaza is the fact that Americans hold a mid-term election in three months.  And, although mid-term elections are seen mostly in a domestic framework, what happens will impact American relations in the Middle East.

Although the president has the constitutional responsibility for foreign relations, it is the Congress that has several checks on that power.  First, the US Senate must confirm any US ambassador to the region and the election climate may make that a very critical issue.  Second, Congress has the authority to authorize military action in the region and provide military and economic aid to nations in the region.  Third, the US Senate must also ratify any treaty before it becomes legal.  Finally, Congress has the “power of the purse,” which can be used to restrict administration actions by refusing funding.  Given these powers and the potential election outcome in November, we can see some changes in how the US will interact in the region starting in a few months.

To understand how events could change, remember that the US government is divided with the Congress passing laws and providing money, while the President executes policy and enforces law.  Currently the Congress is divided between the Democratic controlled Senate and the Republican controlled House of Representatives.  With the Senate in the control of his political allies, legislation that comes out of the Congress has already been made more to Obama’s liking by the input of the US Senate.  Without the Democratic control of the Senate, Obama would only have two options concerning legislation coming out of Congress – veto it in its entirety or sign it.  He would also have to accept that his choices of ambassadors might be declined by a Senate in the control of his political opponents.

As a result, the key battle in November will be over control of the US Senate.  Polling shows that the Republicans will likely retain control of the House of Representatives and a majority of the governorships in the states.  So, the best hope for Obama to retain more control of his agenda lies in preventing the Republicans from gaining six or more seats in the US Senate, which would give the GOP control.

At this point of time, it is looking bad for the Democrats.  Last weekend, the New York Times and CBS News, in partnership with YouGov, released some results of a massive polling and research effort across the country.  YouGov was quite accurate in 2012 and the results indicate that this November could be disastrous for the Democrats in the US Senate.  Republicans hold a clear advantage in races in three states: South Dakota, Montana and West Virginia. They also find the Republicans with a nominal lead in five additional states.  These states are: Arkansas, Louisiana and North Carolina — where Democratic incumbents face tough re-election contests and where Mitt Romney won in 2012. Republicans also have a slight edge in Iowa and Michigan, two open seats in states that usually vote for Democrats in presidential elections.

That is not the only bad news for Democrats.  Americans are so disappointed with Obama at the moment that, if they could do the 2012 election all over again, they’d overwhelmingly back Romney for President.  That’s just one finding in a CNN poll, released Sunday, which shows Romney topping Obama in a re-election rematch by a whopping nine-point margin, 53 percent to 44 percent. That’s an even larger spread than CNN found in November, when a survey had Romney winning a redo 49 percent to 45 percent.  Two years ago, Obama won re-election with about 51 percent of the vote.

Since mid-term elections are usually a referendum on the president in the White House, this is bad news.  An electorate disappointed with the president will either vote for the opposing party or stay home.

Democratic strategists, however, aren’t panicking.  They recognize that they will lose seats, but will try to limit their losses to 5, which allows the Democrats to retain control.  To do this, they will remain focused on those seats they consider the easiest to hold, will move money into those campaigns, will try to cast the Democrat as an opponent to some of Obama’s policies and try to energize some of their voting base which they are afraid will not vote this November.

An important part of this election is to allow Democrats to keep their distance from Obama so as to not alienate independent voters who don’t like him.  Of the ten states with the lowest approval ratings for Obama, Democrats have to defend seats in five: South Dakota, Montana, West Virginia, Alaska, and Arkansas.

The most dramatic distancing comes from West Virginia Democrat Natalie Tennant, who is campaigning for a vacant Senate seat in a coal-producing state targeted by Obama environmental regulations. She is running an ad in which she hits a switch and plunges the White House into darkness in protest over his policies.

Obama has also traveled the country raising money for Senate candidates – often to the criticism of others who accuse him of spending more time in fund raising than governing the country.  So far this cycle, Obama has headlined 11 events for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, while Vice President Joe Biden has hosted five and first lady Michelle Obama has been the top draw for two. The president also has added his weight to the Senate Majority Fund PAC, which has run ads against (GOP candidates Tom) Cotton in Arkansas, Cory Gardner in Colorado, Thom Tillis in North Carolina, and other normally Republican states where Democrats are fending off Republican challengers.

The next challenge is to energize the voter block that gave Obama his two electoral wins in 2008 and 2012.  As a result, he has focused on the “War on Women,” and “Economic Equality,” to encourage his 2012 voters to come out in November.

The desire to energize the Obama base may also be at the heart of the Obama threat to legalize millions of illegal immigrants between now and the election.  Some Republicans have noted that such a move is illegal and would be grounds for an impeachment of Obama.  Noting that the impeachment of Clinton actually helped the Democrats in the 1998 elections, many in the White House think that the threat of an impeachment would encourage Obama supporters to come out and vote for Democratic Senate candidates.

An idea of this strategy was noted by Dan Pfeiffer of the White House.  In reporting of the event by the Los Angeles Times, they said, “Any such move would prompt a major clash with congressional Republicans, and at least some White House officials appeared to relish the prospect that the GOP might overreach in its response and act in a politically self-destructive manner.  When the decision is announced, it will “increase the angry reactions from Republicans,” Pfeiffer said.  “I would not discount the possibility” that Republicans would seek to impeach Obama over his next immigration moves, he said.

Pfeiffer made his comments at a breakfast for reporters sponsored by the Christian Science Monitor.

However, despite such talk, the Republicans appear to be circumspect about impeachment.  They could get articles of impeachment passed in the House, but would be unable to get a conviction, even if the Senate goes Republican.  This would discourage such a course.  Republicans also know that any unilateral action taken by Obama can be easily revoked under a Republican president in the future.

How a Republican Senate Would Impact the Middle East

Assuming the Republicans take the Senate in November, what impact would there be on the Middle East?

The most interesting change would be on the Democratic side of the Senate as the Senate Democratic leadership would likely become more pro-Israel and even less willing to deal with the Palestinians.  That person would be New York Senator Chuck Schumer, who is Jewish and very pro-Israel.

Schumer, is currently the Democrat’s number 4 person in the Senate, but has a realistic path to becoming the Democratic leader.  Senator Tim Johnson, (D-SD), is retiring and Senator Jack Reed, (D-RI), will become the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee after 2014. That leaves Schumer as next in line.

If Republicans seize control of the upper chamber, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid might not keep his job.  Reid’s departure would leave a major power vacuum among Senate Democrats, one most likely filled by Schumer, who has aggressively pursued the Democratic leadership post for years.

However, as the Senator for New York, which has a large Jewish voter block, Schumer has strongly supported Israel over the years.  Last week, Chuck Schumer along with two other senators wrote to Obama that “the threats posed by Hamas rockets and tunnels whose only purpose is to kill and kidnap Israelis are intolerable, and Israel must be allowed to take any actions necessary to remove those threats.”

The senators wanted to impress upon Obama their “strong belief that any viable cease fire in Gaza must remove the threat to Israel posed by Hamas rockets and tunnels…Any cease fire should create a situation in which Israeli citizens no longer face the threat of brazen terrorist attacks,” they wrote. “Israeli citizens have faced over 1800 rocket launches from Hamas since June. While Iron Dome has saved countless lives, over five million Israelis live in fear of incoming rockets fired indiscriminately from Gaza. Twenty-eight tunnels have been discovered by the IDF since the ground operation in Gaza began. Israel has an absolute right to defend its citizens and ensure the survival of the State of Israel.” “…Any effort to broker a ceasefire agreement that does not eliminate those threats cannot be sustained in the long run and will leave Israel vulnerable to future attacks.”

In the past, Schumer has also taken Obama to task for a “hostile” attitude towards Israel.  And, while Senate Majority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) has been a supporter of Israel, a Jewish Senator from New York could be expected to be an even stronger advocate of Israel.  In fact, as the Senate Minority leader and a member of the Congressional leadership, he would be the highest ranking Jewish American in the American government.

There are other ways that a Republican Senate could impact the Middle East.  While Obama has been cool towards the el-Sisi administration in Egypt, the Republican leadership has been more supportive of the Egyptian government and increasing foreign aid.  In addition, Senator McCain, who is in line to chair the Senate Armed Services Committee if the Republicans win, would use his power as part of the Senate majority to force more aid to Syrian rebels.

A Republican Senate might also make their mark on the diplomatic corps in the Middle East.  Obama has made more large political contributors to his presidential campaign ambassadors than any other president.  The result is that people totally unqualified to represent the US are finding themselves advancing US policy in countries that they have never visited or even know the language.  “The Obama administration’s appointments suggest that the president isn’t being honest when he says that diplomacy is important to him,” Henri J. Barkey, Lehigh University professor and former State Department policy staffer, wrote in The Washington Post. “It’s illogical, and insulting, to presume that Norwegians are such wonderful and civilized people — and hence unlikely to cause any problems with Washington — that we can afford to send someone on a taxpayer-funded three-year junket to enjoy the fjords.”

A Republican Senate, which must confirm every ambassador, would be unlikely to let such egregious appointments be confirmed. Although most Democratic Senators are already pro-Israel, a Republican senate would undoubtedly remain pro-Israel – even if other major cuts are made in the foreign aid appropriations.  Consequently, it’s nearly certain that aid to Egypt would continue in order to keep the Egypt/Israel treaty in place.

A Showdown between Obama and Congress in 2015

If the Senate becomes Republican in November, expect to see a major fight between the Congress and Obama in 2015 – a fight that may even lead to a government shutdown.

The Constitution makes it clear that the Congress has the power to appropriate money.  And, the Congress can place any strings to that spending that it wishes.

Since the appropriations bill is the one bill that can’t be filibustered in the Senate, it’s likely that the US House will pass a bill that seriously limits Obama in several areas including immigration, NSA spying, Obamacare, and the power of the IRS.  This bill will pass the Congress and will go to the President for signing – something he will be unlikely to do.  The result will probably be a short government shutdown, political posturing, and bluffing.  In the end, the shutdown will help neither party and some compromises will have to be made by both sides.

The only other critical issue will be the threat of impeachment of the president.  This is unlikely given the polls that show only about a third of Americans support Obama’s impeachment.  Although Obama is unpopular with the majority of voters, there isn’t the political support for his impeachment – a fact the Republicans are well aware of.  They are more likely to rely on the courts, the power to appropriate money, and even a reliance on state powers to negate Obama in the last two years of his administration.

Obama’s Ineffective Gaza Foreign Policy

The Israeli attacks on Gaza appear to be expanding.  Southern Command Major General Shlomo Turgeman spoke to Arutz Sheva about the expansion of the operation throughout new areas of Gaza.  “Yesterday, we expanded operations throughout central and southern Gaza,” he said. “We are hitting wherever we identify tunnels and where Hamas terrorists operate.”

Why hasn’t Obama been able to stop this escalation?

Since the formation of Israel, American presidents have been able to exert some degree of influence on Israeli leadership when it comes to observing a truce.  However, for the first time in seven decades that is not happening.  Is it Israeli intransigence or is it a failing American president.

It is, in fact, both.  Israeli leaders are determined to continue their shelling and ground attack on Gaza.  Meanwhile, Obama is unable and unwilling to exert any pressure on Israel.

One issue that has been recently raised concerning Israel’s bellicose response is the fact that there are significant natural gas reserves off the Gaza Strip that Israel covets.  Daily Sabah reported, “In 1999, the Palestinian Authority granted the British Gas Group (BGG) and Consolidated Contractors International Company gas exploration rights off the coast of Gaza in a 25-year agreement. Following that, two wells were drilled and extensive gas reserves were discovered in the area. The reserves, which hold an estimated 1.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, has made Israel’s mouth water since then. Negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel in the early 2000s went back and forth, leaving Palestine with no concrete steps to benefit from the natural resource.
Furthermore, the course of events became even more inextricable in 2006 when Hamas won a victory in elections and took over Gaza, ousting its rival Fatah, who ended up governing the West Bank.”

Hamas has rejected the 1999 agreement and wants new terms that give more money to Gaza.  This is something Israel opposes.  Consequently, the destruction of Hamas (and thousands of Palestinians) would give Israel more leverage in benefiting from these natural gas reserves.

That explains Israel’s continued attacks in Gaza.  But, what is the strategy behind Obama’s weak response to the slaughter?

Although many have accused Obama of being weak in his response to international crisis, he has moved aggressively to support Israel militarily.  Obama has agreed to re-supply Israel with ammunition, after Israeli military officials made its request to the U.S. Defense Department.  The U.S. will give access to the massive stockpile of American weapons stored in Israel, CNN reported.

The little-known stockpile is officially known as War Reserve Stockpile Ammunition-Israel and has been maintained inside Israel since the 1990s by United States European Command, according to ABC News.  The location of the stockpile as well as the types and quantities of ammunition it stores are classified.  However, a Congressional Research Service report from April says, “the United States stores missiles, armored vehicles and artillery ammunition” in the stockpile.

Compare this action to Obama’s refusal to give any significant military aid to the Ukraine. Obviously Israel has more political importance to Obama than the Ukraine.

The answer is found in domestic politics and recent polling.  According to a recent Washington Post/ABC News poll, the public is sour on Obama’s failure to contain that conflict.  “When it comes to Obama’s handling of the increasing tensions in Gaza, the poll shows 39 percent approve and 52 percent disapprove, with one-third disapproving ‘strongly,’” The Post reported on Wednesday.   In fact, the poll shows that Obama gets lower marks for his handling of the crisis in Gaza than he does for either his approach to the downing Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 or his management of America’s foreign affairs overall.

Interestingly enough, the anger doesn’t come from Jewish voters or pro-Israel Christians, but from his own base, Democrats and young voters.  According to the Washington Post, “Sixty-five percent of Democrats approve of Obama’s efforts, but this falls significantly below the number approving of him on foreign policy overall (77 percent). Likewise, while respondents aged 18 to 39 split evenly on Obama’s general handling of foreign policy (47 percent apiece), this age group disapproves of his efforts in the Middle East by a 21-point margin, 54-33. Separate surveys from the Pew Research Center and Gallup have found younger Americans are significantly more skeptical of Israel’s actions than are older Americans.” (Italics added for emphasis)

What this means is that Americans disapprove of Obama’s Gaza policy and, at the same time, Obama’s supporters are more likely to disapprove because they see it as being slanted towards Israel, not the Palestinians.

Meantime, there is some question about Obama’s sudden focus on using Qatar and Turkey in the peace negotiations.  The Washington Post notes, “Kerry turned to Turkey and Qatar, which as friends and financial backers of Hamas had more leverage. That put the deal first and a stable solution to Gaza’s problems second. The deal blew up anyway, victim of Israeli and Palestinian inability to get to yes.”

However, Turkey and Qatar are critical in controlling the problems in Syria and Iraq.  This opens the possibility that Obama and Kerry are willing to let the slaughter in Gaza continue in order to gain leverage in the conflict against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

The domestic politics for Obama is attractive.  Since younger voters are less likely to vote in mid-term elections than Jewish-American voters, giving Israel more weapons and allowing Israel to continue its attacks is more likely to appease his voter base in November.  At the same time, he positions himself for countering ISIS, which appears to be a more serious concern with the White House because a failure in Iraq will damage Obama politically more than additional killings in Gaza.

The result is more deaths in Gaza, while politics continue as usual in Washington.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Dumping Maliki and Striking at ISIS

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 28, 2014

Commentary

It is time that the United States stopped waiting for good options that could somehow quickly solve its problems in the Middle East and accept the reality that the United States faces an unstable mess in the entire Middle East/North Africa region that is likely to take at least a decade to play out before there is any real stability. There are no “good,” quick, or simple options that can avoid this reality, or avoid the fact the United States must choose between unpleasant alternatives in many cases.  The United States cannot continue to wait, hope that negotiations and half-hearted use of “soft power” can somehow substitute for more tangible action, and “lead from behind” to the point it does not really lead at all. It needs to become far more active in dealing with issues like Iraq and the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), and not let critical turning points pass while it waits for Godot.

Read more

 

 

What the Gaza War Means for the Middle East

By Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, Lina Khatib, Marwan Muasher, Maha Yahya

Carnegie Endowment

July 28, 2014

Q&A

As a result of Israel’s incursion into Gaza, Hamas is now more popular than Fatah according to a recent poll—for the first time in years. And if Israel’s intention is to disarm or weaken Hamas, the historical record does not suggest these objectives will be achieved.   Three earlier ground incursions, in the last six years and another ground war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, failed to weaken Israel’s opponents. And they didn’t disarm either organization. Both Hamas and Hezbollah have actually strengthened their military capabilities over time.   Israel seems to be pursuing tactical objectives to appease its domestic audience and the hardliners in the Israeli cabinet—at the expense of thousands of Palestinian casualties.

Read more

 

 

The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey’s AKP and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

By Senem Aydın-Düzgit

Carnegie Endowment

July 24, 2014

The seesawing relations between the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) demonstrate how ideological linkages can clash with geopolitical priorities in an unstable neighborhood. Between 2007 and 2013, the AKP capitalized on its ideological kinship with the MB to foster closer relations with the movement and to increase its weight in the region. Relations turned sour with the coup in Egypt and Turkey’s fear that links with the MB would lead to retaliation from both the new Egyptian government and the Gulf states (with the exception of Qatar). The once warm relationship between the AKP and the MB has measurably cooled as geopolitical realities have shifted, especially since the most recent presidential elections in Egypt.

Read more

 

 

“Dirty Bombs:” Reason to Worry?

By John R. Haines

Foreign Policy Research Institute

July 2014

The recent report that the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized a quantity of heretofore unreported material from a university laboratory in Iraq sparked much commentary about the possibility of a malefactor fashioning and detonating a so-called “dirty bomb”—formally, an explosive radiological dispersal device or “Erdd.” Knowledge of three recent incidents involving the theft or attempted theft of radiologic material in Mexico further amplified discussions about the risk that such material could be moved covertly into the United States and fashioned into an eRDD for detonation in a major American city. The purpose of this essay is to further explore recent incidents involving the theft or attempted theft of radiologic material, and to assess whether, and if so what, threat such material may pose.

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Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Islamic State’s Driving Force

By Aaron Y. Zelin

Washington Institute

July 30, 2014

BBC News

On 5 July, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, known by his supporters as Caliph Ibrahim, left the shadows and showed his face for the first time, in a Friday sermon in Mosul, Iraq. While previous pictures of him had been leaked, Baghdadi had not shown himself in the four years since he became leader of what was then the jihadist Islamic State of Iraq (forerunner of ISIS, then the Islamic State).  Before April 2013, Baghdadi also did not release many audio messages. His first written statement was a eulogy to Osama Bin Laden in May 2011. His first audio message was released in July 2012 and predicted future victories for the Islamic State.  Since the group’s resurgence, which began 15 months ago, Baghdadi’s media output has risen. The amount of specific information about his background has also increased.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984             C: 301 509 4144

Week of July 25th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

Internationally, the focus of the Washington think community has been on the Ukraine and Gaza.

This week’s Monitor Analysis looks at the continued fighting in Gaza.  We look at Washington’s weak response and some of the reasons behind it.  We also look at the difficulty Israel has had in the recent conflict and exposed weaknesses, including the use of obsolete, vulnerable M-113 Armored Personal Carriers that were built about half a century ago.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The CSIS sees the futility of the fighting in Gaza.  They note, “Israel, however, will not have won except at the tactical level. It will still have to tailor a major part of its security effort to deal with whatever threat emerges after this round of fighting, deal with the challenge of containing more than 1.8 million people, and deal with the risk that it will face much broader hostility from the Palestinians, and the present moderate Palestinian Authority will collapse. It will still have to go on dealing with the broad hostility of the Arab world and Iran, and deal with the fact many countries see its use of force as excessive and Israel as guilty of human rights abuses and blocking the peace process.  The end result is that the war will not end in any real sense. The outcome of this round of round of fighting war will leave the strategic realities on the ground more or less where they began, having been seen as necessary by both sides, but having escalated to nowhere. The resulting pause will be a prelude to yet another round of fighting, and more human costs on both sides.”

The Washington Institute looks at how Hamas has improved its asymmetrical warfare capability.  They conclude, “To prepare for future asymmetric conflicts, Israel and other countries will need to examine Hamas’s adaptation to Israel’s fighting doctrine. The necessity of such study extends well beyond Hamas. Indeed, other terror organizations across continents — from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria to ISIS in Iraq to Boko Haram in Nigeria — all learn quickly, absorbing successful strategies through loose operational networks. They will be eager to draw lessons from Hamas’s experience.”

The Wilson Center also looks at the fighting in Gaza.  In terms of what Israel wants, they note, “Let’s be clear: “Demilitarization,” as Netanyahu means it, is on the far end of the outcome spectrum. This would mean a cessation of hostilities far different than in previous rounds of fighting. It would require a fundamental change in Gaza’s political situation brought about either by military or diplomatic means. Given the loss of 13 Israeli soldiers on Sunday, July 20, in a single incident, it’s hard to imagine that Netanyahu is prepared to do this through force of arms — an undertaking that would require the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip for a prolonged period and the extirpation of Hamas’s military and political wings. Indeed, the number of casualties on the Israeli and Palestinian sides would likely make the costs unacceptable.”

The American Enterprise Institute looks at the Shiites in the Middle East and reminds readers that they aren’t necessarily enemies of the US, and can be important allies.  They note, “Demonizing Shi’ites as Iranian puppets is not only inaccurate but also counterproductive because it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy by which some Shi’ites—especially those who feel themselves under siege by Sunni sectarian forces—feel they have no other choice but to accept Iranian protection even though they resent the price Iran seeks to extract in exchange… Rather than concede and condemn Shi’ites to Iranian influence or bless injustices they may face at the hands of sectarian governments, it is essential that the United States court and coopt each community to not only ensure religious freedom and liberty but also check Ira­nian influence, which fundamentally undercuts such values. Here, it is important that the United States recognize the diversity of various Shi’ite communities and calibrate policies geared to the unique fea­tures of each one.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at misconceptions about Hamas.  They note, “What concerns Hamas’s leaders is their relevance, their ability to articulate the deep senses of frustration and injustice that most Palestinians feel — and whether their rhetoric will resonate with the public. The current path of the conflict, and its fiery rhetoric, offer Hamas opportunities to present itself as more in line with the times.  Yes, Hamas surrendered its cabinet positions to people appointed by Abbas. And yes, Hamas is taking a beating and its activists are being driven underground. But its credentials as the movement that does not bend and dares to take on Israel are being burnished among much of the audience it cares about.

The American Foreign Policy Council looks at the warming relations between Iran and Turkey.  Noting that this new relationship has many advantages, the report says, “The newfound political warmth may also indicate a larger reorientation taking place in Turkish policy. In the years since the start of the Syrian civil war, the Turkish government’s support for various opposition forces operating on the Syrian battlefield has come at an increasingly high political and economic cost, as Mr. Erdogan’s government has come under intense criticism both at home and abroad for its purported role as a de facto financier of terrorism. A mending of fences with Syria’s most important strategic partner may, therefore, serve as a signal that the Turkish government is beginning to question the benefits of its Syria policy — and starting to slowly amend it.  Since then, other opportunities for synergy have arisen. The current turmoil in Iraq provides another potential point of convergence, given that both countries have a vested interest in defanging the radical Islamic State before it becomes a truly regional threat. At the same time, the two are also grappling with similar policy conundrums stemming from the growing assertiveness of their respective Kurdish minorities.”

The German Marshall fund looks at the Western military interventions in Libya and Mali.  In the light of America’s unwillingness to act, it recommends, “that French and British militaries maintain or recover a standing full-spectrum capabilities forces able to deal with simultaneous engagements. This would mean putting an end to the current model of force development, which is unsustainable over the long term…A solution would be instead to favor the development of a balanced high/low technology mix of forces. This means, on one hand, keeping a sophisticated force that would be able to dominate a short and high intensity confrontation, and on the other hand developing a less sophisticated but significant force capable to confront numerous but less demanding operations.”

The Washington Institute says Turks living in Europe and Kurds could be the key to Erdogan winning the presidency on August 10.  They note, “Erdogan’s electoral strategy envisions strong support among European Turks in the first round of voting, and backing from nationalist Kurds in case of a second round. Together, the Turks in Europe and the Kurds could help Erdogan win the 50% of the vote needed to become president. The Kurdish leg of this strategy could have a number of pitfalls, however. Until recently, Erdogan was not known for embracing Kurdish nationalism, so he could renege on his promises to the Kurds after securing his own victory in August and his party’s victory in next year’s parliamentary elections. For their part, many pro-PKK Kurds do not like Erdogan — socialist and leftist in orientation, they take issue with his social conservatism…For now, though, Kurdish support could greatly facilitate Erdogan’s presidential ambitions and the AKP’s 2015 electoral prospects. And if the party prevails next year, it could open the path for further constitutional amendments that replace Turkey’s parliament-centric system with a presidential system — with Erdogan at the helm.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

 

نتنياهو يستمر بعدوانه ومحاولات كيري لانقاذه تفشل

Israeli aggression on Gaza Continue

The Israeli Army is proving what the Monitor Analysis pointed out last week – that combat operations in urban areas are costly.  As of this writing, 32 to 50 Israeli soldiers have died in the aggression on Gaza.  The recent days of combat were the heaviest in terms of Israeli casualties since 1973.

Although the United Nations, the US, Egypt, and even Russia have offered their help, no truce is being considered at this time.  Resistant leaders announced they were ready to accept a humanitarian truce, but would not agree to a full ceasefire until the terms had been negotiated.

The political situation in Israel also complicates the issue of a truce.  It’s obvious the Israeli leadership has committed to a major war in Gaza and seeks to win it as soon as possible.  However, the heavy casualties being suffered by the IDF is creating a strong desire by many Israelis to stop current operations.

Despite this, US officials are downplaying any hopes of a quick truce or settlement.  US Secretary of State Kerry arrived in Israel on Wednesday to talk with Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders.  He did meet with the UN Secretary General and PA President Abbas.

The reality is that Israel doesn’t want to stop operations if at all possible.  They want the time to destroy the tunnels and track down some of resistance leadership.  Meanwhile Palestinian fighters seem content to bleed the IDF with costly urban warfare.

Heavy Operations Continue

Little is known about Israeli operations, as the Israeli government has tried to keep much of the war secret.  In fact, the major news that has come out has only been released as a result of heavy IDF casualties in certain operations.  For instance, the loss of 18 by the Golani Brigade on Sunday was the main reason for identifying that operation.  However, there are reportedly larger operations taking place.

There appear to be about five brigade sized combat teams operating in Gaza.  In addition to infantry, these combined arms teams include armor and engineering teams to identify and destroy tunnels in the Gaza Strip.

Operations have become more intense this week as the IDF has moved from the more open areas of Gaza and into Gaza City.  This, in turn has slowed the advance as engineering units are forced to destroy more buildings in order to allow the advance of the infantry and tanks.  The IDF is also facing heavier fire from rocket propelled grenades and anti-tank weapons.

As mentioned in last week’s analysis, armored vehicles are easy targets in urban warfare.  This has proven true, especially since the IDF has been using the obsolete American M-113 armored personnel carrier, which was proven to be very vulnerable during the Vietnam War in the 1960s.  The M-113 APC has very light aluminum armor that is only effective against small arms fire and unsuitable for urban warfare.  It was originally designed to be air mobile and is very vulnerable to RPG or anti-tank weapons.

This was proven to be true this last week as 7 IDF soldiers, including two Americans, were killed when they were engaged in street fighting against Palestinian fighters and the vehicle was hit by an anti-tank weapon.  A similar attack in Gaza in 2004 led to the death of 11 Israelis.

The M-113 had been hit in the rear and on the side, which indicates that Hamas fighters are able to surround many of the Israeli units entering the urban areas.

Since the destruction of the M-113, 30 Israeli reservists have refused to ride the M-113 if they have to fight in Gaza.  It was only after that that the IDF ordered all M-113s out of Gaza.  In response to the attack, Sami Turgeman, the commander of the IDF Southern Command, said that the army was aware of the M-113′s faults but did not have the means to provide full protection to every soldier entering Gaza.  Then, in a show of opportunism, the Ministry of Defense immediately asked for more money to buy newer APCs.

This successful attack against the M-113 highlights the fact that the destruction of buildings by IDF engineering teams, Israeli artillery, and Israeli aircraft have actually bogged down the pace of the IDF advance as Palestinians have been able to use the rubble for defensive positions.  The IDF is also finding that the tunnel complex in Gaza is much more extensive and harder to defeat than planned.

“It’s like a metro, an underground” connecting weapons-manufacturing and storage sites to passageways beneath the Israeli border about 2 miles away,” Lt. Col. Lerner told the Wall Street Journal. “I would describe it as a lower Gaza City.” He said the army found openings in Shajaiyeh to 10 tunnel shafts leading to the underground network. The army entered the area with infantry, artillery and armored units, he said, expecting strong resistance.

These tunnels are forcing Israel to reconsider their current anti-tunnel capability.  Britain’s newspaper The Telegraph reports, “the IDF’s elite Talpiot unit has been working on developing a tunnel detection system which was tested in Tel Aviv. Its costs are estimated to be $59 million.  “The high-tech system, which uses special sensors and transmitters, is still in its R&D phase, and if all goes well, should be operational within a year”, notes a report on Israel’s I-24 news.”

“Another Israeli company, Magna, already provides defense systems for the Israel-Egypt border, as well as for the nuclear reactor sites in Japan. It proposes digging a 70-km tunnel along the Israel-Gaza border, equipped with a sensitive alert system.

This “will provide real-time alerts of any tunnel digging that crosses our tunnel, whether above or below it. The IDF will know exactly where the attack tunnel is and how many people are in it, and can monitor the progress of digging it in real time, and decide how to respond to the threat,” the company’s founder and CEO Haim Siboni told Israel’s Globes publication.”

American Reaction

Although pro-Israeli critics have lambasted the Obama Administration for what they perceived as a timid and distant from the Israeli government, there is little evidence to prove it.

Obama’s Federal Aviation Administration was criticized for telling US flagged airlines to stop flying into Tel Aviv’s airport after a rocket had landed nearby.  However, many airlines were already stopping their Tel Aviv flights before the FAA had made their request.

There is another reason why the US government will be reticent to criticize Israel.  Much of what Israel is doing in terms of air operations closely mirror what the Obama Administration is doing in its drone war.  Last Saturday an American drone strike killed 11 people in Pakistan.  Two days before, a drone strike had killed 15.

Ironically, the US follows the same rules that Israel follows but occasionally warned them of using excessive force.  The Pakistanis didn’t pose an immediate threat to the US, civilians weren’t warned, and the US has shown no interest in a truce.  Even worse, the US and Israeli drone war has a reputation of “double tapping” targets – hitting the target twice in order to kill people who rush to aid those injured in the first strike.

This leaves the US in an uncomfortable situation.  Should they attack Israel’s tactics, they leave themselves open to criticism of their own tactics.

The US is also boosting military assistance to Israel.  Israel has requested an additional $225 million in United States funding for the production of Iron Dome components and missiles.   In a letter to the leaders of both houses of Congress on Wednesday, U. S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hegel wrote that the Department of Defense “has reviewed and supports this urgent request.”   This will increase Iron Dome funding by the US to more than half-a-billion dollars this year.

Despite the heavy losses by the IDF, it appears that Israel has enough support in the US to continue the war.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Hamas and the New Round of Fighting in Gaza: Both Sides are Escalating to Nowhere

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 17, 2014

Commentary

The key question in any war – in starting it and throughout the conflict – is how will this war end?  Ever since 1967, the answer in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been by pausing and then resuming in a different form with the same result. In the case of the fighting in Gaza, changes in tactics and technology have simply escalated to nowhere. The best outcome has been an unstable ceasefire. The worst has been violence too low in intensity to be labeled another round of conflict.  The initial cause in 2006, 2012, and now in 2014, has been a new attempt by Hamas to change the strategic facts on the ground – increasingly relying on rockets and missiles rather than irregular warfare in the form of ground or naval attacks on Israel. In each case, Israel’s decisive military edge has left Hamas (and the more extreme Palestinian Islamic Jihad) weaker than before, killed and wounded far more Palestinians than Israelis, prolonged the economic isolation that has crippled Gaza and reduced living standards and social mobility, and failed to have any meaningful political impact that benefited Hamas in making even limited strategic gains.

Read more

 

 

The Shi’ites of the Middle East: An Iranian fifth column?

By Michael Rubinabnd Ahmad K. Majidyar

American Enterprise Institute

July 18, 2014

As sectarian violence rages in Iraq and Syria and simmers across the broader region, the role of the Middle East’s diverse Shi’ite communities has become increasingly important for regional stability.  Growing sectarian divisions present dilemmas to Shi’ite communities, regional Sunni rulers, and the United States, including how to preserve communal security and religious freedom while rebuffing outside forces — be they Sunni or Shi’ite — that might try to destabilize or undercut the independence of Shi‘ite religious communities. Iran’s apparent intervention in the ongoing crisis in Iraq highlights another quandary for American policymakers: how can America rebuff Iranian ambitions to speak on behalf of the diverse array of Shi’ite communities beyond Iran?

Read more

 

 

Five Myths About Hamas

By Nathan J. Brown

Carnegie Endowment

July 18, 2014

Washington Post

When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks about Israel’s ground offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, he says that “without action, the price that we would pay would be much greater.” But predicting how Hamas is likely to act and react requires probing what the organization can do, what it wants, and how it sees itself. From Hamas’s angle, the current fighting offers just as many opportunities as threats. Let’s examine five myths about the militant Islamist organization.

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An Iranian-Turkish Reset
By Ilan Berman

American Foreign Policy Council
July 22, 2014

Washington Times

Earlier this summer, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani paid a very public two-day visit to a surprising locale: Ankara, Turkey. The June trip — the first of its kind in nearly 20 years — represented a significant evolution of the political ties between Iran and Turkey.  In recent times, relations between Ankara and Tehran have been troubled on a number of fronts (from energy to Turkey’s role in NATO’s emerging missile shield). However, no issue has roiled ties between the two countries more than Syria.  Iran, a longtime backer of the Assad regime in Damascus, has aided the Syrian government extensively since the start of the civil war there some 3 years ago. Turkey, meanwhile, has become a key source of political support (not to mention logistics and financial assistance) for the disparate opposition factions now arrayed against Mr. Assad — including extreme Islamist ones. These conflicting positions have deeply affected the health of ties between Tehran and Ankara over the past three-plus years.

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Libya and Mali Operations: Transatlantic Lessons Learned

By Philippe Gros

German Marshall Fund

July 18, 2014

The Libya and Mali engagements were very different in nature and scope, but were bothequally rich in providing insightful lessons on the state of transatlantic and European defense cooperation. The operation in Libya was an implicit support to an insurrection and for regime change, while the objective of the operation in Mali was to liberate part of a country occupied by jihadists and to destroy their capabilities. Operationally speaking, the former was a typical air and naval operation and the latter air-land campaign, moresimilar in nature to the Iraq war in 2003 than to any other recent conflicts.  However, these campaigns did share many characteristics regarding the configuration of Western coalitions, particularly in the Mediterranean and in Africa, with the backdrop of a decisive change in the nature of the transatlantic relationship marked by a relative U.S. fallback. This paper offers an analysis of some of the major lessons of each engagement regarding these partnerships, and draws a few key lessons and perspectives of this new strategic construct.

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The Endgame in Gaza

By Aaron David Miller

Wilson Center

July 22, 2014
Until I heard CNN’s weekend interview with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and watched Bloody Sunday unfold with scores of Palestinian civilian deaths and 13 Israeli soldiers killed, I thought I had the Gaza thing pretty much figured out. It would end — more or less — the way the two previous movies had concluded.  In both 2008-2009 and 2012, Israel degraded Hamas’s high-trajectory weapons; but Hamas survived and restocked its arsenal with weapons of greater range, precision, and lethality. Hamas maintained control over Gaza and even derived a few political benefits in the process. Meanwhile, the people of Gaza continued to suffer — from both Israel’s unrelenting economic blockade and Hamas’s catastrophic mismanagement and fixation with its armed struggle against Israel. With the advent of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government in Cairo, intensified Egyptian pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood also pinched Gazans.

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Turks in Europe and Kurds in Turkey Could Elect Erdogan

By Soner Cagaptay and Ege Cansu Sacikara

Washington Institute

July 23, 2014

PolicyWatch 2291

On August 10, Turks will go to the polls to choose a new president for the first time in the country’s history, an electoral change ushered in by a 2010 constitutional amendment. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the longtime prime minister and leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), is on the ballot, as is Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, joint candidate for the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP).  In the March 30 local government elections, the CHP-MHP bloc and the AKP each received 43% of the vote. This leaves two voter blocs as potential kingmakers in next month’s polls: Kurdish nationalists, whose Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) received 6.5% of the March vote, and Turks residing overseas, who will be allowed to vote abroad for the first time following a 2012 change to the electoral system.

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Operational Wisdom amid Strategic Distress

By Alon Paz and Nadav Pollak

Washington Institute

July 22, 2014

PolicyWatch 2289

The current confrontation between Israel and Hamas could look at first glance like merely another military round between the two sides. However, a number of major differences, especially regarding Hamas’s regional isolation, its decade-long force buildup, and its development of military strategy and tactics, distinguish Israel’s Operation Protective Edge from past operations. Although it might be too early to derive strategic conclusions from the current operation, certain key points can already be noted as lessons for the future. Moreover, as other regional terror organizations seek to learn from this conflict, the task of analyzing Hamas’s actions from day one becomes even more crucial.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984             C: 301 509 4144

Week of July 18th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

Although most of the United States and its think tanks are focused on the problems of illegal immigration on its southern border, there were several pieces on the Middle East – especially the Israeli aggression on Gaza.

The Monitor Analysis looks at the Israeli war on Gaza and its threat to invade Gaza.  We look at the risks of such an aggression and what Israel’s military goals would be should they choose that option.  We conclude that although it is an option, it is highly risky and mediation mainly by Egypt could conclude a negotiated end.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The CSIS looks at the futility of the current fighting in Gaza.  They conclude, “The end result is that the war will not end in any real sense. The outcome of this round of fighting war will leave the strategic realities on the ground more or less where they began, having been seen as necessary by both sides, but having escalated to nowhere. The resulting pause will be a prelude to yet another round of fighting, and more human costs on both sides.  If one compares the cost of this and past rounds of such fighting, it is impossible to see what either side has accomplished. Israel will have to live with continued uncertainty and risk and the inevitable charges that it used excessive force. Yet, when one looks at the cost to Palestinian civilians of Hamas’s actions, it is impossible to respect any aspect of Hamas’s intentions and strategy.”

The Heritage Foundation looks at the war in Gaza.  In warning about radical Islam, they note, “Hamas shares a vision with Baghdadi: a global, zero-sum struggle that will impose a totalitarian Islamic state.  They differ over who should lead such a state and the best way to advance this radical agenda.  But both ruthlessly unleash horrific violence to destroy their enemies and impose their harsh brand of Islam.”

The American Enterprise Institute looks at the issues that must be considered in hammering out a truce between Hama and Israel.  They note, “It’s not going to be easy for Hamas to accept any ceasefire without a perception of concessions from Israel… and if we properly understand this entire Hamas war as more of a political than a military effort, there are few scenarios in which Hamas comes out looking better than it did before the conflict. Many have been killed, hundreds wounded, and Gaza has been hit hard by Israel.”

The Wilson Center also looks at the issues involving truce negotiations.  They note, “An agreement that eventually delivers a return to the status quo — quiet for quiet — is hardly ideal, but it is more real in the world which Israel and Hamas inhabit than a more ambitious peace deal between the two.  How long the clash will last is anyone’s guess, but a deal is preferable to the events of last week. The longer the fight goes on, the greater the chances of some truly horrific incident involving massive civilian casualties. That would make escalation, not a deal, inevitable. And nobody — least of all the people of Gaza — can afford that.”

The Carnegie Endowment says that the Iraqi crisis is about more than religious differences.  They say, “The story, which has seemed to be all about religion and military developments, is actually mostly about politics: access to government revenue and services, a say in decision-making, and a modicum of social justice. True, one side is Sunni and the other Shia, but this is not a theological conflict rooted in the seventh century. ISIS and its allies have triumphed because the Sunni populations of Mosul and Tikrit and Fallujah have welcomed and supported them—not because of ISIS’s disgusting behavior, but in spite of it. The Sunnis in these towns are more afraid of what their government may do to them than of what the Sunni militia might. They have had enough of years of being marginalized while suffering vicious repression, lawlessness, and rampant corruption at the hands of Iraq’s Shia-led government.”

The CSIS looks at the complicated net of fighting in the Middle East and warns that the US can’t run foreign policy under the simple maxim of, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  They note, “We do not face one enemy. We face at least three: Assad, Maliki, and the mix of ISIS/ISIL and other hostile Sunni elements in Syria and Iraq. We also face a significant adversary in Iran, and the risk the growing tensions between the United States and Russia will lead Moscow to play a spoiler function in pushing its new view of the Color Revolution and effort to expand its role outside Europe by supporting Iran and Maliki.  If there is any proverb to be employed under these conditions, it is that “our friends must remain our friends.” Our focus needs to be on Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and key Arab Gulf military powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait – as well as security partners with vital facilities like Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt and Oman.”

The Cato Institute looks at the wide difference in Middle Eastern policy views amongst two of the potential Republican presidential candidates, Rand Paul and Rick Perry.  We can’t afford to “ignore what’s happening in Iraq,” Perry argues, because the Sunni radicals of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria now controlling parts of eastern Syria and western Iraq represent a “profound threat” to the United States. Airstrikes have to be on the table, he argues, charging that Paul’s policy is to do “next to nothing.”

The Hudson Institute calls the “Arab Spring” more of an Islamic awakening.  They note, “The present success of the Islamic State confirms that the Islamic Awakening is not only a crucial reality but a two-fold one. It is a tale of two revivals in mortal combat with each another. Inasmuch as the Sunni and Shiite combatants espouse their own specific theological/political agendas, not all Sunnis and Shiites are on board. But the combatants can’t help but try to bring them in. And it is becoming harder and harder for them to resist. As a result, the Greater Middle East is drawing closer to a still broader and deeper sectarian conflict.”

The Washington Institute looks at the ongoing Iranian nuclear negotiations and the upcoming deadline.  Their take is that the current talks could end with an extension, a breakdown, or a surprise deal — all of which pose difficult challenges for U.S. policy.  In terms of a deal by July 20, they note, “Given the gaps between the parties and the inflexibility — and patience — demonstrated by Iranian authorities, a deal at this stage is unlikely without further significant U.S. concessions. This in turn suggests that any deal produced by July 20 would likely be presented to Congress, allies in the Middle East, and perhaps even other P5+1 states as a fait accompli, with war put forward as the alternative.”

The American Foreign Policy Council looks at the failed war on terrorism financing.  They note, “To be sure, eradicating illicit finance and associated criminal activity completely is impossible. What is not, however, is improving the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence communities to follow the money. This effort, more than perhaps any other, is instrumental to victory in the struggle against contemporary terrorism, for a very simple reason: cutting off illicit finance deprives terrorist organizations of their lifeblood.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Israeli Agression Intensifies

Ground War Cannot Solve Problems

As the Israeli aggression intensifies, Israel has ordered up more reservists, warned Gaza residents to evacuate, and made moves to send Israeli troops into Gaza as an occupation force.

Is there any way to avoid this?  And, if that happens, will Israel find itself bogged down again as it has in the past when it has tried to invade urban areas?  How will the problems caused by an occupation of Gaza impact Israel’s willingness to negotiate?

Currently, there are several attempts being made in the region to craft a truce, the most notable was the truce proposal made by Egypt.  However, although a divided Israeli cabinet accepted the terms of the truce, it was rejected by Palestinian resistance forces.   Hamas said from the outset it would refuse: “quiet for quiet,” i.e. merely stopping hostilities on both sides.  Nor, did it include a clause that Hamas considers essential – international guarantees that Israel will meet its obligations.  In addition, Hamas found out about it from the media, and viewed it as an attempt to humiliate the organization, and to undercut its political power.

Besides the mutual cessation of fire, the proposal called for the opening of border crossings to people and goods, but at some undefined time “when the situation on the ground stabilizes.”

Hamas also sees the Egyptian truce as an attempt by the Palestinian Authority to regain political power in Gaza.  PA President Abbas had approved the truce.  And, after Hamas refused the truce agreement, the Palestinian Authority was reported to propose to Egypt that it open the Rafah border crossing under the supervision of PA security forces, and deploy PA forces along the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt.

Turkey has also tried to step in as it has traditionally had relations with Israel.  Turkey has been attempting to mediate a cease-fire between Palestinian groups and Israel, with Foreign Minister Davutoğlu holding talks with his U.S. and Qatari counterparts, along with Hamas leader Mashaal and PA President Abbas.  They also warned Israel that relations between the two countries couldn’t be improved if the current hostilities continue.

Turkey is seeking a greater involvement by the international community and has criticized the UN for its inaction.  “The United Nations is the number one responsible on this matter. I always ask the U.N: What do you serve for? Why was this U.N. founded? To provide the world peace? If the U.N. can’t fulfill its job, then it should check itself. You look at the U.N. Security Council, everything is between the lips of five countries,” Erdoğan said.

Although there is a strong possibility that Israel and Palestinian resistant can agree to a truce in the next few days, there remains the strong possibility that Israel may invade Gaza.  And, for Israeli leaders, the cost of such an invasion is one that must be considered before launching such an attack.  Gaza his heavily urbanized and history shows that committed defenders can hold out against offensive forces several times larger.  One only has to look at the Battle of Stalingrad in WW II, which broke the back of the German Army to see the results of an offensive war in an urban setting.

Despite the lessons of history, the Israeli cabinet called up an additional 8,000 reservists for a total 56,000 – a major expense and a drag on the Israeli economy.  And, Israel’s Foreign Minister Lieberman promised at a press conference this that Israel, “will go all the way,” a plain threat to invade.  Other Israeli cabinet ministers favor invasion, including Deputy Defense Minister Danon, who was fired on Tuesday after criticizing Netanyahu.
Looking at an Israeli Invasion

Invading Gaza will be a daunting task.  Not only is it costly urban warfare, the Israeli Army has usually focused on highly mechanized forces that exploit technology.  House to house warfare doesn’t allow the exploitation of technology as much.  In addition, the cost of urban warfare is higher causalities and slow progress, both of which make it harder to keep reservists on active duty and away from their jobs in the economy.

Consequently, any such attack will have limited objectives rather than the total occupation of Gaza.

The first objective is to neutralize the rocket launching sites, especially those that threaten Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other heavily populated areas to the north of Gaza.  Since the Palestinian resistance rockets are not accurate, they pose less of a risk to less populated areas and are subjected to the degree of effectiveness of the infamous Israeli Iron Dome missile system.

According to military analysts, this can best be accomplished by invading the northern part of Gaza (specifically Bet Lathia), which has been the major launching area for the rockets.  The calculation is that the further away the rockets are from their targets,, the more inaccurate they will be.  Consequently they assert that, even if the resistance does manage to continue to launch rockets from unoccupied Gaza, they will be less effective.  As a result, Southern Gaza will be generally ignored in a land invasion.

The second objective is to destroy as much of the rocket inventory and rocket manufacturing capability as possible.  According to the IDF, Israel has already destroyed about one third of the resistance rocket inventory of 9,000 rockets.  In addition, many of the long and medium range rockets have already been fired at Israel.  This leaves the destruction of rocket factories as a critical goal of any invasion.

However, unlike rocket launch sites, manufacturing sites can be anywhere in Gaza, which leaves Israel with a corundum: do they risk more by actually launching a larger invasion in order to destroy resistance’ rocket manufacturing capability totally, or do they leave that responsibility to the Israeli Air Force and hope that air attacks will sufficiently neutralize the resistance’ ability to rebuild their inventory?

Israeli security sources have stated that they have destroyed 60% of the resistance rocket manufacturing ability with air attacks.  The source also said that Palestinian rocket production was only 30 rockets a month, which means that without the ability to smuggle any completed rockets into Gaza, the resistance can only produce about 10 rockets a month – a small number to merit a major invasion of southern Gaza.  Any other rocket production facilities in southern Gaza will probably be left to the IAF.

The reason for a probably limited excursion into Gaza by the IDF is the expected high intensity of combat that Israeli commanders will face.

Cities are notorious defensive positions.  Building-to-building combat has historically been slow and costly and attacking Gaza would be no different for the IDF.

One problem is that as the fighting gets hotter and the buildings collapse, they make even better positions for the defenders.  An excellent example can be ascertained from previous Israeli aggressions in Lebanon and Palestine and going back to WW II from the Battle for Monte Casino.  The Italian monastery, overlooking the road to Rome, was bombed by the Allies, which provided excellent defensive positions for the Germans, who were then able to hold off the Allied attacks for several months.

Similar destruction by the IDF in Gaza would give Palestinian resistance the same advantages.

The resistance forces have also had the time to build a complex structure of bunkers and tunnels in the region that will show the IDF and be costly in causalities.  Like the tunnels the Viet Cong used against the Americans in the Vietnam War, these tunnels can be used to hide soldiers, gather intelligence on IDF units, carry out surprise attacks from behind Israeli front lines, and plant explosives.  And, as the Americans learned in Vietnam, clearing out tunnels is slow and costly in lives.

Finally, a land invasion of Gaza forces Israel to fight more on resistance’ terms.  Such an attack can’t rely on the air superiority of the IAF or the famous technological advantages of Iron Dome.  Nor will the overwhelming advantage of Israeli armor be helpful because tanks and armored vehicles are very vulnerable to anti-tank rockets in close house to house combat.  The combat will depend more on small arms, anti-tank rockets and light artillery like mortars, all things that resistance has in quantity.  The close in combat will also deny the IAF the ability to strike the front lines as much.

This leaves the Israeli cabinet with a difficult decision – more war or a truce.  Although the current IDF actions have hurt the Palestinians, Israeli commanders know that launching a ground attack in a highly urbanized area like Gaza poses problems – problems that have a high price that Israel’s political leadership many not want to pay.  That’s one reason why they readily accepted the Egyptian offer.

Israel’s call up of reserves is not a total bluff.  Israel has shown in the past that they have the will to invade Gaza.  However, they know full well that the cost in lives, defense spending, and the economy are high prices.  Israel may make belligerent noises and even carry out limited Special Forces attacks into Gaza, but are leery of committing themselves to a costly major invasion.

Although events are moving quickly – faster than it often takes to write an analysis, the cost of a ground war makes Israel eager to seek a truce that stops the war.  But, since they have the edge in the air and are able to intercept some threatening incoming rockets, they are willing to continue the current state of war for additional but limited time.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Gaza Crisis Illuminates a Grave New World

By James Phillips

Heritage Foundation

July 17, 2014

The eruption of the third Gaza war since 2008 is yet another manifestation of the growing threat posed by Islamist militants within an increasingly unstable Middle East.  In recent years, Al-Qaeda and other Islamist revolutionary groups have made major gains in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen.  They have exploited the chaos of the “Arab Spring” uprisings, which have undermined many authoritarian regimes and created ungoverned territories that they seek to dominate.  Nature may abhor vacuums, but Islamist militants love them.

Read more

 

 

Why the Rand Paul-Rick Perry Feud over Iraq Is Good for U.S. Policy

By Gene Healy

Cato Institute

July 14, 2014

Thou shalt not speak ill of any fellow Republican”—that’s the “11th Commandment” coined by California’s GOP chairman in 1965 and popularized by President Ronald Reagan.  It’s been suspended for the duration, judging by Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul and Texas Gov. Rick Perry’s ongoing dust-up over the future of the GOP’s foreign policy—even while the two combined for an impressive 19 invocations of Saint Ronnie in three dueling op-eds.  In a recent Wall Street Journal oped Paul argued that “America Shouldn’t Choose Sides in Iraq’s Civil War.” On Saturday, Perry entered the lists with a Washington Post piece titled “Why Rand Paul Is Wrong on Iraq” (print edition). In his Politico surrebuttal yesterday, Paul took a swipe at Perry’s trendy new glasses, which apparently “haven’t … allowed him to see [the world] any more clearly.” Zing!

Read More

 

 

Hamas and the New Round of Fighting in Gaza: Both Sides are Escalating to Nowhere

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 17, 2014

Commentary

The key question in any war – in starting it and throughout the conflict – is how will this war end?  Ever since 1967, the answer in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been by pausing and then resuming in a different form with the same result. In the case of the fighting in Gaza, changes in tactics and technology have simply escalated to nowhere. The best outcome has been an unstable ceasefire. The worst has been violence too low in intensity to be labeled another round of conflict.  The initial cause in 2006, 2012, and now in 2014, has been a new attempt by Hamas to change the strategic facts on the ground – increasingly relying on rockets and missiles rather than irregular warfare in the form of ground or naval attacks on Israel. In each case, Israel’s decisive military edge has left Hamas (and the more extreme Palestinian Islamic Jihad) weaker than before, killed and wounded far more Palestinians than Israelis, prolonged the economic isolation that has crippled Gaza and reduced living standards and social mobility, and failed to have any meaningful political impact that benefited Hamas in making even limited strategic gains.

Read more

 

 

Iraq: The Enemy of My Enemy is Not My Friend

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 16, 2014

Commentary

The proverb that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” is not an Arab proverb, it is a Sanskrit proverb that predates the Prophet Muhammad by roughly 1,000 years. It is also a proverb with a dismal history in practice. In case after case, the “enemy of my enemy” has actually proven to have been an enemy at the time or turned into one in the future. The Mongols did not save Europe from the Turks, and the Soviet Union was scarcely an ally after the end of World War II.  ISIS/ISIL and the “Islamic State” are Vital Threats to Our National Security, But, the United States needs to remember this as it considers military action in Iraq and reshaping its military role in Syria. It needs to remember this as it reshapes its security partnerships with proven friends like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. There is no question that the rise of ISIS/ISIL and the creation of an “Islamic State” that overlaps Eastern Syria and much of Western Iraq poses a major security threat in the Middle East.

Read more

 

 

Hamas vs Israel: Truce? No truce. Here’s why

By Danielle Pletka

American Enterprise Institute

July 16, 2014

AEIdeas

The press is reporting that Israel accepted the terms of an Egyptian offered ceasefire on Tuesday morning, and that Hamas rejected it. The terms of the truce required rocket fire to cease at 9 am Israeli time; Hamas launched several dozen rockets over the course of the morning, though fewer than in recent days. Israel did not retaliate for much of the day, clearly in the hope that Hamas would come to its senses and recognize that its actions were doing more to harm the Palestinian people than Israel. The truce terms were just that — truce — with no concessions by either side, though it required border crossing openings into Egypt and other humanitarian gestures. (Note, the borders have only been closed to human traffic and general trade; food and other necessities have continued to flow into Gaza from Israel.) It also contemplated both sides meeting to hammer out an agreement within short order.

Read more

 

 

Iraq Illusions

By Jessica Tuchman Mathews

Carnegie Endowment

July 10, 2014

The story most media accounts tell of the recent burst of violence in Iraq seems clear-cut and straightforward. In reality, what is happening is anything but. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), so the narrative goes, a barbaric, jihadi militia, honed in combat in Syria, has swept aside vastly larger but feckless Iraqi army forces in a seemingly unstoppable tide of conquest across northern and western Iraq, almost to the outskirts of Baghdad. The country, riven by ineluctable sectarian conflict, stands on the brink of civil war. The United States, which left Iraq too soon, now has to act fast, choosing among an array of ugly options, among them renewed military involvement and making common cause with Iran. Alternatives include watching Iraq splinter and the creation of an Islamist caliphate spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq.

Read more

 

 

A Stalled War On Terror Finance

By Avi Jorisch
American Foreign Policy Council
July 15, 2014

The Journal of International Security Affairs

Only two weeks after the attacks of September 11th, President George W. Bush addressed the media in the White House Rose Garden and declared “war” on terrorism financing. “Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations,” he told reporters.[1] “Today, we are asking the world to stop payment.” A few weeks later, the Treasury Department—the agency that would become the weapon of choice of the White House in this new economic conflict—boasted in a press release, “The same talent pool and expertise that brought down Al Capone will now be dedicated to investigating Usama bin Laden and his terrorist network.”  Unfortunately, more than a decade after these pronouncements, it is obvious that the war on terror financing and money laundering has stalled. This is clear even through the lens of the government’s own bottom-line metrics: assets seized and forfeited, successful investigations and prosecutions, and effective sanctions. In fact, the situation has gotten considerably worse of late, as political considerations have progressively displaced or rolled back serious work that has been done to date on draining the financial “swamp” in which terrorists and terror-supporting regimes operate.

Read more

 

 

An Islamic Awakening?

By Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby

Hudson Institute

July 10, 2014

More than three years ago, revolts broke out in several Arab countries against their authoritarian regimes. The revolts were often dubbed variously as either the “Arab Spring” or the “Arab Awakening.” Both phrases anticipated the establishment of democratic regimes in those countries.  But almost immediately the leaders of the radical Shiite regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected this terminology. It was to be sure an awakening but an “Islamic Awakening.” It was an awakening that represented the triumphant culmination of the 20th-century movement known as Islamism, often known as political Islam for its ambition to bring religion into a leading political role in the Muslim world and thereby revive Muslim political fortunes.

Read more

 

 

What it will take to stop the Gaza carnage

By Aaron David Miller and Josh Nason

Wilson Center

July 15, 2014

Want to try for a cease-fire to end the burgeoning conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza?  Mix a cocktail of three ingredients: urgency, the desire of both sides to climb down; an agreement that allows them to do so; and a mediator to bring it all together. Egypt’s latest cease-fire proposal, clearly coordinated with (and accepted by Israel), can’t get us there — at least not yet. Hamas, weak and desperate for a victory, isn’t ready to stand down.

Read more

 

 

Assessing the Three Scenarios for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations

By Michael Singh and Robert Satloff

Washington Institue

July 16, 2014

PolicyWatch 2284

With less than a week remaining until expiration of the six-month negotiating period that began with the signing of the “Joint Plan of Action” (JPOA) in January, significant gaps reportedly remain between Iran and the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany). Foremost among these is the uranium enrichment capacity Iran would be permitted to retain under a deal. Yet gaps also reportedly persist on matters such as inspector access to military sites (as opposed to declared, ostensibly civilian nuclear facilities) and the duration of any constraints to which Tehran is subject.  As a result, an agreement by the July 20 deadline appears unlikely. Yet it is one of the three possible scenarios that could unfold in the coming days — in order of likelihood, these include an extension of the talks, collapse of the talks, and a last-minute deal.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984             C: 301 509 4144

Week of July 11th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

This last week included the American Independence weekend holiday, so the number of papers dropped significantly.  In addition, much of the focus was on the US southern border issue, which is seeing a flood of illegal immigrants.  These tended to drown out events in Gaza, including the typical pro-Israel bias of the media that focused on the Israeli side of the issue and largely ignored the kidnapping and horrendous murder of an Arab Palestinian youth.

Although events in Gaza are moving rapidly, the Monitor Analysis looks at a couple of issues.  The first issue is the lack of interest and reaction by Obama to events in Gaza.  We look at the evolving profile of the Jewish voter, who Obama and the Democrats need to come out in the November elections and see that the American Jewish voter is becoming more conservative and pro-Israel.  This encourages Obama to let Israel continue its attacks in hopes of winning these voters.

The Monitor Analysis also looks at the new technologies on both sides of this conflict.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

The pro-Israel Center for Security Policy sees serious societal problems within Israel that led to the kidnapping and murder of the Arab youth and argues that they must be stamped out if peace is to be achieved.  They conclude, “Israel will have to deal with our Jewish terrorist problem.  The weeds of our society must be uprooted. And we must take action to heal Israeli Arab society…We must build on the actions of the Arab mayors who have begun to stand up to the rioters and actively encourage Israeli Arabs to integrate into Israeli society while enforcing the laws without prejudice against those who incite, condone, facilitate, organize or otherwise abet mob violence and irredentism among Israeli Arab society.  Israel faces a difficult, violent period ahead. But there are certain imperatives of freedom that we cannot shirk.”

The CSIS looks at trying to roll back the gains made by ISIS/IS.  They note, “the U.S. must find some way to limit and roll back ISIS/ISIL without taking sides in Iraq’s broader civil war. It means creating a bridge across Iraq’s increasingly polarized and divided factions while also meeting the challenges to create a more effective and unified national government in Iraq, and try to support and to rebuild Iraqi forces.  At the same time, the U.S. must consider the risks posed by a much broader set of new strategic forces in the Middle East that go far beyond Iraq’s borders and are beginning to involve the U.S. in a new form of competition – or Great Game – with Russia and possibly, China as well.”

The American Enterprise Institute looks at the Iraqi crisis through the eyes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).  They note, “They intend to defeat the Islamic State, of course, and their interests coincide with the U.S. in that regard. But they embrace the sectarian mobilization of the Iraqi Shi’a community as part of a broader regional mobilization that they see tilting the balance of power in their favor and against the U.S. and its allies. Their enthusiastic embrace of regional sectarianism—despite their rhetorical denunciations of it—is even more dangerous for American interests, however, than their overt hostility toward the U.S. It signals IRGC support for a regional sectarian war that will continue to destabilize the Middle East and create fertile recruiting ground not only for their ersatz basijis, but for al Qaeda sympathizers as well. The U.S. cannot support a basiji strategy.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at Egypt and the expansion of authoritarianism in the name of protecting national security and combating terrorism.  They recommend, “Egyptians should not be made to choose between stability, security, and freedom. To move forward, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi could call for a national dialogue on translating the key principles of the constitution into actionable legislative frameworks, programs, and institutions and on addressing current and future challenges, priorities, and opportunities. This dialogue would also consider the policy trade-offs required to address Egypt’s daunting socioeconomic issues, deal with the escalating needs of its vulnerable population, and implement the structural economic reforms that are necessary to place the country on the path of sustainable development.”

The Washington Institute looks at the movie “Red Lines,” which is about the crisis in Syria.  A video of the post movie question and answer session is included.

The CSIS has prepared three related reports that illustrate the current security threats in stabilizing the Afghan security forces; the post-election challenges to Afghan reconstruction; and the challenges facing Afghan governance and the Afghan economy.  These reports all show a rising risk that Transition will fail. They show that the “surge” in Afghanistan did not achieve anything like the positive results that the surge in Iraq achieved before U.S. and allied forces left, and that Afghan security forces still have critical problems in quality and funding. These are problems that Obama largely discounted in his May 27, 2014 speech on Transition in Afghanistan.

The Heritage Foundation looks at countering China’s military moves to deny access to the United States military in case of a crisis in the region.  They conclude, “To counter Chinese plans for A2/AD capabilities, the United States needs to field a comparably holistic approach, incorporating political measures, operational military deployments, as well as technical counters to Chinese military capabilities. Washington has one major advantage over Beijing—almost all of the countries on China’s littoral are U.S. friends and allies. Leveraging these relationships, and in the process underscoring American credibility and commitment, is key.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Israeli Aggression on Gaza and U.S. Acquiescence

Kidnappings, torture and murder, missile strikes, and bombings by American made Israeli aircraft are ripping Gaza apart, but the White House seems unwilling or unable to act.  When most presidents would cancel events and spend more time in Washington in order to influence events and monitor hostilities in the Middle East, Obama has taken off on a trip that will raise money for fellow Democrats who running for reelection.  What’s going on?

Actually, the fact that Obama is raising money for the elections in four months rather than dealing with the Gaza crisis makes his strategy clear – his inaction is political and geared towards helping the Democratic Party in November.  With dismal polls, a weak economy, and a Democratic Senate at risk of going Republican, Obama is focused on politics, not foreign policy – especially Middle Eastern foreign policy.

Obama knows he has lost the American swing vote, which usually votes based on the state of the economy.  That means limiting the damage on Election Day in November depends on getting his Democratic voters to be energized enough to vote.

Since young people, who helped Obama win in 2008 and 2012, are less likely to vote in mid term elections, Obama is trying to craft a coalition of likely voters that will come to the polls and help incumbent Democratic senators at risk of losing.  This is reflected in current White House policy.

In the last week, Obama has criticized the recent Supreme Court Hobby Lobby case that allowed closely held corporations to restrict coverage of abortifacients, in order to boost the turnout of women voters, who tend to vote Democratic.  He has also allowed illegal immigrants to flood the Border States in order to solidify his hold on the Hispanic and progressive pro-immigration voter base.

However, these voting blocs are not as likely to turn out in midterm elections.  That means Obama has to rely more on the one Democratic group that votes regularly in midterm elections – likes the Jewish vote.

American Jews are more politically aware and have the highest percentage of voter turnout of any ethnic group in America.  And, although 2-2.5% of the United States population is Jewish, 94% live in 13 states, which give them more power to help vulnerable Democratic politicians.

Despite attempts by Republicans to crack the Jewish vote, they remain solidly Democratic.  According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, 70% of Jews self-identify as leaning towards or are members of the Democratic Party. That compares with just 49% of the American public overall who at least lean Democratic.  This makes the Jewish vote a critical one for Obama and the Democrats.  In fact, they are critical in battleground states like Ohio, Florida, and Pennsylvania.

But, why should Obama worry about the Jewish vote since they are traditionally Democratic voters and many Jewish voters don’t have a strong interest in American policy towards Israel.  In fact, polls regularly show that American Jewish voters aren’t concerned about Israel because most American Jews are becoming more American and less Jewish.  A Pew survey showed that 71 percent of non-Orthodox Jews intermarries and two-thirds of Jews do not belong to a synagogue.  These are the ones more likely to vote Democratic regularly and who don’t have a strong affinity for Israel.  In fact, 54% of American Jews say American support of the Jewish state is “about right.”

What about the other 46% of American Jews?  These are the Jewish voters that Obama needs in November and there are concerns that not only are they drifting towards the Republican Party, their higher birthrate mean that they are becoming a larger percentage of the American Jewish voting bloc.  And, they are the Jewish voters who are concerned about Obama’s lack of support for Israel.

One of the fastest growing Jewish American groups is Orthodox Jews.  Orthodox Jews, represent 12% of the United States’ Jewish population, but about 75% of Jewish children under 18.  It is this group that tends to make up the majority of Republican Jews.  And, like the rest of Jewish voters, they tend to congregate together in key states.  For instance, in New York City, a major Orthodox Jewish Community, a Jewish voter is 33% more likely to be Republican than Democrat.

A recent survey of Jews in New York City showed that 40% of Jews in the New York area identify as Orthodox, up from 33% a decade ago, and today three in four Jewish children there are Orthodox.  That means that in a generation, the Jewish vote could be more reliably Republican than Democratic

Orthodox Jews are more likely to vote Republican than other Jews because they identify with the party’s more conservative positions on same sex marriage, abortion, church-state separation and other social issues.  In 2012, Orthodox Jews voted 86% Republican compared to 28% among the non-Orthodox. By comparison, 72% of non-Orthodox and 14% of Orthodox Jews voted for Obama.

Orthodox Jews are far more likely to put Israel as a top priority in making choices at the polls.  That’s one of the reasons reason for Obama’s neglect of the Gaza crisis – if he is to continue to rely upon the Jewish vote, he must make concessions to Israel in order to win the growing pro-Israel Jewish vote.

New Technology in war between Palestine and Israel

The events in Gaza are taking a new high tech profile.  From anti missile systems to long range missiles, this war has taken on a different appearance than clashes in the past.

While Hamas and other resistant forces have always had a large arsenal of rockets, they were short range.  However, that has changed.  Today, they have a small quantity of M-302 Chinese designed and Syrian\Iranian produced rockets that can reach deep inside Israel with their 100 mile range.

Although still inaccurate, they carry a 20 kg warhead or more and are designed to strike large targets like cities, military bases, and industrial complexes.  It was the missile that hit Hadera this week.  It was the use of these missiles, which have operational characteristics that lay outside the Iron Dome operational envelope, which forced the IDF to make a prototype David’s Sling/Magic Wand system operational.

Of a larger concern to Israel is the more accurate M-75 rocket.  These have been used to target Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.  The fact that it weighs nearly a ton and is 31 feet long indicates that is probably produced locally and hasn’t been smuggled in.  It has a range of 75 kilometers and a warhead of 100 kilograms. Palestinian resistant forces have claimed that three were fired at the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona.

Despite the improved quality of the Palestinian rockets, they haven’t been able to exact any toll on Israel partially due to their inaccuracy and partially due to Israeli’s Iron Dome anti missile system.  All seven batteries are deployed near Gaza and although they haven’t been able to handle the salvos fired from Gaza, the radar’s ability to calculate the individual rocket’s trajectory and impact point allow the system to only target and intercept those rockets headed towards populated and sensitive areas.

According to Israeli newspapers, Iron Dome only targeted 27% of the 180 missiles fired this week.  Of those interceptors launched, 90% were effective, if it is true, a much better hit ratio than the 84% rate, when they were used in Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

Although the interceptor missiles of the Iron Dome are expensive, their ability to counter  some of the Palestinian rocket salvo has allowed Israel to strike more aggressively in Gaza, knowing that the Palestinians are unable to defend themselves or strike back with effective rocket attacks.

Another interesting facet to the current fighting was the amphibious commando assault against Israel by Palestinian forces. It shows that Palestinians has developed an amphibious capability that will force the IDF to more carefully watch its coastline.

All of this indicates that fighting will continue.  Israel has called up 40,000 reservists and Netanyahu has said that Operation Protective Edge will take time.  Israeli Air Force aircraft have already hit over 550 targets including populated areas, command and control targets and missile launch facilities.  And, the number of reservists called up indicates that extensive ground action inside Gaza can be expected.

This was confirmed, when Netanyahu said, “We have decided to further increase the assault on Hamas and the terrorist organizations in Gaza. The IDF is prepared for all possibilities. Hamas will pay a heavy price for firing at Israel’s citizens…The operation will be expanded and will continue until the firing at our communities stops and quiet is restored.”

President Shimon Peres, whose role is largely ceremonial and is not involved in setting policy, said that he believed a ground offensive “may happen quite soon.”

Meanwhile, don’t expect Obama to take any tangible action that will risk his or the Democrats’ political future.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

The U.S. Needs an Integrated Approach to Counter China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy

By Dean Cheng

Heritage Foundation

July 9, 2014

Backgrounder #2927

As the Chinese military has been comprehensively modernizing its air, naval, and ground forces, it has been incorporating a variety of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems and capabilities. These include not only weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, but also political warfare methods, including legal, public opinion, and psychological warfare techniques. To counter these A2/AD capabilities, the United States needs to adopt a comparably holistic approach, incorporating political measures, operational military deployments, as well as technical counters to Chinese military capabilities. Washington has one major advantage over Beijing—almost all of the countries on China’s littoral are U.S. friends and allies. Leveraging these relationships, and in the process underscoring American credibility and commitment, is key.

Read more

 

 

The New “Great Game” in the Middle East: Looking Beyond the “Islamic State” and Iraq

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 9, 2014

Report

The U.S. has good reason to try to prevent the creation of a violent, extremist Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, to reverse the gains of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)/ ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham), and to help move Iraq back towards a more stable and unified form of government. This may still be possible in spite of a steady drift towards civil war that has now lasted at least three years, and in spite of IS’s gains and Maliki’s failures and intransigence.  Such an effort does mean, however, that the U.S. must find some way to limit and roll back ISIS/ISIL without taking sides in Iraq’s broader civil war. It means creating a bridge across Iraq’s increasingly polarized and divided factions while also meeting the challenges to create a more effective and unified national government in Iraq, and try to support and to rebuild Iraqi forces.

Read more

 

 

Afghanistan and the Growing Risks in Transition

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 8, 2014

Report

As the Vietnam War and recent events in the Iraq War have shown all too clearly, every serious counterinsurgency campaign involves at least three major threats: the enemy, dealing with partners and allies, and dealing with ourselves. A review of the trends in all three areas raises growing questions as together the U.S. and its allies can carry out a successful Transition in Afghanistan.  The Burke Chair has prepared three related reports that illustrate the current security threats in stabilizing the Afghan security forces; the post-election challenges to Afghan reconstruction; and the challenges facing Afghan governance and the Afghan economy.

Read more

 

 

Iraq Through the Eyes of Iran’s IRGC

By Mehrdad Moarefian

American Enterprise Institute

July 7, 2014

The rapid advances in Iraq of the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham; formerly known as al Qaeda in Iraq) have forced the U.S. to confront a complex reality.  Iraqi Security Forces have been unable to stop the advances on their own, but President Obama is extremely reluctant to provide U.S. support.  Some analysts argue that the U.S. should align with Iran against the common al Qaeda enemy, even suggesting that we should combine military efforts.  Iran’s efforts in Iraq are controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), especially Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani.  The feasibility of cooperation with Iran in Iraq depends in part on how the IRGC sees the problem.  This post is the first in a series that will look at the Iraq crisis from the perspective of the IRGC.

Read more

 

 

Choosing Security and Freedom in Egypt

By Maha Yahya

Carnegie Endowment

July 1, 2014

Egyptians, it seems, are being asked once again to exchange their political freedoms for stability and security. However, the expanding clampdown on fundamental rights overlooks the fact that security and stability cannot be attained in the absence of freedom.  Recent Egyptian court rulings have signaled the expansion of authoritarianism in the name of protecting national security and combating terrorism. International and Egyptian rights organizations have condemned the long-term imprisonment of well-known political activists and journalists and the doling out of death penalties en masse. They argue that the judicial proceedings leading up to the sentences were politicized and flawed and that the crackdown is a gross violation of basic freedoms, including the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and due process.

Read more

 

 

Fighting enemies from within and without

By Caroline Glick

Center for Security Policy

July 10, 2014

Sixteen-year-old Muhammad Abu Khdeir was doing his own thing last Tuesday when he was abducted by Jewish terrorists, who slaughtered him. They killed him because he was an Arab, and they are racist murderers.  The police made solving Abu Khdeir’s murder a top priority. In less than a week, they had six suspects in custody. Three confessed to the murder.  There are dark forces at work in Israeli society. They need to be dealt with.  And they will be dealt with harshly.  They will be dealt with harshly because there is no significant sector in Israeli society that supports terrorism.  There is no Jewish tradition that condones or calls for the murder of innocents. In Jewish tradition, the line between protecting society from its enemies and committing murder is long, wide, unmistakable and unmoving.

Read more

 

 

Red Lines: Inside the Battle for Freedom in Syria

By Mouaz Moustafa, Andrew J. Tabler, and Andrea Kalin

Washington Institute

July 9, 2014

Forum

Syria’s declared chemical weapons material has left the country, but Bashar al-Assad’s onslaught continues, and the beleaguered non-Islamist forces are now caught in a multifront fight against both the regime and a new generation of brutal jihadist groups. Red Lines, a gripping documentary from Washington-based Spark Media, follows young activists Razan Shalab al-Sham and Mouaz Moustafa across battlefields, smuggling routes, and foreign capitals, putting a human face on the struggle for Syria’s future that is often lost in debates about “redlines” and acceptable levels of international response. Red Lines was an official selection at the Hot Docs festival in Toronto, where it was among the audience’s top-rated films.

Read more

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Week of July 04th, 2014

Executive Summary

It has been an unusually quiet week for the Washington think tank community as it is a short week because of American Independence Day on July 4th.

Although the American government has proven to be quite stable and resilient, this week saw several cracks in the American system of government as the Supreme Court ruled against Obama on several key cases and polls show a plummeting favorability rating for the president.  In fact, one poll showed that Americans consider Obama to be the worse president in the last 70 years.

The Monitor Analysis looks at these issues in light of the American system of government, its separation of powers, how it evolved in its early years, and the unique role of the people in the American system.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

 

The Institute for the Study of War thinks that IS may be readying itself for the battle of Baghdad.  They note, “ISIS is formidable, but it is also predictable. ISIS has exposed many of the core elements of its strategy, and it is possible to anticipate their next steps. ISW assesses with confidence that ISIS’s urban offensive begun in Mosul has not culminated, and its campaign for Iraq is not over. ISIS’s next urban objective will likely be to clear the Haditha-Ramadi corridor along the Euphrates River in Anbar. ISIS’s ultimate military objective in Iraq is likely to destroy the government in Baghdad.”

The Center of Security Policy argues that the crisis in Iraq isn’t a failure of the American intelligence community, but a policy failure.  The paper says, “There was a wealth of information in the news media over the last year that a sectarian war was brewing in Iraq and ISIS was gaining strength in both Iraq and Syria. I am certain U.S. intelligence agencies provided similar assessments to U.S. officials based on classified information.

The event that should have caused Obama officials to shift their approach to Iraq occurred last December when ISIS seized control of Fallujah and parts of the city of Ramadi. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn issued a public warning about the significance of this development in February when he testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that ISIS “will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria to exhibit its strength in 2014, as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah, and the group’s ability to concurrently maintain multiple safe havens in Syria.”  That sounds to me like a top U.S. intelligence official was doing his job by warning U.S. officials about major global security threats.”

The Hudson Institute looks at what Kurdish independence would mean.  They note, “The problem, however, is in getting to the point where you can draw borders, which has little to do with the right to self-determination, or even material wealth, which the potentially oil-rich Kurdish Regional Government, or KRG, may soon have in abundance. Rather, it’s about geopolitics and the disposition of larger, more powerful states. And at this point it seems that besides Israel, none of the regional and international players involved—above all, Turkey, Iran, and the United States—have any interest in promoting Kurdish statehood.”

The Washington Institute takes a different position and argues that Turkey will want a Kurdish state as a buffer.  They note, “ISIS’ advances in Iraq — including a June 11 attack on the Turkish consulate in Mosul, during which the group took Turkish diplomats and security officials hostage — has added urgency to the drive to improve relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds. It also made Turkey go back on some clear redlines it had previously set for the Kurds; back in 2005, Turkey had threatened military action should they occupy Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq. Kirkuk’s oil reserves would have given the Kurdish regional government independent income (it relies on Baghdad for financial transfers), which would have been a first step toward full sovereignty. But on June 12, when Kurdish forces moved to occupy Kirkuk, Ankara did not utter a word.

It now seems safe to say that if the Iraqi Kurdish regional government declared independence, Ankara would be the first capital to recognize it. In today’s Middle East, in other words, ISIS is a bigger threat to the Turks than Kurdish independence in Iraq.”

The Carnegie Endowment also argues that the European Union must reassess its relationship with Iran.  They note, “The EU should also work more closely with the United States, beyond the well-established cooperation between their negotiating teams. Broader outreach to U.S. policymakers and the American think tank community is necessary given that the EU’s role on the Iran file is generally poorly appreciated by the American public and that Congress plays a crucial part in many decisions regarding U.S. sanctions. In a concerted effort, the EU delegation and member states’ embassies in Washington should work with members of Congress, both before and after the midterm U.S. elections that will take place in the fall of 2014, to secure the necessary U.S. support for sanctions relief if a comprehensive agreement is achieved—or indeed to devise a new common approach to Iran if the talks break down.”

The Carnegie Endowment argues that NATO must reexamine its priorities.  They conclude, “Contrary to intuition, the Ukraine crisis has not provided NATO with a new raison d’être. Quite the opposite: the fact that allies have such widely differing views on whether Russia constitutes a threat could actually pull NATO apart even further. The example of Poland shows the effects of disappointment in the alliance’s cohesion. That country may become even more unwilling to engage in pooling and sharing if it believes it cannot trust NATO to show full solidarity in a conflict. If NATO turns itself into a convenient toolbox for coalitions of the willing, it will not be sustainable as a coherent alliance.  NATO needs to re-create a sense of solidarity among its members, and this will be possible only if all of them regain at least some shared perception of threats. This is the challenge that lies behind the post-Afghanistan narrative. The Ukraine crisis is no solution, but it does have the merit of highlighting what NATO and its members urgently need to do.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Ruptures in the Governing Fabric of America

 

As Americans celebrate their independence from Britain this weekend, the American system of government is showing cracks in it – cracks that were quite evident this last week.  That system, outlined by the US Constitution, creates a limited form of government with checks and balances.  It also recognizes the central power of the people, who not only have a right to vote for their leaders, but also retain the power, according to the original founding document, the Declaration of Independence, to abolish a government they don’t like.

But, it is becoming increasingly clear that many Americans think that the government and president has exceeded its authority and is restricting the freedoms expressly written into the US Constitution?  Polls are reflecting disapproval of their leadership and the institutions of government.  The US Supreme Court, which has the traditional role of interpreting the Constitution, is frequently ruling against the government in key court cases.  And, people are taking to the streets, not to demonstrate, but to physically stop government actions.

All three of these things have happened just in the last week.  A string of newly released polls showed high disapproval percentages for Obama and the other branches of the Government.  They are also showing that the American people are becoming more pessimistic about their freedom and future.  The highest court in the United States ruled in four cases in the last week alone that the Obama administration has exceeded its powers granted under the US Constitution.  And, finally, Americans physically stopped the movement of illegal immigrants by government employees in California on Tuesday.

Is America at the brink?  Can we expect more unrest?

Although it’s very hard to predict, there is a likelihood that America is on the edge of civil unrest.

To better understand these problems, we have to look at how America is governed and how Americans perceive their relationship with the government.

Limited Government – Separated Powers and Shared Sovereignty

Unlike the governments of many other countries, the US government has limited powers and those powers are separated into three different branches of the federal government – the presidency, congress, and the judiciary.  In addition, sovereignty is shared between the federal government, the states, and the people.  However, this isn’t the way the American government began and the United States underwent 15 years of trial and error before settling on the current system of government.

The first government of the United States was the Continental Congress, which was assembled on September 5, 1774.  Its president, and therefore the first president of the United States, was Peyton Randolph.  It was this government that fought the American Revolution and was recognized by France, the Netherlands, and Morocco.  Although it did handle foreign policy and the conduct of the war, it had very few powers.  The problem was that the Continental Congress was an assembly of sovereign states and it could do little unless all the states agreed.

As the war continued, the Continental Congress form of governance was shown to be too weak, so it was replaced by a second form of government formed under the Articles of Confederation, which gave the central government more power, but recognized that the states retained full sovereignty.  The US operated under the Articles of Confederation from 1779 to 1788.

When this central government proved to be too weak, a new Constitution was proposed – the one that the US currently operates under.  However, the states were worried about an all powerful central government, so certain checks were put into the document.  These checks provide the tension that governs the US today.

One new power that was granted in the Constitution was the recognition of the sovereignty of the people.  While the previous forms of government gave sovereign power to the states, the US Constitution stated in its opening words, “We the People of the United States,” a radical and controversial statement giving ultimate power to the citizens.  In fact, well known Founding Father Patrick Henry stated, “What is this “We the People” in the Preamble?  This is a Confederation of states.”  Future president Samuel Adams stated, “I stumble at the threshold. We are a confederation of states.”

Therefore, the United States represents a balance of powers granted to several entities, with the idea, that although not the most efficient government, it is the best one to protect the rights of the people and states.  It also prevents the central government from becoming too powerful.

The balance between the three sovereign powers is as follows:

Federal government – powers granted by the Constitution

President – executes laws, carries out foreign policy, Commander-in-Chief of military

House of Representatives – power of the purse, must initiate budget and tax bills

Senate – Originally represented states, but now an upper chamber that must pass bills

Supreme Court – Interprets the constitution

State Government – powers granted by the Constitution and the 10th and 11th amendments.  The bulk of laws and police enforcement reside here.

People – Power to elect federal, state, and local leaders.  Also powers and rights granted by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights (Amendments 1 – 10). These include freedom of religion, assembly, and speech; right to own weapons; prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in peacetime; privacy against searches; rights of the accused; right to a fair trial and counsel; trial by jury; ban on excessive punishment; and recognition that all other powers not given to the federal government or states reside in the people.

The role of the People in the United States is relatively unique.  In most countries, even democracies, sovereignty resides in the government or in the person of a monarch.  However, the key founding documents of the US, the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution recognize that ultimate sovereignty resides in the People.  In fact, the Declaration of Independence states, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.”

This position was ratified in the 2008 Supreme Court Ruling of the District of Columbia vs. Heller, which held that keeping and bearing arms was an important constitutional right of the people because, “they are better able to resist tyranny.”

That right of the American people to abolish a government and the right to own weapons, “to resist tyranny,” gives it a unique power people in other countries don’t have.  And, the average American is well aware of this power, which is one reason why attempts by the government to control gun ownership in America always fail.

This brings us to the current situation.  The federal government, especially the presidency, has moved rapidly to centralize power.  It has acted without the approval of the Congress, it has tried to assume powers reserved to the states, and it has tried to restrict the freedoms of the People.

And, the people aren’t happy.

Obama Versus the Supreme Court

One tool the state governments and the people have to remedy the overstepping of power by the federal government is the Supreme Court, which has the traditional role of interpreting the Constitution.  And, it has been this court that has dealt some of the most far reaching losses against the Obama Administration, even though Obama has named two of the justices sitting on the court himself.  Since January 2009, the Obama administration has suffered at least 20 unanimous defeats in cases it argued (not counting cases in which it filed an amicus brief), according to Texas Senator Ted Cruz.

“President Obama’s unanimous Supreme Court loss rate, for the five and half years of his presidency, is nearly double that of President Bush and is 25 percent greater than President Clinton,” Cruz notes in a survey of how Obama’s lawyers performed before the high court.

Last week, in a unanimous, 9-0 rebuke, the justices ruled Obama had overstepped his constitutional authority when he went around the US Senate and unilaterally appointed three members to the National Labor Relations Board.  This clearly upheld a US Senate Constitutional right to approve the people nominated to key positions in the US government.

They also ruled 9-0 that the government couldn’t search cell phones without a search warrant.  Although the case dealt with a state law, the Obama Administration had argued for the additional power.  However, the court ruled unanimously that the 4th Amendment of the Constitution protected the people from such abuses.

Several Freedom of Speech rulings went against Obama as the court ruled last week that the government couldn’t force people to join a union and pay dues for political speech that they didn’t agree with.  They also agreed that anti-abortion protesters had a right to speech around abortion clinics.

Freedom of Religion also was defended when the court ruled that private companies can refuse to provide some contraceptives, mandated under Obamacare that the company owners felt were against their religious beliefs.

States have also used the Supreme Court to shift power back to themselves.  The court ruled against Congress and the Department of Justice by declaring some of parts of the Voting Rights Act, which gave the federal government power over some states voting laws, unconstitutional.

The Declining Popularity of Government in America

Although the Supreme Court has acted in its traditional role of determining the role of government and its limitations under the Constitution, the damage to the image of the government and Obama is great.

Currently Obama is suffering from approval ratings lower than any president in recent history.  According to a new poll from Quinnipiac, Americans pick Obama as the worst president in the last 70 years (Ronald Reagan was voted the best).  There is also a considerable amount of buyer’s remorse as voters now say America would be better off if Republican Mitt Romney had won the 2012 presidential election (45 percent to 38 percent).

An Investors Business Daily poll this week gave Obama more bad news.  59% of Americans blame Obama for the current immigration crisis.  56% think his withdrawal of troops from Iraq has caused the current conflict there.  And, 65% think his administration is trying to cover-up wrongdoing in the IRS.

“Mr. Obama finds himself in the uncomfortable position where every age group, independents, and whites all agree that the public has given up on his ability to accomplish anything before the end of his term,” said pollster John Zogby.

This negative perception isn’t limited to Obama.  It has permeated feelings towards government as a whole.  According to a Gallup poll released this week, 79% of Americans think that corruption is widespread in the US government.  That is up 20 points since 2006 and places the US government in the top 30% of nations in terms of perceived corruption.

The poll also showed that only 29% of Americans have great confidence in the presidency, down from 36% at the beginning of the Obama Administration.  Congress’s approval rating is only 7%.  The Supreme Court ranked highest at 30%.

Americans, who have traditionally felt America was the freest country in the world no longer think so.  The same Gallup Poll showed fewer Americans are satisfied with the freedom to choose what they do with their lives compared with seven years ago – dropping 12 percentage points from 91% in 2006 to 79% in 2013. In that same period, the percentage of Americans dissatisfied with the freedom to choose what they do with their lives more than doubled, from 9% to 21%.

Today, countries like Cambodia and Uzbekistan rank higher in freedom (New Zealand and Australia come in first and second).  America comes in 36 out of 150 countries.  The decline in American freedom isn’t as great as that experienced in Egypt according to the poll, but is similar to the loss of freedom in Yemen and Pakistan from 2006 to 2013.

What does this mean for America?

The fact is that America’s society is much more brittle than many think.  A decreasing standard of living, a perception that freedom is declining, a lack of faith in government, and a perception that the US has a corrupt government have seriously hit the underpinnings of American society.

While the Supreme Court has been a relief valve in some cases, there is a growing sense of frustration in Middle America – frustration that is leading to action.  This week about 200 Americans in California physically blocked three buses that were going to drop illegal immigrants off in their town and forced the Border Patrol to reroute them to another destination.  The action was very similar to the incident 10 weeks ago at the Bundy Ranch, where people stopped the BLM from rounding up cattle.  There are also reports of armed private militia units patrolling the border in Texas and Arizona.

Historically in cases where a society becomes brittle and likely to break down, governments that back down usually can restore normalcy.  However, leaders that continue to pursue unpopular policy often face rebellion.  Czar Nicholas II in Russia is an excellent example.

Will Obama step back from the actions that have elicited rebukes from the Supreme Court and plummeting approval ratings from the public?  Possibly not.  Despite dramatic disapproval from the public, Obama has announced he will unilaterally make changes to American immigration law.  He has also promised other unilateral actions that are currently unpopular.  This will only fuel more unrest.

How far can Obama push?  We can’t say.  However, a belief that the current course of action can continue without repercussions to the government and society is likely wrong.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Why Defense Matters: A New Narrative for NATO

By Judy Dempsey

Carnegie Endowment

June 24, 2014

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in search of a new narrative. While Russia’s involvement in Eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea will not give NATO a new sense of solidarity, these events have highlighted what the alliance and its members must urgently do. It is time for all NATO countries to engage in a real strategic debate about why defense matters and what members should do to uphold the transatlantic relationship.  Alliance countries face many threats apart from Russia, including terrorism, cyberattacks, instability south of the Mediterranean and in the Sahel in particular, Iran’s nuclear program, and China’s strategic ambitions. NATO has no strategies to deal with them.

Read more

 

 

EU-Iran Relations: A Strategic Assessment

By Cornelius Adebahr

Carnegie Endowment

June 23, 2014

The EU’s approach to Iran has emerged as one of the few successes of European foreign policy. In particular, the signing of an interim agreement in November 2013 that put limits on Tehran’s nuclear program for the first time marked a historic victory for EU diplomacy. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s top diplomat, continues to lead negotiations with Iran on behalf of the international community and aims to reach a “comprehensive” long-term agreement by late July 2014.   Even so, the EU is not thinking strategically. Despite the EU’s central position in the P5+1 talks, a strategic assessment of its overall approach to Iran reveals that Europe falls short.

Read more

 

 

The Iraq Crisis Is Not a US Intelligence Failure

By Fred Fleitz

Center for Security Policy

July 2, 2014

Stories are being circulated by Obama officials and some former intelligence officers that the Obama administration was caught off guard by the recent offensive in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group because of a failure by U.S. intelligence agencies to provide warning about the ISIS threat.   Some former intelligence officers are blaming this failure on a lack of human intelligence sources in Iraq and an over-reliance on technical intelligence collection.  Congressman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, disagrees. He says the Iraq crisis is a policy and not an intelligence failure.  Rogers says the signs were there about the ISIS threat and the deteriorating situation in Iraq but Obama officials ignored them. He contends that “It was very clear to me years ago that ISIS was pooling up in a dangerous way — building training camps, drawing in jihadists from around the world. We saw all of that happening.”

Read more

 

 

ISIS Battle Plan for Baghdad

By Jessica Lewis

Institute for the Study of War

June 27, 2014

There are indications that ISIS is about to launch into a new offensive in Iraq. ISIS published photos of a military parade through the streets of Mosul on June 24, 2014 showcasing US military equipment, including armored vehicles and towed artillery systems. ISIS reportedly executed another parade in Hawijah on June 26, 2014. These parades may be a demonstration force to reinforce their control of these urban centers. They may also be a prelude to ISIS troop movements, and it is important to anticipate where ISIS may deploy these forces forward. Meanwhile, ISIS also renewed the use of suicide bombers in the vicinity of Baghdad. An ISIS bomber with a suicide vest (SVEST) attacked the Kadhimiya shrine in northern Baghdad on June 26, 2014, one of the four holy sites in Iraq that Iran and Shi’a militias are most concerned to protect. ISIS also incorporated an SVEST into a complex attack in Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, on June 25, 2014 in a zone primarily controlled by the ISF and Shi’a militias on the road from Baghdad to Karbala. These attacks are demonstrations that ISIS has uncommitted forces in the Baghdad Belts that may be brought to bear in new offensives. ISIS’s offensive has not culminated, and the ISIS campaign for Iraq is not over. Rather, as Ramadan approaches, their main offensive is likely imminent.

Read more

 

 

What Kurdish Independence Would Mean

By Lee Smith

Hudson Institute

July 1, 2014

The president of the Kurdish Regional Government Massoud Barzani announced today that he intends to call for a referendum on independence within the next few months. And if the Kurds do elect to break free of the central government in Baghdad, they’ll have at least one regional actor eager to acknowledge them as an independent state—Israel.

“They are a warrior nation, that is politically moderate,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said of the Kurds in a speech Sunday. They are “worthy of statehood,” Netanyahu continued. “We need to support the Kurdish aspiration for independence. They deserve it.”

Read more

 

 

Turkey‘s Kurdish Buffer

By Soner Cagaptay

Washington Institute

July 1, 2014

Foreign Affairs

If anything good comes out of the turmoil in Iraq, it will be improved ties between Turkey and the region’s Kurds. Until recently, they were bitter enemies. Ankara had never been able to stomach the idea of Kurdish self-government — in Iraq or Syria or Turkey — and it had generally refused to give in to Turkish Kurds’ demands for cultural rights. Instead, it preferred to crack down. Meanwhile, the region’s Kurds had never been able to stomach Iraqi, Syrian, or Turkish rule and, taking issue with Ankara’s treatment of Kurds within Turkey’s borders, threw their support behind the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a violent separatist movement in Turkey.  The Syrian civil war and developments in Iraq have started to change all that. These days, from Turkey’s perspective, Kurdish autonomy doesn’t look half bad. The portions of northern Iraq and Syria that are under Kurdish control are stable and peaceful — a perfect bulwark against threats such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)…It is a tall order, but the stars may be aligned in favor of a Turkish-Kurdish axis.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984             C: 301 509 4144

Week of June 27th, 2014

Executive Summary

The eyes of the Washington think tank community remain fixed on Iraq.

In this week’s Monitor Analysis we note that this Saturday is the 100th anniversary of the event that started World War One, the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand.  We note that just as the Balkans was a tinderbox in the early 20th Century, the Middle East is a tinderbox today, where an incident could cause a widespread war.  We look at several situations and how they could become a major conflict.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

 

The CSIS Situational Awareness newsletter talks about the growing strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean.  They conclude, “Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral Jim Stavridis and others have rightly observed that the United States needs a new strategic approach for the Eastern Mediterranean. But before such a strategy can be created, the United States simply needs an updated understanding of the changesunderway across the region. Washington needs to understand how Eastern Mediterranean capitals view their own regional dynamics, and what it is they would want from U.S. influence, let alone how they might be willing to cooperate to reinvigorate a regional security approach. In the year ahead, working across its functional and regional programs, CSIS plans to engage in this deep analysis and understanding of a region that has returned to strategic prominence and peril.”

The Wilson Center looks at American options in Iraq.  They conclude, “For the United States, these political challenges are formidable—and perhaps insuperable—but there’s no real alternative. Washington should beware “quick fixes,” the new International Crisis Group report cautions. “The U.S. can achieve little through air strikes, the insertion of special forces or other light-footprint tactics without, in its counter-insurgency jargon, an effective Iraqi army to ‘clear’; an accepted Iraqi police to ‘hold’; and a legitimate Iraqi political leadership to ‘build.’ ”

The Hudson Institute looks at Russian concerns in Afghanistan.  They note, “Russian leaders have expressed growing anxiety that NATO was withdrawing prematurely from the region, dumping a massive regional security vacuum into Moscow’s unwelcoming arms. Russia still exercises military primacy in Central Asia but is threatened already by religious militants in the North Caucasus and other Russian regions with large Muslim populations. Russian officials expressed dissatisfaction with NATO’s decision to remove most if not all its forces from Afghanistan while the Taliban insurgency remains severe, believing the withdrawal would contribute to terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and instability throughout Central Asia. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov has said that ISAF “has been too hasty about making the final decision to pull out.”

The A-10 aircraft has been used by the US Air Force in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  The American Enterprise Institute disagrees with the Congress’s attempt to keep it operational.  They agree with the US Air Force decision to decommission the A-10 fleet saying, “this fight is really about lack of money and ability to meet the war plans. The Joint Chiefs signed up to the defense strategic guidance, but the president owns it. He has issued clear guidance that the U.S. will not be engaged in major counterinsurgency or nation-building or long-term stabilization operations, period. So long as this remains the official doctrine from on high, then expect the Air Force to stand by the plan to retire the A-10. Eventually Congress will, too.”

The Washington Institute looks at Hezbollah sending forces to Iraq to fight ISIS.  They note that even a small force could be quite decisive and conclude, “The war in Syria requires a great commitment from Hezbollah in terms of personnel and weapons, and significant numbers of its fighters have already lost their lives in helping the Assad regime. Yet given its willingness to answer Iran’s call for help in Syria, the group will probably answer the call to fight in Iraq as well. Nasrallah is already laying the groundwork to justify such involvement by invoking the same hollow excuse of “defending Shiites and Shiite holy places.”  As in the past, Hezbollah’s contribution does not have to include hundreds of fighters, but only a limited number of experienced trainers and special operations “consultants.” This type of contribution would not overstrain the organization, and it could facilitate far-reaching achievements for Iraqi Shiite militias.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at the growing authoritarian nature of the Egyptian government and what it means to the economy.  One of the problems the paper notes is, “The interim military regime seems as desperate as the governments of Mubarak and Morsi before it to keep the old Nasserist constituencies, mainly state employees, as appeased as possible. Most government measures target those working for the state’s civilian and military bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises—a total of around 6 million employees, which is a significant share of the total workforce and the overall population if their families are counted as dependents. These groups also include state security and the two law-enforcement bodies, the military and the police force.”

The German Marshall Fund looks at the potential of liberal pluralism in Middle Eastern governments.  They conclude, “If liberal values are to find a home in the Arab world, Tunisia enjoys the best prospects, as was the consensus at a recent Ditchley Park conference. That country merits considerable time and investment from liberal reformers, while recognizing the regional impact of Tunisia will be limited by its remoteness from the Arab heartland.  For the rest, however, the constructionist model fits well, in a region beset with growing exceptionalism when faced with the evolving global norm. The challenge for policymakers is to establish realistic goals, accepting the seemingly unending reality of Arab states beset with autocratic leaderships and riven societies. To articulate and channel political ambitions and create meaningful civil societies in this environment is no easy task.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

 

What Middle East Hot Spots Could Cause Another World War?

 

Saturday marks the 100th anniversary of the incident that started World War One, the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Sarajevo.  The incident is more than just a historical event because it shows how a small event can cause a world war and turmoil that lasts decades.  This assassination not caused the First World War, it caused the downfall of the Russian czar, which lead to the Communist takeover that precipitated the Cold War.  In addition, it was the post WW I unrest in Germany that led to Hitler’s rise in Germany and the Second World War.

At the time of the assassination, the world was enjoying a period of international peace.  France and Germany, historical enemies, hadn’t fought since 1870.  England, Germany, and Russia were close since their ruling families were closely related.

The death of Franz Ferdinand changed that.  The Balkans were a tinderbox and many major powers were trying to expand their influence there – especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, who was anxious to use the assassination to expand its influence in the Balkans, demanded severe concessions from Serbia, where the assassination took place.  When Serbia refused to agree to one of those demands, Austro-Hungary declared war on them.  This caused a string of declarations of war that soon set the whole world at war.

Russia, as an ally of Serbia declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  Germany then declared war on Russia in order to support Austro-Hungary.  France then declared war to support its ally Russia.  When Germany invaded Belgium in order to attack France, they triggered the declaration of war from Britain.

How does this equate to the situation in the Middle East today?  The assassin, Gavrilo Princip, was a political extremist and Serbian nationalist.  And, today, the region is filled with political and religious extremists that threaten to create an incident that could cause another major conflict.  And, just as the Balkans were a tinderbox before WW I, the Middle East is a tinderbox today with unrest and small scale conflict throughout the region.  It is also a region where several world powers are seeking to expand their influence.

Let’s look at some of the potential scenarios that could cause a wider conflict.

The Strait of Hormuz

Iran lies currently at the intersection of many sources of potential dangers in the Middle East and one of the most likely is a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.  The Strait allows the passage of about 20% of the world’s oil and choking off this waterway could cause a major war.

There are several events that could spark a closure.  One would be a move by the US, Israel, or other Western powers to prevent Iran from fielding a nuclear bomb.  The most likely would be an attack by Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities.  In retaliation, Iran would launch a barrage of ballistic missiles and close the Strait and move additional military assets to the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands.

Such a move would likely spark a move by the US and NATO naval forces to force opening the Strait.  Although Iran couldn’t stop the NATO forces from inflicting serious damages, they might counter such an attack by launching missiles against other targets in the Middle East, like U.S bases and GCC oil fields and Israel.  In the case of an attack on

Israel, a major Israeli retaliation could be expected.  It’s even possible that Israel might even launch nuclear tipped missiles against Iran.

Although Russia and China would be expected to stay out of the conflict initially, it’s possible that Iranian allies like Syria and Hezbollah might then attack Israel with missiles and possible incursion in the Galile occupied area.  Israel would then retaliate, leading to a major war in the Middle East that would range from the Mediterranean to the Strait of Hormuz.

The ramifications would be enormous.  As in WW I, many governments and ruling houses might fall and more radical regimes might take power.  Casualties would be high from the possibility of WMD attacks and the possibility that violence would spread beyond the region is great.

Coup Against one of the GCC Nations

The GCC nations are ruled by hereditary ruling families that aren’t always in tune with the population (Bahrain being a prime example).  And, the history of the last few decades is replete with attempted coups in the Middle East.

The most likely scenario is a military coup against the ruling families in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  The coup leaders would be quickly recognized by Iran, which might quickly move Iranian forces into the country to solidify the new government’s control.

Reaction to the coup and Iranian presence could be quick.  Other GCC nations could attempt to move forces into the country in response to the ruling family’s request for assistance and in order to secure oil facilities.  As with the previous scenario, Western nations might also act in order to guarantee their oil supply.  The result would be a wide spread conventional war in the entire Gulf.

Although the war would probably remain conventional, it could escalate if Iran decides to blockade the Strait of Hormuz in order to stop oil shipments or to stop reinforcement of GCC nations by NATO naval forces.  However, since nuclear armed Israel wouldn’t be involved, the chances of the incident going nuclear are less.

Iraq, Syria, and ISIS

The current events in Iraq are certainly capable of causing a major conflict.  And, unlike the other scenarios, the war could be multi-sided with Kurds, ISIS, Iran (and the Maliki and Assad governments), and extremist forces vying for control of Syria and Iraq.

As it stands, no side has the ability to achieve a total win.  Iran and its allies in Syria and Iraq control the capitals, but not all of the surrounding territory.  ISIS has control of a lot of territory in Iraq and Syria, but its radical version of Islam has caused it to lose support from larger population, which precludes a quick win.  Meanwhile, other militias have more support from outside countries, especially GCC nations, but don’t have the manpower to convert that support into major battlefield victories.  The Kurds are currently satisfied to harass ISIS and consolidate their hold on Kurdistan in hopes of creating an independent Kurdistan as Iraq fractures.

Much depends on ISIS’s moves because they are currently fighting a two front war – in Iraq and Syria.  As it stands, they can’t advance much further in Iraq, so military strategy says, it would be in their best interest to shift their military assets into Syria in order to attempt to defeat the other Syrian militias and the regime.  Then, theoretically after securing Syria, they shift back to Iraq, with a larger force.

The recent bombings of ISIS forces in Iraq by Syria could be a move to preclude this shift.

Since ISIS has captured considerable Iraqi military equipment, they are much more powerful than before and pose a greater threat to other Syrian militias and Arab Syrian Army.  The most likely result of a ISIS shift to fighting in Syria is that the GCC nations, Russia, Turkey, and Iran will provide more support to their allies in Syria, which will only increase the bloodshed.

There is also an additional threat of widespread conventional war if neighboring countries see ISIS threatening them.  For instance, if ISIS moves closer to the Saudi border, it is likely that a call by some Iraqi factions opposing Maliki government” to protect” them might mean Saudi Arabia (or even a joint GCC force) would move into Iraq to protect them and provide a buffer against ISIS advances.  The same could happen with Jordan.

As violence escalates in Syria, Israel could become involved; either in response to attacks against it (as seen in the last few days) or in order to support a militia that would occupy the Golan Heights and act as a buffer between ISIS and Israel.  It would also try to covertly stop ISIS, which would create the interesting position of Israel, the GCC nations and Iran all having the same goal of stopping ISIS.

Kurdistan

Although it appears that Turkey has acquiesced to the creation of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, in the past they have threatened an invasion lest independence fever cross the border and inspire Turkish Kurds to seek independence.

If Kurdistan becomes independent, Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds may seek to join that nation.  Although Syria is less powerful now, both Iran and Turkey have the forces to try to quash such desires for independence.  In such a case, Kurdistan might need to switch sides and sign a truce with ISIS and shift those forces against Turkey and Iran.  This, in turn would give ISIS more forces to move against Baghdad or Damascus, which would further destabilize the region.

Collapse, Coup, or Assassination of Assad

Just like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the assassination of President Assad (a dream of his desperate) opponents could change spark a wide ranging conflict.

Opponents of President Assad still hoping to affect the collapse of the Syrian regime, but such outcome would benefit the militia with the greatest resources – currently ISIS.  In that case, the plans of the outside nations to train and equip other rebel militias would go out the window as ISIS could be expected to take nearly total control of Syria.  Even Israel might move further into Syria to build up a buffer zone, under a friendly, puppet militia as they did in Lebanon.

Elsewhere in the World

As we saw in WW I, events in one part of the world can cascade into other regions.  World War One saw conflicts in Africa, where the Germans were actually winning when the armistice was signed.  In addition, Japan took German colonies in the Pacific and several nations, including the US invaded Siberia in an attempt to stop the Soviet rebels in Russia.

Spreading unrest in the Middle East would allow Russia to push its interests in the Ukraine.  Currently, world attention and NATO deployments in Eastern Europe have forced Putin to rein-in his territorial interest in the Soviet era.  However, if those NATO forces need to deploy to the Middle East, he would have the opportunity to move against the Ukraine and the Baltic nations.

China would also benefit as they have become increasingly active in the South China Sea and have had military confrontations recently with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  Since any hostility in the Middle East would require the movement of American aircraft carriers from the Western Pacific to the Arabian Gulf, it would remove the largest threat to Chinese influence and power.

The same movement of American military assets would also encourage North Korea.

Even events inside America could have an impact on Middle Eastern events.  Obama and his administration are unpopular with American voters and plagued with scandals.  This makes his reactions hard to gage if events occur overseas.  Many presidents who are unpopular try to regain favor with voters with foreign military initiatives,, which may mean that Obama might suddenly take an aggressive stance towards events in the region.

However, Obama has been unwilling to intervene much in the Middle East and polls show Americans are uninterested in sending troops to the region again.  Therefore, Obama might try to regain popularity by steadfastly refusing to move internationally.  This uncertainty only makes the situation more dangerous as world leaders are more likely to misjudge.

And, it is misjudgment that led to WW I.  The Emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire misjudged Serbia’s response to its demand.  Germany misjudged its ally, when it gave unconditional support for Austro-Hungary.  And all the countries misjudged when they thought the war would be over in months instead of 4 years.

Such a misjudgment today could turn a small event in the Middle East into a major war.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

FYSA: For Your Situational Awareness

By Samuel J. Brannen, David Miller, Robert Kim, and Sarah Weiner

Center for Strategic and International Studies

June 24, 2014

Newsletter

The Eastern Mediterranean was once a strategic geography discussed in reverent tones in Washington. It was NATO’s southern flank: a gateway to chokepoints and supply routes,in the crosshairs of the Soviet Union, and ignored at the peril of global stability. The Eastern Mediterranean demanded deep subject matter expertise, drove Pentagon planning, and invited big geopolitical strategy from the Truman Doctrine through the Camp David Accords.  After the Cold War’s end, the United States largely managed crises as they appeared and fostered stability in the region despite waves of instability on its periphery.  This was a successful overall strategy for the region for several decades.  But in recent years, shifting domestic politics, internal violent conflict, and uncooperative governments across the region have challenged an ad hoc and disaggregated approach to advancing U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.  Traditional regional allies such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel are asserting themselves in ways that are increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. NATO has failed to reengage the region. And Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly asserting themselves, exposing the region again to the return dangers of international competition with consequence for transatlantic and global security.

Read more

 

A-10 vs. fighters and bombers

By Mackenzie Eaglen

American Enterprise Institute

June 25, 2014

The Hill

 

It’s a time-honored tradition inside the Beltway to “kick the can” on really hard decisions while making sure immediate “solutions” to defer pain only cost more and create bigger problems later. Congress is set to do it again.  But the jig is up for these cut-off-the-nose-to-spite-the-face answers. Thanks to the defense drawdown underway, the military can no longer avoid political pain for the politicians in charge.  One high profile example of this is the Pentagon proposal to retire the fleet of A-10 Warthog aircraft. Members of Congress are set to pat themselves on the proverbial back for rejecting the president’s proposal once the defense bills are finalized. But the cost of saving the A-10 fleet will be much larger numbers of fighters and bombers that will be on the chopping block instead. If the outcry was loud from the A-10 proposal, just wait until next year’s budget lands with a thud on Capitol Hill.

Read more

 

 

The Economics of Egypt’s Rising Authoritarian Order

By Amr Adly

Carnegie Endowment

June 18, 2014

Egypt’s economy is in crisis as the new military-backed regime seeks to reestablish its authority. Fiscal restructuring and austerity measures are necessary to spur economic recovery, but they may be politically difficult to pass at this time. The new regime, therefore, will have to broaden its base and forge a more inclusive coalition of supporters in order to stabilize Egypt, retain power, and restore economic growth.  Egypt Between Populism and Austerity.  Years of political turmoil following the overthrow of then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 2011 have exacerbated many of the country’s economic problems.  Annual rates of growth have declined and there has been massive capital flight, which has worsened budget, balance of payment, and foreign reserve deficits.

Read more

 

 

Liberal Attitudes and Middle East Realities

By Michael Bell

German Marshall Fund

June 25, 2014

A multitude of issues contribute to the dysfunction of Arab Middle East polities, including traditions of colonialism, authoritarianism, the rentier state, clientalism, corruption, and imagined history. Most importantly Arab politics is dominated by ethno-nationalism and ideological belief systems. There is little tolerance for liberal pluralism. Despite the yearning of many for a meaningful pluralistic governance system, there is at best only modest prospect for successful liberal reform, so much are these traditions part of a deeply ingrown culture. For Western policymakers, “sober realism” must be the watch phrase. The spread of what we call “progressive values” is important but can only be satisfying when seen in the light of what “can be” rather than what we think “should be” done. To ignore this reality risks making matters worse rather than better.

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Moscow’s Afghan Endgame

By Richard Weitz

Hudson Institute

June 25, 2014

Few will have been watching the troubled Afghan presidential elections with greater attention than Russia. Although Moscow has not shown a strong preference for either candidate, and has managed to develop a good working relationship with outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Russian policymakers have been seeing nightmares in Kabul for years. Now the Iraq breakdown, coming after the years of civil strife in Syria, has deepened Russian anxieties about social and economic chaos along its vulnerable southern front at a time when relations with NATO remain strained over Ukraine.

Despite its public complaints, Russians have viewed the Obama administration’s initial surge into Afghanistan and its subsequent military drawdown with unease. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin acquiesced to the U.S. and then NATO interventions in Afghanistan, he did so reluctantly, with a fearful eye on potential threats to Russia’s regional influence.

Read more

 

 

Iraq’s House of Cards: The Primary Mission

By Robin Wright

Wilson Center

June 23, 2014

On Friday, a new report by the International Crisis Group, an independent research and policy institute, bluntly warned of both the political and military challenges in Iraq. Under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the report declared, “Parliament has been rendered toothless, independent state agencies shorn of their powers. Ministries, to an unprecedented extent, have become bastions of nepotism and other forms of corruption; the severely politicized judiciary represents anything but the ‘rule of law,’ with even the Supreme Court doing the government’s bidding.”  This week, as the jihadi juggernaut solidifies its control over almost a third of the country in a Sunni proto-state, a token American team of Special Forces will embed in Iraq to assess and advise Iraq’s disintegrating military. Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry is conferring with regional leaders about ways to prevent a geostrategic prize from imploding into a failed state. He, too, is expected in Baghdad.

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Hezbollah in Iraq: A Little Help Can Go a Long Way

By Matthew Levitt and Nadav Pollak

Washington Institue

June 25, 2014

PolicyWatch 2277

As Sunni militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) captured Mosul two weeks ago and set their sights on Baghdad, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah offered to send fighters to Iraq to help turn the jihadist tide. In Syria, the Lebanese Shiite group’s forces have already deployed in large numbers over the past several years and made all the difference in the Assad regime’s battle for survival. In Iraq, Hezbollah would likely dispatch only small numbers of trainers and special operators. Yet given the group’s past special operations and training activities in Iraq and its close ties with Iran’s elite Qods Force, even a modest deployment would likely have a significant impact.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Week of June 20th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

The most important analysis of the week comes from the Carnegie Endowment, which produced the “Global Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict series,” in which Carnegie experts from all over the world analyze the strategic and geopolitical interests at play in the ongoing civil war.  Hyperlinks to all the articles are found below.

The Monitor Analysis looks at the recent series of missteps and mistakes by Obama and his administration.  We look at the reasons for the policy and political mistakes and conclude part comes from the institutional problem of isolation of the president and some comes from the character flaws of Obama.  The result is major misreading of the American voter by his administration and collapsing favorability ratings.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

 

The Cato Institute argues against American military intervention in Iraq.  They note, “Bombing ISIS on behalf of the Iraqi government may not change the balance of power in Iraq very much. If we again prop up a weak government, we may simply delay the day when Iraq develops a political system that matches its domestic balance of power. That seems likely to be a long, violent process that our participation may only delay.”

The CSIS looks at events in Iraq and their impact on oil markets.  They note that much of the Iraqi oil is out of the war zone, “Last month (May), Iraq produced some 3.4 million barrels per day (mmb/d), at least 75 percent of which came from the Shia-dominated south (Rumaila, West Qurna, Zubair, etc.).  An additional 200-250 mmb/d is reportedly still accessible out of Kirkuk (primarily transported by pipe and truck) to neighboring Turkey, although sabotage and security threats are likely to limit that volume as the earlier pipeline repairs (see above) are unlikely to be undertaken/completed anytime soon.”

The CSIS looks at countries in the region that benefit by the ISIS victories in Iraq.  One of the beneficiaries according to them is Assad.  They explain, “For Bashar al-Assad, ISIS’s spread to Iraq attracts attention to the brutality of his enemies and distracts from his own brutality in Syria. Assad wants the world to see his struggle as one against foreign jihadists without a shred of humanity rather than as a merciless civil war against his own citizenry. On a more tactical level, the opening of the battle space in Iraq draws some jihadists away from Syria and into Iraq, which means the jihadists are killing Iraqis and not Syrian soldiers. It also means even Assad’s enemies are working to target the very people who are targeting him. Overall, ISIS’s Iraq advance is great news for Assad.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at ways to defeat ISIS and its allies.   They note, “Already, fissures are developing over its uncompromising vision and imposition of sharia law. For every Tweet of trash collection, vaccinations, and children’s toy drives, there are corresponding images of mass executions, crucifixions, and beheadings. Add to this is its longstanding policy of extortion… It is vital, therefore, that any response – Iraqi, Iranian, or American – be designed to exploit the divisions and contradictions within the organization and the coalition it has formed. Airstrikes can slow its march but its ultimate dislodging hinges on mitigating the Sunni grievances that have fueled its rise. Such a solution will invariably mean an even greater shift of power from Baghdad to the provinces – and a corresponding rise in hybrid governance marked by tribal, sectarian and “official” authorities working side-by-side.”

The American Foreign Policy Council looks at Obama’s missteps in Syria.  They conclude, “It may now be true that, as Mr. Obama’s supporters contend, there are no good solutions to the Syria conflict. It would also be fair to say that America’s strategic options — and its ability to shape events on the ground — were much greater at the outset of the conflict three years ago. If the White House had acted decisively back then, it could have staved off, or at least mitigated, the humanitarian disaster that Syria has become. That it did not turn into a tragedy for the Syrian people.”

While the focus has been on unrest in Syria and Iraq, the Washington Institute warns that there is unrest in Jordan.  They conclude, “Last month, Western concerns about foreign fighters spiked after an American-born suicide bomber detonated in Syria and a former French jihadi attacked Jewish tourists in Belgium. With the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) now controlling vast tracts of territory in these states, Sunni Islamist militancy in the Middle East has become a central concern for the West and its regional partners. For Jordan, a regime historically targeted by al-Qaeda for its close relations with the United States, the threat is increasingly proximate. Still, the extent of Salafi jihadi inroads in the kingdom will likely remain unknown until the war in Syria ends and these battle-hardened foreign fighters return home. If the problem turns out to be as pervasive as it now seems to be, the first sign may be an uptick in terrorism in Jordan.

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Defending Iraq and Stopping ISIS

What Can America Do?

 

The big question this week is what the US is going to do to stop the relentless advance of ISIS forces on Baghdad?  At this point in time, the answer is very little.  Obama has dispatched about 300 soldiers to provide embassy protection and to help evacuate US citizens.  There are reports that some Special Forces soldiers will arrive to help train the Iraqi Army.  An amphibious ship has entered the Arabian Gulf, with a detachment of Osprey aircraft, which would be ideal for an evacuation.  And, the nuclear aircraft Carrier USS George H. W. Bush has moved into place, also most likely to provide assistance in an evacuation.

Is this all the US can do?  What are the military options available to it?  Before looking further into that, we should look at ISIS strategy.

The ISIS insurgency is following the steps of classical guerilla warfare.  Currently they are in the final stage, where they have evolved from small guerilla units into a major conventional force capable of defeating the Iraqi Army and taking and controlling territory.  The ISIS army in Iraq is estimated to be about 5,000 – small in relation to the Iraqi Army, but fully capable as seen by recent events.

The rapid disintegration of the Iraqi Army last week has slowed down as ISIS forces have been forced to pause in order to consolidate their victories.  Iraqi forces have moved in to plug holes in the defense.  In addition, some sources claimed that the Iranians have sent about 2,000 men from their Quds paramilitary force to protect Baghdad.

It’s looking more likely that ISIS can’t take Baghdad in a conventional battle under current circumstances.  In fact, they were unable to capture the Baiji oil refinery this week despite a major effort by the rebels.

The ISIS is still advancing, but at a slower rate.  They have also started fighting around Baghdad rather than trying to enter the city now.  While ISIS units have moved south toward Baghdad, units also attacked along the highway between Samarra and Baghdad. The towns of Karma, and Falluja, which are to the west of Baghdad, are reportedly under ISIS control.  ISIS and its Sunni militia allies also have an operational presence all around the town, which means that ambushes or probing attacks could be expected from any direction.

This appears to be following the strategy of ISIS’s forerunner, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).   That plan is to avoid a bloody battle in the streets of the capital and wear the defenders down though terrorist attacks.  This plan was discovered after the US found a crude map on the body of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was killed by US forces in Baqubah in June 2006. The “Baghdad belts” map was released by Multinational Forces-Iraq during its offensive to liberate vast areas under al Qaeda/ISI control in 2007 and 2008.  Zarqawi’s plan was to seize control of the outer provinces and Baghdad’s belts, or key areas surrounding the capital. The ISI would then use its bases in the belts to control access to Baghdad and funnel money, weapons, car bombs, and fighters into the city. The ISI also planned to strangle the US helicopter air lanes by deploying man portable anti-aircraft missiles along known routes in the belts areas around Baghdad.

American Options

The key question is the amount of political will to be found in Obama and the White House.  Americans aren’t interested in getting involved in Iraq again and Obama has shown little interest in countering that prevalent view.  However, the stakes are huge and Americans, while not wanting a major involvement in Iraq will be quick to criticize Obama if this causes major problems in the region.

The biggest problem is that ISIS appears to be girding for a major conflict similar to that which took place in 2007 when President Bush sent more US forces into Iraq to quell the ISI insurgency.  More than 130,000 US troops, along with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi security forces were needed to control Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the “triangle of death.” The operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the ISI’s command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.

The problem is that there are no significant American ground forces in Iraq.  And, even in the presence of Obama’s willingness to deploy them, few can arrive in a short time.  A 500 man Marine Force could be quickly landed from American ships in the Gulf and elsewhere, but these numbers would not be enough to protect Baghdad from a major attack, much less push the ISIS back.

The US could also quickly deploy the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions and some of the units could be on the ground within days.  However, these are light infantry units and their heavier equipment would take longer to reach Iraq.  They would also mean creating a major logistics chain to support them.  They would also inevitably require the approval of Congress. As of now Obama ruled out any introduction of US ground combat forces into Iraq.

Such a major military involvement would stop the ISIS for the moment.  However, the deadly insurgency attacks of 2006 – 2007 would quickly return and the US would once again have to decide whether to escalate the operation or pull out.

The second option that would have an impact would be massive air strikes by the US Air Force.  These would not be the surgical strikes of drones, cruise missiles, or F-18s off American aircraft carriers.  This would be B-52, B-1, and B-2 strikes at major ISIS combat formation, headquarters, and supply centers in order to demolish them.  This would also stop the ISIS advance on Baghdad.  However, these conventional attacks are only effective against conventional targets, so this would encourage ISIS to return to insurgency tactics.  This would delay ISIS, but not defeat them.

The US could also carry out more surgical air attacks with fighter aircraft, cruise missiles and drones.  The political cost back home would be less, but so would the military advantage.  Experience has shown in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere that these attacks, while helpful, can’t take the place of an army on the ground that can take and hold territory.  In addition, these attacks would really require some American forces on the ground for air control and target acquisition.  There is also the problem of MANPADS that have been recently acquired by ISIS from Iraqi stores that could be used against the aircraft.

There is a political and regional problem with deploying US air assets without having US forces on the ground because it means the US is relying on Iran to become a major force in stabilizing Iraq.  Secretary of State Kerry said Washington is “open to discussions” with Tehran if the Iranians can help end the violence and restore confidence in the Iraqi government. Asked about possible military cooperation with Iran, Kerry said he would “not rule out anything that would be constructive.”

However, Senator McCain, who ran against Obama in 2008, said that such a move would be a mistake.  McCain said in a statement: “This is the same Iranian regime that has trained and armed the most dangerous Shia militant groups, that has consistently urged Prime Minister Maliki to pursue a narrow sectarian agenda at the expense of national reconciliation, that supplies the rockets that have been fired at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, that has sponsored acts of terrorism throughout the Middle East and the world, and that continues to use Iraq’s territory and airspace to send weapons and fighters to prop up Bashar al-Assad in Syria…”

 

“For all of these reasons, and more, the United States should be seeking to minimize greater Iranian involvement in Iraq right now, not encouraging it. That means rapid, decisive U.S. action to degrade ISIS and halt theiroffensive in Iraq.”

Some critics of Obama are stressing that conducting U.S. airstrikes without deploying American special operators or other ground forces would in effect make the U.S. Air Force a part of Iran’s army.

Some US military experts are suggesting that American air operations could be enhanced by inserting a small number of Special Forces units into Iraq to coordinate air attacks, train Iraqi forces, and carry out covert operations.  However, they are recommending that these forces must be under military command and not under State Department control as current military assets in Iraq are now, and that these forces need a broad charter and wouldn’t be limited to supporting the Iraqi government, but would be used to assist the Kurds, who had very good relations with US Special Forces in the 2003 invasion.  This would force ISIS to divert forces from the Baghdad operation to protect the Kurdish front.  As this report being prepared President Obama announced he is ready to send up to 300 U.S. military advisers to Iraq to assist in training and advising Iraqi forces as the tense situation in the country continues to escalate.

In a statement in the White House briefing room, Obama said the U.S. is prepared to create joint operation centers between the U.S. and Iraq in Baghdad and northern Iraq.

He also said the U.S. is taking steps so that it’s “prepared to take targeted and precise military action if and when we determine the situation on the ground requires it.” He reiterated that he would consult closely with Congress and leaders in Iraq before any decision is made.

Obama said Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to the Middle East and Europe where he will talk about the situation in Iraq.

According to former US intelligence officer :”Both the Syrian and Iraqi fronts would benefit if American air operations would be immediately carried out to target captured American vehicles and armored vehicles that are moving to Syria, this could be done with some Iranian assistance and intelligence”.

The US must also reverse its policy in Syria and counter the rise of ISIS as it grows so powerful that it is capable of establishing an area of control stretching from Baghdad, to the Saudi border to the Mediterranean.  It also means more heavy equipment that can combat the heavy equipment that ISIS has captured in the last week in Iraq.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia are now faced with the potential of ISIS controlled territories on their borders and they will have to deal militarily and diplomatically with that threat as well as changing course of supporting rebels in Syria.  Saudi Arabia will also have to worry about increasing internal security threats that likely to cause unrest in the oil producing provinces of Saudi Arabia.

Although America has several options that are less vigorous than returning to Iraq in force, the long term impact of the ISIS victories are likely to be significant. Without a major investment of arms and men Iraq can’t retake what they have lost to ISIS.

That leaves ISIS with control of a major piece of Iraq, but unlikely to be able to take Baghdad proper, especially since some of its Sunni militia allies have major religious and ideological differences with the radical ISIS.  The makings of a long term stalemate are in place.

This in turn, could lead to more ethnic and religious fighting and less conflict on battle fronts.  There is considerable concern about religious and ethnic fighting on a major scale as Sunni and Shiite forces try to cleanse areas of potentially hostile groups.  ISIS has already carried out religious killings in its occupied territory.

According to the former intelligence officer who worked in Iraq “The Kurds may be in the best position in history to become a separate nation.  Syria and Iraq are too powerless to stop it and recognize that a strong Kurdistan threatens ISIS.  The Turks will oppose an independent Kurdish state, but may have problems stopping it.  Turkey is now the largest foreign investor in Iraqi Kurdistan, and regards the KRG as a reliable partner.  And although Turkey has threatened to invade an independent Kurdistan, it may have changed its mind”.

“The Kurds of Iraq have the right to decide the future of their land, said Huseyin Celik, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling AKP on Friday.  “The Kurds of Iraq can decide for themselves the name and type of the entity they are living in,” Celik said in an interview.  “In case Iraq gets partitioned, the Kurds, like any other nation, will have the right to decide their fate.”  Celik believes that Iraq is already headed towards partition thanks to “Maliki’s sectarian policies.”

The Kurds also have the only military force that isn’t stretched to its limits.  Kurdish Peshmerga forces advanced to take control of territories abandoned by the Iraqi army that were previously claimed by the Kurds – most notably the city of Kirkuk and its surrounding oilfields.

However, the Kurds have not tried to stop the ISIS fighters moving south.  But, Peshmerga forces are close enough to the roads leading south from Mosul to Baghdad to cut the ISIS line of communications and stop the advance on Baghdad if it is to the Kurd’s advantage.

Conclusion

Although the US is forced to be a major player in the region, it appears that Obama is disengaged.  He is unwilling to invest the military force necessary to assist Maliki government in defeating or countering ISIS either in Syria or Iraq.

Since Obama will be unwilling to make the major investment to support a whole and independent Iraq and will probably only invest enough military forces to stabilize the political situation, a de facto divided Iraq is the likely outcome in the short term.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

America: Stay out of Iraq

By Benjamin H. Friedman

Cato Institute

June 13, 2014.

National Interest

President Obama said today he would essentially take the weekend to decide whether to use the U.S. military to help Iraq’s government repel Sunni Islamist rebels—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—who recently took Mosul and swaths of other territory in northern and central Iraq. Obama ruled out using U.S. ground forces, but drone strikes and traditional air support remain on the table. The usual Congressional hawks are outraged that has not happened already.  The major reason using force to defend Iraq’s government is a bad idea is that it always was. Advocates of going into Iraq, like advocates of staying in Iraq in past years, tend to employ sunk costs logic, where the pursuit of a dumb idea before somehow makes it sensible now. Invocations of dead and wounded Americans’ sacrifice give such thinking added resonance but do not make it sensible.

Read more

 

 

Iraq and Global Oil Markets

By Frank A. Verrastro and Sarah O. Ladislaw

Center for Strategic and International Studies

June 18, 2014

How is the recent escalation of violence in Iraq impacting global oil markets?

A1: Last week’s attack on and seizure of Mosul (Iraq’s second largest city) by armed groups affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an extreme jihadist group, represents a major expansion of the group’s previously held control of areas near the Syria/Iraqi border and escalated security concerns within Iraq. Unable to stem the tide of the incursion thus far, the Maliki government asked Parliament to declare a state of emergency and requested assistance from the U.S. military as well. The U.S. Embassy is already evacuating certain employees and sending in additional troops to bolster security at the Embassy.

Read more

 

 

Hoping for Trouble in Iraq

By Jon B. Alterman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

June 17, 2014

Few in the United States take much pleasure in what has happened in Iraq in recent days. Many in the Middle East do. Until Western governments understand Middle Eastern governments’ motivations better, they won’t have much influence on the violence unfolding in Iraq.  At first blush, it would seem obvious that anyone with any pretention of humanity would be appalled at the gains of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL or, by its Arabic acronym, Da‘ish). Before taking over Mosul, Tikrit, and other cities north of Baghdad, the organization proved so extreme and murderous that even al Qaeda sought distance from it. Massacres and beheadings are ISIS’s most common calling cards, but it also performs a large number of amputations and crucifixions, and then brags about them on social media.  How could anyone see their rise in Iraq as good news?

Read more

 

 

To Beat ISIS, Exploit Its Contradictions

By Frederic Wehrey

Carnegie Endowment

June 17, 2014

Back at the height of the U.S. war in Iraq, the late emir of what was then just the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) remarked that “Iraq is the University of Terrorism.” Its curriculum, he believed, was made up of all the combat tactics students would learn there, before graduating to range beyond the borders of Mesopotamia. But the jihadi leader’s pupils seem to have absorbed another lesson from the Iraq War: the necessity of winning popular support and co-opting local sources of authority.  In its lightning sweep across northwestern Iraq, ISI’s successor, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has engaged in a careful strategy of civic administration, social outreach, and coalition building.

Read more

 

 

Chaos In Syria Is Obama’s Own
By Ilan Berman
American Foreign Policy Council
June 16, 2014

It’s hard not to notice that the Obama administration’s foreign policy is on the skids. Increasingly, the critiques leveled at the administration from both left and right share a common theme: that U.S. foreign policy has become characterized by strategic drift, with serious consequences for American interests abroad.  The list of failures is legion, from a lack of leadership on Russia to faulty assumptions about the feasibility of detente with Iran to a rudderless “pivot” toward Asia — but it is Syria that is perhaps President Obama’s greatest foreign-policy failure to date.  Since the start of the civil war there a little more than three years ago, the White House has chosen to pursue a deliberately minimalist strategy. Its principal achievement — a Russian-brokered deal to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons — has yielded only meager results. The Syrian regime has repeatedly missed deadlines for dismantling its chemical stocks, as it attempts to delay its own disarmament. It is also continuing to use chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians alike, confident that America won’t do much in response.

Read more

 

 

Jordan Has a Jihadi Problem Too

By David Schenker

Washington Institute

June 13, 2014

American Interest

The Jordanian city of Maan is boiling. Three hours of bad road south of the capital, Amman, this underdeveloped and economically depressed tribal town of 60,000 has long been a locus of anti-government protest. But lately the natives have been particularly restive. Last June, so many locals were firing automatic weapons at the downtown police station that a decision was made to move the headquarters out of town. More recently, violent clashes between Maanis and the gendarmerie have become so ubiquitous that a tank has been stationed along the highway at city limits.  Endemic unemployment — believed to be more than 30 percent — is a big part of the problem. So is criminality and hair-trigger hostility toward the central government. Worse, the city’s residents are armed to the teeth, and misunderstandings routinely escalate to Hatfield-McCoy proportions. Perhaps most troubling, however, has been the unprecedented growth of the Salafi jihadist movement in Maan.

Read more

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Week of June 13th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

The most important analysis of the week comes from the Carnegie Endowment, which produced the “Global Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict series,” in which Carnegie experts from all over the world analyze the strategic and geopolitical interests at play in the ongoing civil war.  Hyperlinks to all the articles are found below.

The Monitor Analysis looks at the recent series of missteps and mistakes by Obama and his administration.  We look at the reasons for the policy and political mistakes and conclude part comes from the institutional problem of isolation of the president and some comes from the character flaws of Obama.  The result is major misreading of the American voter by his administration and collapsing favorability ratings.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

 

The CSIS looks at the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Some key takeaways from this study include: Grand strategic values must dominate at all times. Must be ruthless, objective and ongoing.  Never embrace or fall in love with the mission. Never let the moment dominate longer-term interests. All wars that do not involve truly vital, if not existential, US strategic interest are optional and can be lost, avoided, or terminated on less than favorable terms. Cost-benefit and risk analysis must be ongoing. The rationale for, and progress of, the war effort must be public and transparent or the US government will start lying to itself at every level. Never bet on the come. Never “sell” or “spin” progress at the tactical, civil, strategic, or grand strategic level. Where possible, make US commitments explicitly conditional.

The Carnegie Endowment looks at the players in Syria.  Although many countries and groups are involved in the war, they conclude, “The highly localized nature of the Syrian conflict suggests that no external actor can fully grasp, let alone control, the intricacy and fluidity of complex dynamics at the grassroots level. But given the Assad regime’s dependence for its survival both on its external allies and their proxies, as well as on the diverse array of local actors it has brought into being since the start of the conflict, it has little hope of regaining meaningful sovereignty. Indeed, no matter who eventually “wins” the war, the scale of destruction, the loss of economic opportunity, and the degree of capital flight Syria has experienced mean that the country will remain completely dependent on external assistance and subject to foreign influence for decades to come.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at the differing interests of the GCC states in Syria.  They conclude, “All told, Gulf policies in Syria will continue to be shaped by the security concerns and unique domestic contexts of the individual Gulf States. Despite some Saudi-led efforts to impart coherence, competition between formal and informal actors and among the Gulf states will contribute to factionalism and radicalism within the Syrian opposition.”

The Carnegie Endowment also looks at Iran, the Syrian regime’s only regional partner.  They note, “While Iranian largesse has helped prevent the collapse of the Assad regime, prolonged conflict in Syria may be difficult for Tehran to sustain financially. Draconian international sanctions have ravaged Iran’s oil production and exports, its economic lifeblood. Absent a comprehensive nuclear deal that reduces economic sanctions and allows Iran to access the global banking system once again, Tehran’s financial support for the Assad regime could be viewed with increasing scrutiny at home by a population chafing under external pressure and internal mismanagement.  Prolonged conflict in Syria will also continue to cause Iran great reputational harm throughout the predominantly Sunni Arab world. Whereas in the past Shia, Persian Iran has been able to transcend ethnic and sectarian divides by appealing to popular Arab outrage against U.S. and Israeli policies, today Iran is increasingly perceived by Sunni Arabs as a nefarious, sectarian actor complicit in the death and displacement of millions of Syrians.”

The Carnegie Endowment also looks at Israel’s perspective on the Syrian civil war.  They conclude, “its primary preoccupation is with preventing, and if need be mitigating, the possible spillover of the Syrian civil war or its consequences into Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. Israel is acutely concerned that one or more parties to the civil war could try to draw Israel in or somehow trick it into getting involved in the conflict. And it is as a result bent on preventing Lebanese soil from becoming a launching platform for aggression (or support for violence) against Israel.  Looking ahead, Israel has to contend with one more worrisome prospect that could materialize in the course of 2014: a nuclear deal with Iran that would bolster Iran’s stature, diminish the sanctions regime against it, and provide it with greater legitimacy and freer hands to meddle in Syrian-Lebanese affairs.”

The Carnegie Endowment also looks at the threats posed to Lebanon by the Syrian conflict.  They note, “The Lebanese economy has been strained by both the demands of these refugees and the broader political tensions associated with the Syrian conflict, which have resulted in decreased investment, trade, and tourism. Particularly in the context of already simmering sectarian tensions, these factors leave the door wide open to the possible recruitment of destitute Syrian refugees into extremist ranks and to social unrest due to the increased unpopularity of the presence of refugees. The unpopularity of refugees has also led Lebanese politicians to distance themselves from the refugee file regardless of which political coalition they belong to, and that means the social, economic, and security implications of the refugee crisis will not be adequately addressed and therefore are likely to escalate.”

The American Enterprise Institute looks at the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq.  They conclude, “When Obama took office, he inherited a largely pacified Iraq where al Qaeda was in retreat.  Today, thanks to Obama, al Qaeda is resurgent in Iraq – taking back cities from which it had been driven by the blood of American soldiers, using Iraq as a base from which to carry out jihad in neighboring Syria.  And that danger may come back to haunt us here at home. As CIA director John Brennan told Congress in March, “We are concerned about the use of Syrian territory by the Al Qaeda organization to recruit individuals and develop the capability to be able not just to carry out attacks inside of Syria, but also to use Syria as a launching pad” for attacks outside of Syria.”

The Washington Institute looks at the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s seizure of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq.  They optimistically note, “The potential silver lining to the crisis is that it could spur Iraqi factions to refocus on national stability. Politicians are currently debating two issues of critical importance: the composition of the next government following April’s parliamentary elections, and the ongoing revenue and oil-licensing disputes between the federal government and the KRG. Regardless of the exact balance of seats in the new parliament, all major ethnosectarian groups are needed to form a government. Moreover, at a time of escalating violence, the Kurds control the only reserve of uncommitted military forces in Iraq, the peshmerga. Yet Baghdad has proven quite troublesome to the KRG in terms of withholding its budget allotment and interfering with its independent oil sales using legal threats.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

The Collapsing American President

 

The last few weeks haven’t been good for Obama.  In fact, 2014 is slated to be the worse of his presidency.  The continuing problems of Syria, Benghazi, Afghanistan, the Ukraine and Iraq, Obamacare, and the IRS were just the foundation of a slew of new problems that hit the White House in the last couple of weeks – a weak foreign policy speech at West Point, new proposed rules on power plant emissions, the Veterans Administration scandal, and the Bergdahl prisoner trade.  No wonder a Reuter’s poll this week showed Obama with a 38% approval rating and a 55% disapproval rating.

The slide is not coming from Republicans or independents, which have already deserted Obama.  The slide in approval is coming from the Democratic base.  The National Journal, a generally pro-Obama publication had an article titled: “’I’ve Had Enough’: When Democrats Quit on Obama – Bergdahl swap is latest last straw for top Democrats frustrated with president’s leadership.”  The theme of the piece was that several top level Democrats have lost faith in Obama.  The article stated, “They respect and admire Obama but believe that his presidency has been damaged by his shortcomings as a leader; his inattention to details of governing; his disengagement from the political process and from the public; his unwillingness to learn on the job; and his failure to surround himself with top-shelf advisers who are willing to challenge their boss as well as their own preconceived notions.”

The result is that the White House has become tone deaf and is lurching from self-induced crisis to self-induced crisis.  The West Point speech was to counter Obama’s perceived weakness in foreign policy, but merely highlighted it even more.  The Bergdahl trade was designed to quiet the VA scandal and show his concern for veterans and those who serve in the military, but it proved unpopular with veterans.  In fact, 68% of veteran or veteran families opposed the deal.  And, to top off the damage done to his popularity from the trade, he didn’t consult Congress as required by law, which caused more political damage, especially amongst Democratic allies in both the Senate and House.  The vast majority (64/30) of Americans believe Congress should have been consulted, including a (67/38) landslide among independents.

So, why Obama and the White House are making so many spectacular failures now?  The answer is complex and is a blend of institutional problems and personality traits of Obama and his closest advisors.

The White House Prison

The insularity of the presidency has grown dramatically in the past 60 years.  President Truman would frequently leave the White House for morning walks without his Secret Service protection.  Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy would frequently travel in open cars to see the people.  That changed with the Kennedy assassination.   The Secret Service became so obsessed with protecting the president that he is now isolated from the people he represents.

The protection for the president (Republican or Democrat) is smothering.  Air and surface traffic is stopped while he is in motion and any group that he is seeing is carefully screened in advance for potential troublemakers or even people with politically opposing ideas.  And, those groups are usually limited to hearing a preplanned speech or, in the case of Oval office visits, are merely there for a few chosen words and a photo opportunity.

The result is that the president rarely sees or hears an average American from the day he becomes president until he leaves office.   His only window to the public is polling, which is frequently less about knowing what Americans think or want, but is tuned for a political outcome.  The problem has grown as more polls are commissioned to produce certain results by carefully wording the questions.

The second institutional problem is the same one that faces most leaders, a staff of sycophants who tell the leader what he wants to hear, not bad news that he probably should hear.  This week, Dana Milbank of the Washington Post noted that this was the problem with the Bergdahl trade.  Commenting on the unanimous view by Obama’s advisors that the trade was the right choice, Milbank wrote, “I don’t doubt these accounts about Obama’s agreeable advisers. Such affirmations of Obama’s instincts are what has worried me about the way Obama has structured his administration in his second term: By surrounding himself with longtime loyalists in the White House and on his national-security team, he has left himself with advisers lacking either the stature or the confidence to tell him when he’s wrong…The danger with such an arrangement is you create a bubble around yourself, and your advisers become susceptible to groupthink.”

Combined with the isolation of the presidency, the choice of agreeable advisors leaves the president unusually reliant on few reliable sources of information about voter views.  In fact, the American president may know more about views in other countries than the views of his own citizens.  The result is that the president is more vulnerable to making political mistakes that he wouldn’t have made if he were more in tune with the electorate.

The Obama Personality

The natural isolation of the presidency is combined with some of Obama’s personality traits to make a dangerous mix.  Obama is something of a loner, who is surrounded by a small coterie of trusted advisers like Valerie Jarrett and is unwilling to expand his political circle, even in the face of evidence that such a move would enhance his own political fortunes and the nation’s.

Everybody else, including members of his Cabinet, have little face time with him except for brief meetings that serve as photo ops. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner both noted that they were shut out of important decisions.

Vanity Fair, in a piece titled “The Lonely Guy,” says Obama lives in a personal and political bubble.  They note, “The latest round of ‘what did the president know and when did he know it’ on the disastrous rollout of Obamacare and the tapping of German chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone raised troubling questions: Were Obama’s aides too afraid to tell him?  Was he too detached to ask?  Or both?”

Again, this means that Obama has limited sources of information on what is happening with average Americans and even fewer people to rely upon for feedback when he is contemplating a decision.  And, that leads to the surprises and frequent backlash that occur when the president makes a decision.

Obama also refuses to accept criticism, which reinforces the tendency of those around him to agree rather than provide useful criticism.  A good example was shown in the campaign book Double Down, where the authors note Obama’s relationship with members of the Congressional Black Caucus is tense because he balks at any hint of criticism from black politicians

Another weakness appears to be a short attention span.  Again, from the National Journal article, “A Democratic House member whose endorsement in 2008 helped lift the Obama candidacy told me in January, “He’s bored and tired of being president, and our party is paying the price.” “Talented guy but no leader,” said a Democratic lobbyist and former member of Congress in March. “If he could govern half as well as he campaigns, he’d be a good-to-great president.””

Unlike most presidents, who work long hours, Obama is not a workaholic.  In fact, he admitted that in an ABC news interview in 2011.  Obama’s workdays are said to end early, often at 4 p.m. He usually has dinner in the family residence with his wife and daughters, then retreats to a private office. One person said he takes a stack of briefing books. Others aren’t sure what he does.

The natural isolation of the White House, Obama’s loner mentality, his short attention span, and lazy work habits have created a long list of problems for this administration.  There has been a loss of confidence among some U.S. allies about the administration’s commitment at a time of escalating tensions thanks to a lazy nature that fails to take foreign policy seriously and a short attention span that fails to follow up after a “pivot.”  Russia is displaying more aggressiveness than anytime since the Cold War and China has provoked many of its neighbors with aggressive actions at sea.

Obama has fallen short also by misreading the US electorate.  The Bergdahl trade and the VA scandal are excellent examples of how he has totally misread American values and opinion.  He is still convinced that Obamacare is popular with Americans because he is too isolated to speak with the majority of Americans who disapprove of it.  Other issues like immigration, environmental policy, regulation, voter identification, a balanced budget, and defense policy are also 180 degrees out of step with what been perceived American views.

The Future

As has been noted in the past, second term presidencies are usually cursed with bad ratings.  However, Obama is suffering more do to a tone deafness that has set him at odds with the American electorate.

Can he recover?  Probably not.

A turn around would require two things, new staff and a new attitude by Obama.  However, Obama has shown distaste for firing members of his administration, even when faced with serious problems – the VA firing is an exception to the rule.  That means that he will continue to live in the self imposed bubble of limited information, a lack of dissent, and access.  In fact, chances are that the circle of confidants will shrink as the attacks against his policies grow.

Nor is it likely that Obama will change his personality traits that have bedeviled his administration.  In fact, some reports are coming out of Washington saying that he is already distracted by his post-presidential life and looking forward to it.

This leaves the Democratic Party with a dilemma.  Like it or not, they are tied to Obama and his policies and the election in 6 months will reflect it.  The House looks secure for the Republicans and the Senate may swing out of Democratic hands in November.

A legislative branch dominated by Republicans will only make life that much more miserable for Obama.  Given his personality, he will likely withdraw that much more into the Presidential bubble and look forward to January 20, 2017.

Although Obama can withdraw, the Democrats can’t.  They will need a visible leader for the run up to the 2016 presidential election.  And, it’s become clear in the last few weeks of presidential missteps that Hillary Clinton is readying herself to fill the role of leader of the Democratic Party.

A withdrawn Obama and a bumbling White House will strengthen her status amongst Democratic faithful.  She can raise money and start supporting candidates for congressional and state offices, which will help her if she decided to run for president.

However, Hillary Clinton has to carry the baggage of her service in the Obama Administration – baggage that may very well sink her.  Although many of the failures in foreign policy came after her term as Secretary of State, she still has to adequately answer questions on Libya, Syria, and Russia.  She will also have to answer for her political support for controversial Obama decisions when she could have resigned in protest.

And, although Hillary has better work habits than Obama, she also suffers from tone deafness that rubs some American wrong.  The most recent example was her comments this week that she and her husband President Bill Clinton were “dead broke,” after leaving the White House, even though she had just signed a $8 million book deal and they were buying a house in New York so  she could run for the Senate.  These could be just as damaging as some of the Obama missteps.

As it stands, the power of the Obama White House is collapsing.  Its missteps are organic and likely to continue unless there is a major shakeup at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.  The Republican Party is preparing to take a more active role in government after the mid-term elections and the Democratic Party is looking for a new leader – a leader that can win in 2016 and erase the failures of the current administration.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Worst Case Wars

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Center for Strategic and International Studies

June 10, 2014

The US needs to learn hard lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan even if it does intend to fight such wars in the future. The Burke Chair is issuing a summary analysis of these lessons that focuses on what the US needs to learn as it shifts towards a strategy centered on strategic partnerships, and where irregular and unconventional war will be a critical element in US security efforts.

Read more

 

 

Al Qaeda takes control of another city in Obama-abandoned Iraq

By Marc Thiessen

American Enterprise Institute

June 10, 2014

Remember Joe Biden’s claim in 2010 that Iraq would go down as “one of the great achievements of [the Obama] administration”?  Back then, Biden boasted “You’re going to see 90,000 American troops come marching home by the end of the summer. You’re going to see a stable government in Iraq that is actually moving toward a representative government.”  Well, the Washington Post updates us on the results this morning:

Insurgents seized control early Tuesday of most of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, including the provincial government headquarters, offering a powerful demonstration of the mounting threat posed by extremists to Iraq’s teetering stability.

Read more

 

 

Syria’s Very Local Regional Conflict

By Yezid Sayigh

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

A few months after Syria’s uprising began in March 2011, it became commonplace to portray the country as the battleground for a proxy contest between regional and international powers. Since then, Syria’s descent into full-fledged civil war has prompted an equally widespread view that any resolution depends wholly on reaching an understanding between those powers. But the highly localized nature of the Syrian conflict means that its evolution and eventual resolution, whether this comes through diplomatic or military means, will elude the control of outsiders.

Read more

 

 

Iran: Syria’s Lone Regional Ally

By Karim Sadjadpour

Carnegie Endowment

June 9, 2014

Few countries in the world stand to lose more from the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria than its lone regional ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite being subjected to onerous economic sanctions over its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s unwavering financial and military support has proven critical to Assad’s continued survival. For Tehran, the Syrian conflict is not simply about who controls Damascus. It is the epicenter of a broader ideological, sectarian, and geopolitical struggle against a diverse array of adversaries, including radical Sunni jihadists, Arab Gulf states, Israel, and the United States.

Read more

 

 

An Israeli Perspective on Syria

By Ariel (Eli) Levite

Carnegie Endowment

June 9, 2014

Israel’s strategy toward the Syrian conflict has been rather opaque, with Israeli officials maintaining an unusually low profile on the issue since the onset of the civil war. Only a handful of authoritative official statements have been made on the issue during this period, and even these have been largely enigmatic on the broader issues concerned, usually confined to a single topic—namely, Syrian strategic arms transfers to Hezbollah. Furthermore, Israel has made no active effort to be part of the Geneva diplomatic process.

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Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict

By Lina Khatib

Carnegie Endowment

June 9, 2014

Lebanon faces complex problems associated with the Syrian conflict. Over 1 million refugees are changing the country’s demographics, straining its social contract, and putting pressure on its economy. The Lebanese government’s lack of a refugee policy and sharp domestic political divisions over intervention in Syria are contributing to security concerns and sectarian tensions in Lebanon. And regional rivalries, namely between Saudi Arabia and Iran, have exacerbated polarization between Lebanese clients.  Lebanon has always been in the shadow of Syria. Following both countries’ independence in the 1940s, Syria did not fully accept Lebanon’s sovereignty—despite its official recognition of the Lebanese state—and since then Damascus has exerted significant influence over Lebanese politics. Syrian oversight was strengthened during the Lebanese civil war, when in 1976 the then Lebanese president, Suleiman Frangieh, invited Syrian troops into his country to act as a “deterrent” force in the struggle between Lebanese and Palestinian factions. Those troops ended up becoming key players in the conflict.

Read more

 

 

Gulf Calculations in the Syrian Conflict

By Frederic Wehrey

Carnegie Endowment

June 9, 2014

The Gulf is far from a monolithic force, and Gulf policies toward Syria are complex, driven by a number of factors ranging from sectarian divides to power politics. Still, there are some clear commonalities and divergences when it comes to the Gulf states’ interests, activities, and prospects in Syria.

Read more

 

 

Turkey’s Uphill Battle in Syria

By Sinan Ülgen

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

Turkey faces the challenge of recalibrating its policy toward Syria given the Assad regime’s resilience and gradual recovery of international legitimacy.

Read more

 

 

The Costs of U.S. Restraint in Syria

By Michele Dunne

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

Washington’s reluctance to take a leadership role in Syria has played a part in increasing the threat to core U.S. interests.

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Russia’s Interests in Syria

By Dmitri Trenin

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

Russia has two broad strategic objectives in the Syrian conflict: challenging U.S. dominance in world affairs and aiding Assad in the fight against Islamist radicals.

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Moving Beyond China’s Confident Rhetoric on Syria

By Paul Haenle

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

China is unusually secure in its policy of nonintervention in the Syrian conflict. But will strong rhetoric and vetoes be enough?

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The European Union’s Concerns About Syria

By Marc Pierini

Carnegie Endowment

June 10, 2014

The Syrian conflict has recently become a major source of concern for Europe, but it could still be overshadowed by an escalation of tensions in Ukraine.

Read more

 

 

Mosul Security Crisis: A Chance to Break Iraq’s Political Logjam

By Michael Knights

Washington Instutute

June 10, 2014

PolicyWatch 2265

Over the past week, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, has seized control of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. ISIS and its antecedents have long maintained a covert presence in the city, including major fundraising via organized crime networks, but the current breakdown has witnessed open terrorist control of the streets to an extent not seen since 2005.  Beginning with powerful probing actions by Sunni militant convoys at the city’s northern and western edges on June 6, the ISIS offensive quickly snowballed. At present, hundreds of militants are openly contesting control with government forces in the predominantly Arab neighborhoods west of the Tigris River. The provincial council and governor have been forced to withdraw from their offices, which were overrun on June 9; they are reportedly sheltering under Kurdish protection in eastern Mosul. ISIS forces are now within the perimeter of the city’s international airport and military air base; worse yet, over 200 U.S.-provided armored vehicles and masses of weaponry have been lost to the group, greatly strengthening its capabilities in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, over 150,000 people have reportedly left the city, and streams of displaced people are visible on outbound roads.

 

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144

Week of June 06th, 2014

Executive Summary

 

Obama’s trip to Europe this week focused the Washington think tank community on NATO and European relations.

This week’s Monitor analysis looks at how NATO is being pushed by US hawks to undergo certain changes to face what is perceived a renewed threat from Russia.  However, the threat is more complex than it was during the Cold War in that many of the newer NATO members in Eastern Europe are militarily less powerful than the older NATO membership, which means they must be strengthened with deployed units from elsewhere.  The analysis looks at what is being contemplated to be done and what is being done currently.

 

Think Tanks Activity Summary

 

The Heritage Foundation also looks at Obama’s trip to Europe and makes some suggestions on countering Russia.  They note, “The President should make clear to Russia that any armed aggression toward a NATO member will immediately cause him to call for NATO to invoke Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty.  The President should emphasize that the survival of NATO depends on the development of increased defense capabilities by European member states, as well as on the willingness of all NATO member states to stand up to Russian efforts to re-establish a sphere of interest in the independent states of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.  President Obama should halt base closings in Europe and pledge a firm commitment to America’s military presence across the Atlantic. It is time for NATO to scrap the 1997 agreement with Russia, which limits the basing of NATO assets in Central and Eastern Europe. This would offer more opportunities for joint military training and demonstrate U.S. commitment to transatlantic security.”

The American Enterprise Institute looks at NATO’s dwindling land forces.  They note, “Today’s allied land forces are smaller, lighter, designed principally to handle a wide range of out-of-area contingencies, and capable of operating in multinational coalitions. Moreover, they have been infused with operational experience from deployments in the Balkans, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But looking forward, the question is whether these forces have become too small and, because of budget constraints, lack the equipment to deploy rapidly and sustain themselves operationally. Combined with the planned cuts to America’s land forces, is NATO on the verge of losing a traditional, key strategic capability-the ability to control both territory and population?”

The Washington Institute looks at Turkey’s commitment to NATO and its recent moves to distance itself from the alliance.  In this new Institute Research Note, author Richard Outzen argues that while it is premature to view this as an epochal event, examining longer-term trends brings greater concern. Turkey’s domestic political sentiment, trade patterns, and geostrategic thinking are undergoing a profound change — and this does portend fundamental shifts in Turkey’s relationship with the West in coming decades. U.S. policymakers should study these trends and work to mitigate possible negative consequences.

The CATO Institute looks at American military spending and argues that other NATO allies are relying too much on American defense spending for their own defense.   They conclude, “We could have revisited our alliances after the end of the Cold war. We could have paid more attention to the culture of dependency we created among our allies. Instead we continued to spend vast sums on the military, discouraging others from developing their capabilities, and removing their will to use their militaries in ways that could have advanced both their and our security. Today, our wealthy allies are little more than wards of Uncle Sam’s unending dole, and they will remain militarily irrelevant so long as we continue along our present path.”

The Carnegie Endowment looks at Assad’s election in Syria.  They argue that Assad will follow the Egyptian pattern and present himself as the alternative to terrorism.  They conclude, “Following the June 3 election, Assad will continue to allow groups like the jihadi group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to operate in order to emphasize that terrorism is a shared interest for Syria and the West. He is likely to increase cooperation on the destruction of chemical weapons to show the international community that he can be trusted. He will in the meantime try to position himself as a reliable international counterterrorism partner.  How the West reacts to the Syrian election sends important signals to Assad. It is crucial for the international community not to repeat the same, ongoing mistake of the Egyptian scenario. So far, condemnation of the Syrian election has not gone far beyond the level of rhetoric. The West needs to act urgently and decisively to break the cycle of hypocrisy that has allowed numerous Arab dictators to continue oppressing their own people by positioning of themselves as Western security allies.”

With the Egyptian presidential election over, the Washington Institute argues that the US must advance its relationship with Egypt.  It concludes, “For the U.S.-Egyptian relationship to truly be “strategic,” Washington must have a sense of its strategy in the region and Egypt’s place in it. Such a strategy should involve strengthening weakened bilateral alliances, emphasizing security cooperation and bolstering allies’ own capabilities, and promoting long-term democratic and economic reform. A successful American policy in Egypt will not careen between these objectives but seek to advance them together — for example, by using a strong alliance as a platform to advocate reform and defend human rights. Yet a sensible policy must also recognize, amid Egypt’s internal turmoil, the limits of American influence in all of these areas by adopting a long-term view and prioritizing broad multilateral support for any policy initiative.”

The Heritage Foundation looks at fighting the terrorism threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  They conclude, “Iraq is a crucial theater in the war against al-Qaeda and a key oil producer whose surging oil exports are increasingly important for the world oil market. The Obama Administration has neglected to adequately address the metastasizing threat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It should work much more closely with the new Iraqi government to combat ISIS and implement a comprehensive national reconciliation strategy to drain away support for the Sunni insurgency and stabilize Iraq.”

The CSIS also looks at the crisis in Iraq.   The problems Iraq faces in 2014 are a legacy of mistakes made during and after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, but increasingly the nation is dealing with the self-inflicted wounds of its leaders who abuse human rights, repress opposing factions, and misuse the Iraqi police and security forces to their own end.  It pessimistically notes, “No outside power can change the situation.”

The Carnegie Endowment argues that maybe the European Union can restart the Israeli/Palestinian peace talks.  They note, “However, from a decade-to-decade perspective, many of the main ideas for settling the conflict were incubated in Europe before they became common diplomatic wisdom. Most notably, the two-state solution that now is touted as the “known solution” was one that U.S. officials found literally unspeakable for many, many years. Not so in Europe. The first time that the European Community, the precursor to the EU, tackled the question was with its 1971 Schumann Document, which proposed the creation of demilitarized zones, the Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, and the internationalization of Jerusalem.”

The RAND Corporation looks at the evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups.  It finds the number of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters increased after 2010, as well as the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida and its affiliates.  Examples include groups operating in Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon, and Syria.  These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, which have started to resurge in North Africa and the Middle East, despite the temptations to shift attention and resources to the strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

NATO – Revision 2.0

 

Probably the biggest news coming out of Obama’s trip to Europe this week was the increased focus on NATO’s defense against Russia. Advocates of such course admit the task isn’t one that can  be solved by a three day visit to Europe. To them it requires the restructuring of NATO from a rapid reaction force that could be used in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, back to a conventional land army that is tasked to defend Europe from the newly rising Russian threat.

Yet, this change isn’t merely a return to the old NATO of the Cold War.  That NATO was comprised of economically powerful nations with large conventional land armies.  And, although there were several countries bordering the Warsaw Pact nations like Greece, Turkey, and Norway, the major emphasis during the Cold War was on protecting West Germany from a massive armored attack across the German Plain.

Today’s NATO faces more challenges.  Not only are there more nations “threatened” by Russia projection of influence and power today, they are considerably more vulnerable than NATO was 25 years ago, when the Soviet Empire collapsed.  The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have no fighter aircraft of their own and can only muster three tanks between them.  Estonia is already spending over 2% of their GDP on defense spending (the NATO goal for member nations) and Latvia and Lithuania are promising to double their spending in order to reach that goal.

The other major European NATO powers are spending more, but are still falling behind.  Only Great Britain and Greece joined Estonia in hitting the two percent benchmark, and Greece reached that goal more as a response to Turkey than Russia.  Poland has been increasing military outlays, in a major arms modernization and spent 1.8 percent last year (that will go up to 1.95 in 2015). France and Turkey fall short. Germany comes in at 1.3 percent. Italy is at 1.2 percent. Overall, NATO hit 1.6 percent last year.

By comparison, America defense spending was 4.1 percent of GDP.

NATO’s Shifting Mission

One reason for the low defense spending by the other NATO allies is the shifting mission of NATO from a conventional military alliance to a post Cold War small, rapid reaction force.  Smaller, more mobile forces didn’t need the level of spending, which pleased NATO countries, which could use the additional money for domestic programs.

Many analysts even saw post Cold War NATO, not as a military alliance, but as an alliance of democracies.  Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote in 2002, “NATO can be usefully re-imagined. Its new role should be to serve as incubator for Russia’s integration into Europe and the West. It is precisely because NATO has turned from a military alliance into a trans-Atlantic club of advanced democracies that it can now safely invite Russia in…NATO is dead. Welcome, Russia, to the new NATO.”

Needless to say, that idea is now dead.  But, it can’t merely return to the old NATO concept with a massive conventional army in Germany.  There are more fronts to cover and several weak allies that must be protected until they develop more powerful militaries.

Obviously the keystone to an eastern NATO defense is Poland.  Poland has the largest military establishment in Eastern Europe and is strongly committed to its defense against Russia.  It has also contributed towards the mission in Afghanistan, which means it has a small core of combat trained troops.  It also has the largest army in Eastern Europe, with about 900 tanks and over 100 combat aircraft.  Although much of the equipment is former Soviet, they are aggressively modernizing with new German Leopard tanks.

US military strategists are looking in to the problem; however they see, with the exception of Turkey, the rest of the front line NATO nations are militarily weak and could be easily invaded by Russia.  That means NATO must not merely rely upon a massive, slow moving conventional military force in one place, but a mobile force capable of quickly deploying to a threatened NATO country and being capable of combating a Russian Army as soon as it enters the theater.

The US has already begun working on this.  In April, approximately 600 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland for training and NATO exercises.  In March the United States increased the Poland Aviation Detachment (AVDET) with additional F-16s.  These F-16s and airmen will act as a tripwire in Poland and improve coordination with the Polish Air Force.  In addition, three C-130J aircraft were deployed to Powidz Air Base, Poland, as part of a regularly scheduled two-week AVDET rotation.

Another need is for NATO to pre-deploy equipment and forces to front line nations that will not only act as a tripwire, but can allow for a rapid mobilization in a crisis.

One such operation is the NATO air operations in the Baltic nations.  In March, the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four F-15Cs already in Lithuania in order to have a quick reaction interceptor aircraft force to protect Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  The U.S. rotation began in January and ended in early May.  Since then, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, and Denmark, have assumed the air policing mission in the Baltic.

Although the threat in Southeast Europe is less, NATO has also increased its presence there.  Canada deployed aircraft to augment NATO air policing in Southeast Europe.  In addition, there is the Black Sea Rotational Forces (BSRF) based out of Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base, Romania, which includes 250 Marines.  There are also 500 U.S. troops and 175 U.S. Marines temporarily based out of MK Air Base.  The Marines are part of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) that is designed to respond to a broad range of military operations in Africa and Europe.

The NATO meeting this week in Brussels saw additional measures to rapidly reinforce NATO nations.  NATO defense ministers agreed to a Readiness Action Plan, which will improve the NATO Response Force’s (NRF) capability, upgrade NATO’s intelligence and awareness, pre-position equipment and supplies in frontline NATO nations, and focus NATO exercises on the threat from Russia.  The United States pledged several thousand service members to the NRF, including a brigade combat team from the 1st Cavalry Division, air-to-air refueling tankers, and escort ships.

NATO ministers also approved Germany’s initiative on “Framework Nations,” which will help boost multinational forces in Eastern Europe.  The NATO Secretary General welcomed the decision by Denmark, Germany and Poland to start work to raise the readiness of Multinational Corps North East in Poland. “This will strengthen our ability to address future threats and challenges in the region. And it is a significant contribution to our collective defense,” he said.

NATO will also have to increase cooperation with non-NATO nations friendly with the West.  NATO Defense Ministers met their Ukrainian counterpart Mykhailo Koval in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. They reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s security and defense reforms. A comprehensive package of measures aimed to increase the capacity and strength of the Ukrainian armed force will be finalized in the coming weeks.

Although NATO doesn’t have the manpower to station large combat units in the frontline NATO nations, they need to step up exercises that rotate more forces through these nations, while increasing cooperation with the militaries of these countries.  To that end, NATO launched a large-scale exercise, STEADFAST JAVELIN 1, in Estonia on May 16.  Around 6,000 troops from Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in the exercise which finished on May 23.  Many participants were already in Estonia taking part in the annual Estonian-led KEVADTORM14 exercise that began on May 5 and was merged into the NATO-led event.

Finally, individual NATO nations will have to reconfigure their militaries to the new reality.  This may mean that armored units that were scheduled for demobilization may remain active.  NATO nations that were anxious to retire main battle tanks too large for operations in places like Afghanistan may keep them active.  It may also mean more emphasis on armor technology than there has been in the past decade. US military industrial complex will get its lion share of course from any future military build up

And modernization by these countries…..

Is This Enough?

Although NATO’s defense forces are considerably smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War 25 years ago, the NATO nations have cobbled together a plan that will refocus NATO on the current threat, while giving the individual nations a chance to modernize their respective defense forces.

 

NATO does have several advantages that help.  First, it has more of a defense in depth that it during the Cold War.  25 years ago, most of Western Europe was within range of the Russian military.  Today, countries like Germany, France, and England are far removed from the potential front lines, which make it harder for Russia to deliver a decisive blow against NATO.

Another advantage according to US military leaders is that NATO’s military – especially the major nations of the UK, France, Germany, and the United States have more technologically advanced militaries than the Russian Army, which still relies on leftover equipment from the Cold War.  They can hit harder and more effectively than Russia can ever hope to.

Ironically, the post Cold War NATO also gives the alliance another advantage they claimed.  The focus on small rapid reaction forces that could carry out combat operations in Afghanistan is critical to countering the Russian threat today.  Since the Eastern NATO frontier is so large, NATO must rely upon the rapid movement of forces from theater to theater during a crisis.  These forces, which contain a large number of combat hardened troops that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be more capable than their numbers suggest.

NATO planners boast also that NATO has a much larger logistics chain – both in its military and its commercial infrastructure.  That means the military units of the US, France, Britain, and Germany can rapidly deploy into Eastern Europe in case of a crisis.

They stress finally, NATO has a much larger economic base than Russia.  Therefore, was the winning edge during the Cold War and, if anything, the advantage is even greater today than it was a quarter century ago.

To the military adventurists ,although Russia remains a threat to Europe, NATO has started to take the threat seriously.  Until several of the newer NATO nations upgrade their conventional combat capabilities, they will have to rely upon the major NATO nations to provide technologically advanced, highly mobile, professional forces to act as a tripwire and counter to Russian military might.  The only question that remains is if European NATO members will be able to sacrifice much needed funds for another illusion of preparing for a new cold war that only benefiting the trans-Atlantic military industrial complex.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

 

President Obama Goes to Europe: Top Five Policy Recommendations

By Nile Gardiner, Theodore R. Bromund, and Luke Coffey

Heritage Foundation

June 4, 2014

Issue Brief #4234

President Obama’s visit to Europe this week will be an important opportunity for the U.S. President to restate America’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership, strengthen the NATO alliance, and shore up European opposition to Russian aggression against Ukraine.  Across the Atlantic, President Obama should also take note of the mounting disillusionment with the European Union, expressed in recent European parliamentary elections, and voice his support for the principles of national sovereignty and self-determination in Europe, as well as economic freedom and free trade.  Below are Heritage’s recommendations for what the President should do and say in his meetings with European leaders and in his public and private statements.

Read more

 

 

To Defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Stronger Counterterrorism Cooperation Needed

By James Phillips

Heritage Foundation

June 3, 2014

Issue Brief #4233

Iraq faces major political, national security, and economic challenges that should be addressed by the new government that emerges from the April 30 elections. Last year, more than 7,800 civilians and 1,050 members of the security forces were killed in political violence and terrorist attacks, making it Iraq’s deadliest year since 2008.  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), formerly known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has staged a bloody comeback and seized large swaths of territory in western Iraq. Its leader has threatened attacks against the U.S. homeland, and it is recruiting foreign fighters in Syria who could carry out this threat. Washington urgently needs to step up cooperation with Iraq to address this mounting threat.

Read more

 

 

Our Freeloading Allies

By Christopher A. Preble

Cato Institute

May 29, 2014

One of the overlooked aspects of President Obama’s speech at West Point yesterday was his call for other countries to step forward, and do more to defend themselves and their interests. He also expected them to contribute “their fair share” in places like Syria.

It might have been overlooked because it was neither new, nor unexpected. Polls consistently show that Americans believe we use our military too frequently, and they are tired of bearing the costs of policing the planet. Meanwhile, the minority who believe that we should be spending more on the military  – 28 percent of Americans, according to a recent Gallup poll – might not feel that same way if they knew how much we spend as compared to the rest of the world, especially our wealthy allies.

Read more

 

 

Iraq in Crisis

By Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 30, 2014

Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war in 2014. The country now faces growing violence, a steady rise in Sunni Islamist extremism, an increasingly authoritarian leader that favors Iraq’s Sunnis, and growing ethnic tension between Arabs and Kurds. The recent Iraqi election offers little promise that it can correct the corruption, the weaknesses in its security forces, and the critical failures in governance, economic development, and leadership. The problems Iraq faces in 2014 are a legacy of mistakes made during and after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, but increasingly the nation is dealing with the self-inflicted wounds of its leaders who abuse human rights, repress opposing factions, and misuse the Iraqi police and security forces to their own end.

Read more

 

 

NATO’s land forces: Losing ground

By Guillaume Lasconjarias

American Enterprise Institute

June 4, 2014

The state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) land forces is something of a paradox. Although the alliance has no equal in terms of its gross domestic product, commands a wealth of human and social capital, and boasts the world’s largest aggregate defense sector, NATO’s land forces in particular have lost ground when it comes to their overall combat capacities.  In member states, the effects of the worldwide economic crisis on defense budgets have been compounded by dwindling public support for the continued commitment of national armed forces to apparently insoluble foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, as the alliance draws down its longest and costliest mission in Afghanistan, now is the time to review the lessons learned from a decade of sustained combat operations and to ensure they are implemented in time for the next major deployment. Overall, the idea is to shift from a “NATO deployed” to a “NATO ready” mode; the challenge, according to US General Philip Breedlove, current supreme allied commander in Europe, is to maintain the operational excellence acquired over the past decade

Read more

 

 

Assad’s Election: A Security Quest

By Lina Khatib

Carnegie Endowment

June 2, 2014

On June 3, 2014, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad looks forward to securing a new seven-year presidential term in a sham election conducted in the shadow of regime violence. A key objective for Assad in his third term is consolidating his “counterterrorism” campaign—in other words, presenting his crackdown on Syrian opposition groups as a fight against jihadism. In doing so, Assad is betting on the eventual support of, or at least coordination with, the international community in this new “war on terror,” which would secure his position in power. Although Western countries have called the June 3 election a “parody,” Assad’s bet is not too far-fetched. The Egyptian case shows why.

Read more

 

 

Can the EU Revive the Cause of Middle East Peace?

By Dimitris Bouris and Nathan J. Brown

Carnegie Endowment

May 29, 2014

Two very strong assumptions have governed much international diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the past decades. The first is that the solution is known, so all that is necessary is strong leadership—and U.S. determination—to arrive at that goal. The second is that European action is not likely to have much independent effect, so Europe can at best only support American efforts. The unhelpfulness of the first assumption is now apparent to all but a few diehards. That makes it an especially important time to demolish what remains of the second assumption. This is not to suggest that Europeans can succeed where Americans have failed. Rather, Europe might be able to have some long-term positive effects in precisely those areas where the United States has decided not to go. This conclusion flows not from unrealistic optimism but from a hard-nosed look at the past.

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Turkey’s Commitment to NATO: Not Yet Grounds for Divorce

By Richard Outzen

Washington Institute

June 2014

Research Notes 19

The history of Turkey’s relations with the United States and NATO has been characterized by stable commitment on security matters and remarkable volatility in political matters. In a time of great political change in Turkey — the end of military tutelage and the ascendance of political Islam over Kemalist secularism — how far from the North Atlantic political consensus can Turkey move without affecting its security role within NATO? The preliminary decision taken by Turkey last year to select the Chinese HQ-9 intercept system for its air defense network caused much speculation in Western capitals about whether this development marked a definitive change in Turkey’s strategic identity.

Read more

 

 

Egypt After the Election: Advancing the Strategic Relationship

By Michael Singh

Washington Institute

May 30, 2014

PolicyWatch 2259

Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s apparent victory in Egypt’s presidential election this week marks the beginning of a new chapter for his country, though not necessarily the end of its political and economic turmoil. The past three years have not only left Egypt gripped by domestic troubles and economic malaise, they have also resulted in further deterioration of bilateral relations. Cairo has looked inward, immune to advice or influence, while Washington has looked on in bewilderment. Although American officials continue to describe relations with Egypt as “strategic,” they have in fact become transactional, with one side trading its immediate needs for the other’s: the United States needs a stable and cooperative Israeli-Egyptian relationship and preferential access to the Suez Canal, while Egypt needs military hardware and international recognition. Paradoxically, Egypt has had the upper hand in the relationship despite its troubles, mainly because it believes it can turn to others to meet its needs in the short run — Russia for military equipment, the Persian Gulf states for aid, and the international community for validation. Washington, in contrast, has no geopolitical substitute for Egypt.

Read more

 

 

A Persistent Threat The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists

By Seth G. Jones

RAND

June 2014

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Based on an analysis of thousands of primary source documents, the report concludes that there has been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years. The author uses this analysis to build a framework for addressing the varying levels of threat in different countries, from engagement in high-threat, low government capacity countries; to forward partnering in medium-threat, limited government capacity environments; to offshore balancing in countries with low levels of threat and sufficient government capacity to counter Salafi-jihadist groups.

Read more

 

 

 

 

Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor

 

www.thinktankmonitor.org

C: 202 536 8984  C: 301 509 4144